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INTRODUCTION
As you consider these words, someone, somewhere, is railing
against politicians. "All they care about is getting re-elected."
"They're all on the take." "They never solve any problems; they only
make them worse." "All they do is vote themselves pay raises." These
are common populist refrains. Indeed, common enough that com-
plaining about politicians takes on the comfortable ritualism of a na-
tional pastime.
Yet, if past elections prove anything, voters are quite pleased with
their politician. While politicians generally are regarded beneath used
car dealers and, naturally, lawyers, incumbents are returned to office
at a startling rate. The public seems to say, "Politicians are all no
good. Except, of course, for my local representative." And, nowhere
is this electoral schizophrenia more evident than in elections for the
United States House of Representatives. In the 1998 elections, the
House's approval rating was forty-one percent,1 yet voters returned
ninety-eight percent of the incumbents who sought re-election.2
Practically speaking, why do voters see a specific politician as
"their" representative? With the United States House of Representa-
tives, the answer is straightforward. The House is elected by single-
member districts: each state is divided into as many districts as there
are representatives, and each district elects one representative. Thus,
1 The rating is from a Gallup Organization poll taken from November 13 to 15,
1998. See Gallup News Service, Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way Congress is Han.
dling its Job?, at http://iw".gallup.com/poll/trends/pjobapp-cong.asp (last visited
Oct. 6, 2000). The poll asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress Is
handling its job?" Id. In addition to the 41% who responded "approve," 54% re-
sponded "disapprove" and 5% responded "no opinion." Id.
2 Karen Foerstel, Voters' Plea for Moderation Unlikely to be Heralded, 56 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2980, 2980 (1998) (reporting that 401 House incumbents were re-elected
while only seven were defeated).
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voters in each district can readily identify a single person as "their"
representative.
This system is neither inevitable nor our uniform political tradi-
tion. The Constitution does not require election of the House by sin-
gle-member districts. Rather, it simply grants States the power to run
federal elections and reserves to Congress the power to "alter" the
state election laws.3 For the first fifty or so years after ratification of
the Constitution, the States elected their House members in a variety
of ways. For example, some States elected all of their representatives
at large,4 while others did so by multi-member districts.5 In either
system, voters could not identiffy a single politician as "their" local
representative.
In 1842, Congress passed the first law to require election of the
House by single-member districts.6 Congress re-enacted this require-
ment in seven subsequent reapportionment statutes, one of which
continues in force today.7 And, it is this law, and its single-member-
district requirement, that allows voters to identify a single incumbent
as "their" representative, selected within and speaking for their local
district. Over the last 160 years, the single-member-district require-
ment has become embedded in our political psyche and shaped our
political world. The modem truism that "all politics is local" is built
3 See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4.
4 By "at large," I mean an election system in which each voter in a state votes for
every representative. This method has also been referred to as the "general ticket"
system. See RosFmum ZAGARmR, THE PouTcs OF SiZm: REPESmENTAON IN THE UNMrED
STATES, 1776-1850, at 105 (1987). It is possible, as several States have done, to mix
different systems within the same state. For example, a State entitled to twelve repre-
sentatives might elect eleven of those representatives by single-member districts and
elect the twelfth representative at large.
5 By "multi-member districts," I mean an election s)stem that divides a state into
more than one district, but fewer districts than the number of representatives. In this
system, one or more districts elect more than one representative, ith all voters in a
district voting for all representatives allocated to that district. See Kathryn Abrams,
"Raising Politics Up: Minority Political Partidpation and Srdion 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 451 n.13 (1988). For example, if a State were entitled to twelve
representatives, the State might be divided into four districts with each district elect-
ing three representatives. Of course, other permutations of districts and representa-
tives would be possible under a multi-member district s)stem.
6 Act of'June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)).
7 See Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581, 581 (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 2c (1994)). Throughout this Article, I refer to this requirement, whether
under the 1842 statute or one of its successors, as the "congressional districting re-
quirement" or simply the "districting requirement." For the text of the various stat-
utes, see the Statutory Appendix at the end of this Article.
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upon the edifice of House members representing local districts, one
per district.8 This accepted structure informs and permeates all ele-
ments of the present system.
But, what if the federal statute requiring single-member districts
were held unconstitutional? States would then be free to elect their
House members through other electoral systems, as was done during
the early decades of the Republic. Consider, for example, what would
happen if Texas went from single-member districts to an at-large, win-
ner-take-all system. Under the last reapportionment, Texas elects
thirty House members, with its delegation presently split seventeen
Democrats and thirteen Republicans. 9 In an at-large, winner-take-all
election, each party would put up a slate of thirty candidates, and each
voter would cast a single vote for a party's entire slate of candidates.
The switch to such an at-large election would have two immediate con-
sequences. First, the entire Texas delegation would be one party--
either all Republican or all Democrat. This all-or-nothing electoral
result could radically shift the balance of power in the House.' 0 Sec-
ond, Texans could no longer identify a single politician as "their" rep-
resentative. At-large elections would redo voters' expectations and
likely dilute loyalty to incumbents. In short, a switch from single-
member districts could remake American politics.
This Article argues that the federal statute requiring single-mem-
ber districts is unconstitutional and that the States should be free to
choose their own method for electing the House. This result flows
from the Supreme Court's recent federalism precedents, which have
carefully and consistently returned power to state governments." Cu-
riously, while the Congress that passed the first single-member-district
statute in 1842 hotly debated the constitutionality of the districting
requirement, no one has addressed the question since. 12 This nearly
160 years of neglect persists even though we elect a new House under
the single-member-district requirement every two years,' 8 and, every
ten years, state legislatures labor under that requirement as they strug-
8 See generally Tip O'NELL, ALL PoLmcs is LocAL AND OThER RuLEs OF TnE
GAME (1994).
9 See Office of the Clerk, Official List of Members of the House of Representatives of the
United States-One Hundred Sixth Congress, at http://clerkweb.house.gov/106/
mbrcmtee/members/mbrsstate/uolmfram.htm (Oct. 12, 2000).
10 The same concern over the political balance of power in the House led to
enactment of the 1842 districting requirement. See ZAGARRi, supra note 4, at 129-31;
Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the "Bear Garden": Representation and the Apportion
ment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLUC 362, 362-63 (1985).
11 See infra Part III.A.
12 See infra notes 389-400 and accompanying text.
13 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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gle to redraw congressional districts.1 4 Given the current federalism
revival and the approaching reapportionment after the 2000 census,
now is an apt time to examine the question anew.
Before outlining my plan of analysis, let me frame the question
more exactly. The Times, Places and Manner Clause in Article I, Sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution 5 charges States with the duty to regulate,
not surprisingly, the times, places, and manner of holding elections
for federal office, leaving the nature of those regulations to the States'
discretion.' 6 The Clause also grants Congress the secondary power to
"make or alter" any of the States' regulations.17 On its face, then, the
Clause does not mandate any specific manner of electing the House.
Rather, States may choose their preferred method, as they did for the
first fifty years after ratification of the Constitution,' 8 subject to
change by Congress.
In 1842, as part of its decennial reapportionment of the House, 19
Congress passed an act mandating that States with more than one rep-
resentative elect their representatives by single-member districts.20
Significantly, neither this statute nor any of its successors actually drew
congressional districts; rather, each statute directed the state legisla-
tures to do so.2' In the parlance of modem constitutional law, each
statute "commandeered" the States into drawing House districts.
Fast forward to 1992 and the Supreme Court case New York v.
United States,2 2 decided almost 150 years to the day after Congress
passed the first congressional districting requirement.2 In that case,
the Court held that Congress could not commandeer state legislatures
to make law. At issue was a federal statute that required the States to
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legis-
lature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or ,alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
16 See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) ("The Clause is a default provision; it
invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but
only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices." (citation omit-
ted)); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1972) (same).
17 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4.
18 See ZA.ARm, supra note 4, at 125-26, 154-57.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (decennial census and apportionment).
20 Act ofJune 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)).
21 See, e.g., id.; statutes cited infra Statutory Appendix.
22 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
23 The congressional districting requirement was enacted on June 25, 1842, see
Act ofJune 25, 1842, § 2, and New York v. United States was decided onJune 19, 1992,
see 505 U.S. at 144.
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enact certain regulations of low-level radioactive waste. The Court
held that while Congress could enact such regulations itself, it could
not command the States to do so. 24
As part of its analysis in New York v. United States, the Court ex-
plained that it had not come across any prior federal statute that had
commandeered the States to make law, implying none existed.25 But,
what about the congressional districting requirement? That is noth-
ing short of a clear prior instance of commandeering. Yet, none of
the briefs before the Court cited to that statute, and none of the com-
mentary on the case, before or since the Court's decision, has done so
either.26 Thus, one of the central cases in the Court's new federalism
jurisprudence was decided in complete ignorance of directly contrary
historical precedent.27
Ignorance of the districting statute takes on even greater signifi-
cance when one considers that the Congress that passed the 1842 dis-
tricting requirement debated the very issue central to New York v.
United States-whether Congress has power to commandeer state legis-
latures.28 Ultimately, the 1842 Congress decided it had the power to
do so, having enacted a statute that commandeered the States to draw
districts. But, the House of Representatives came to the opposite con-
clusionjust two years later when four States persisted in electing their
representatives at large.29 When the at-large representatives arrived in
Washington, the House debated whether to seat them even though at-
large elections violated the districting requirement.5 0 A House com-
mittee appointed to study the issue concluded that the districting re-
quirement was unconstitutional because it commandeered the state
legislatures; the House adopted the committee's conclusion.35 So,
two consecutive Congresses reached opposite conclusions on the same
constitutional issue. And, in each instance, Congress was closely
divided.32
24 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 187-89.
25 Id. at 177.
26 The first districting requirement is discussed in Joel Francis Paschal, The House
of Representatives: "Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle," 17 LAW & CorTE iv.
PRoBs. 276, 280-86 (1952).
27 On the centrality of New York v. United States to the Court's renewed interest in
federalism, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2184-85 (1998), and John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1340-49 (1997).
28 See infra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 463-64 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 463-69 and accompanying text.
31 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 6 (1844).
32 See infra notes 449-50, 499 and accompanying text.
[VOL- 76:2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
The congressional districting requirement is like a missing piece
to a puzzle that nobody knew was incomplete. In New York v. United
States, the Court probably believed it had the whole commandeering
picture before it. The Court reviewed the pieces it had, the Constitu-
tion's text, history, structure, and precedent, and concluded that Con-
gress could not commandeer state legislatures.33 The Court even
mentioned that the puzzle did not reflect any prior government prac-
tice, noting the supposed absence of any prior acts of
commandeering.34
Against the full historical background, this Article returns to the
question last debated nearly 160 years ago: Can Congress comman-
deer the States to draw House districts? Returning to this question
serves several purposes. First, as noted above, it raises an issue of im-
mense political importance. If Congress cannot make States draw dis-
tricts, it has two choices: draw districts itself for all fifty states, or leave
the States to choose the election method they prefer (for example,
single-member districts, multi-member districts, or at-large elec-
tion).3 5 If Congress were to draw the districts itself, the task might be
politically or practically impossible. Districting is a politically divisive,
expensive, and time-consuming process when done separately within
each State's legislature. Those difficulties would increase exponen-
tially if consolidated in a single, national body, where regional pres-
sures would rear their heads.
If Congress left the choice to the States, the political balance of
power in Congress could shift dramatically. A State with a House dele-
gation split between the major political parties under the single-mem-
ber-district system could switch to an at-large, winner-take-all system,
where one party would elect the entire delegation to Washington. In
an almost evenly divided House, as we have now, the possibility of
such a dramatic shift in membership invites experimentation.
A second reason to return to the question is that the districting
statute potentially undermines a key precedent lying at the heart of
the Court's new federalism: New York v. United States. In a controver-
sial five-to-four decision in the mid-1980s, the Court withdrew almost
entirely from applying federalism-based limits on Congress's enumer-
ated powers.3 6 The national political process, not judicial review, wras
33 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-89 (1992).
34 Id. at 177.
35 A more complex question, which is reserved for future consideration, is
whether Congress could condition state receipt of federal funds on a State electing its
representatives by single-member districts.
36 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also
William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mic. L RE, 1709, 1726-27
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the States' primary protection against Congress's enumerated pow-
ers.37 But then, seven years later, with some turnover on the Court, a
new five-to-four majority put the Court back in the federalism busi-
ness. That case, New York v. United States, revived judicial review of
federalism limits on Congress's power. As noted above, however, New
York v. United States ignored prior congressional precedent for com-
mandeering state legislatures-the congressional districting require-
ment. So, the districting statute forces us to confront a flaw in the
Court's new federalism.
Third, the districting question offers an apt opportunity to take
stock of the Court's new federalism jurisprudence. The question is
untouched by Supreme Court precedent, leaving us free to explore
the issue through various methods of constitutional interpretation,
without the cloud of authoritative Supreme Court precedent hanging
overhead. Now is an especially appropriate time to ask the question,
as the Court's recent decision in Alden v. Maine 8 has tied together
several strands of the new federalism jurisprudence. The Court's
emerging approach to federalism issues can guide our application of
the various methods of interpretation.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I sets up the dilemma
posed by the districting requirement in light of New York v. United
States, which held that Congress cannot commandeer the States.39
The districting requirement plainly commandeers the States. Part I
outlines the options constitutional lawyers face in trying to reconcile
this conflict.
Part H then reviews the Court's opinion in New York v, United
States. The discussion analyzes the Court's various arguments in sup-
port of the anti-commandeering rule, identifying the different meth-
ods of constitutional argument used. This review serves as
background for analysis of the congressional districting requirement,
both illustrating the methods of constitutional argument in action
(1985) (noting that the Court's jurisprudence in Garcia effected a "withdrawal of sub-
stantive judicial review" of federalism questions); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty:
DefiningFederalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REy. 27, 27 (1998) (noting that Garcia repre-
sented a "striking declaration ofjudicial abdication" from federalism questions).
37 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-55. The Court suggested it might find some limits on
Congress's enumerated powers, but did not elaborate. Id. at 556 ("These cases do not
require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure
might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause.").
38 527 U.S. 706, 758-60 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state
courts to hear private damages suits against their states).
39 505 U.S. at 187-89.
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and suggesting substantive arguments to be applied to the districting
requirement
Part III turns to the question first posed in 1842: Can Congress
commandeer the States to draw House districts under its Times,
Places and Manner Clause power? Part III analyzes this question by
using a methodology of constitutional interpretation that considers
text, history, precedent, structure, and prior government practice. I
am compelled by the Constitution's text, history, and structure, the
Court's reasoning in New York v. United States and other relevant prece-
dents, and the history of the districting statute itself to conclude that
Congress cannot commandeer the States to draw districts under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause. I am mindful of the drastic politi-
cal consequences that might flow from this conclusion. But the Su-
preme Court itself set the major premise in New York v. United States,
and we ought not shrink intellectually from exploring the full consti-
tutional syllogism.
The Conclusion performs two tasks. First, it takes stock of the
current project. As noted above, the districting requirement is poten-
tially at odds with the Court's decision in New York v. United States.
Given Part IlI's conclusion that Congress cannot commandeer under
the Times, Places and Manner Clause, the Conclusion suggests that
the anti-commandeering rule in New York v. United States should ex-
tend to that Clause, and that the districting requirement should be
struck down.
The Conclusion's second task is to explain how this Article fits
within a larger scholarly project. Striking down the districting re-
quirement would raise a host of questions for future study. For exam-
ple, if the districting requirement is unconstitutional, where does that
leave impending House elections? Could States choose whatever elec-
tion system they desired, or is their choice limited by the Constitution
or other law? Could Congress re-enact the districting requirement
under another grant of power? As these questions suggest, the ques-
tion examined in this Article, though substantial, isjust the beginning
of a larger project. The Conclusion briefly outlines that larger
project
I. THE DIEN ihA PosED
This Part frames the rest of the Article. Section A describes New
York v. United States and its anti-commandeering rule. Section B then
explains how the congressional districting requirement commandeers
state legislatures. Section C then draws together New York v. United
States and the districting requirement to ask how they affect one an-
2001]
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other. Does New York v. United States require courts to strike down the
districting requirement? Or, does the existence of the districting re-
quirement undermine the Court's reasoning in New York v. United
States? Or, is there a way to reconcile the two?
A. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,40 which cre-
ated several incentives for States to dispose properly of their low-level
radioactive waste. New York challenged the constitutionality of three
of the incentives. First, the Act imposed a surcharge on waste disposal
and authorized payment from the surcharge to States that complied
with a waste disposal timetable set forth in the Act-the Court called
this requirement the "monetary incentive."41 Second, the Act barred
a State from access to other States' disposal sites if it did not meet
milestones in the federal waste disposal timetable-the Court called
this requirement the "access incentive." 42 Third, the Act forced any
State that had not met federal waste disposal deadlines to take title to
all waste within the State's borders-the Court called this requirement
the "take title" provision. 43
The Court easily upheld the monetary and access incentives. The
monetary incentive fell within Congress's Spending Clause power,44
under which Congress may place conditions on state receipt of federal
funds.45 The monetary incentive merely conditioned receipt of the
surcharge funds on compliance with the federal timetable for low-
level radioactive waste disposal. Next, the access incentive merely
threatened pre-emption of state law if a State did not regulate waste
disposal. Specifically, the access incentive would displace state law
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1994).
41 505 U.S. at 152.
42 Id. at 153.
43 Id.
44 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
45 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). Specifically, Con-
gress may condition receipt of federal funds when: (1) the condition promotes the
general welfare, (2) the condition is unambiguous, (3) the condition is related to the
purpose for which the federal funds are to be used, and (4) there is no independent
constitutional bar to States complying with the condition. See id. For example, in
Dole, Congress had conditioned 5% of federal highways funds on state passage of a
drinking age of twenty-one or over. The drinking age would promote the general
welfare (public safety); the condition was unambiguous (raise the drinking age or lose
5% of the funds); the drinking age was related to the purpose of the highway funds
(safe interstate highways); and the Constitution did not bar state compliance with the
condition. Id. at 207-09.
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with a federal law-a law that denied access to other States' disposal
sites46-if a State failed to regulate.
The take title provision posed a more difficult question. That
provision could not be upheld as conditional spending because it did
not deal with receipt of federal funds. Similarly, the take title provi-
sion could not be upheld as pre-emption of state law because it did
not threaten to displace state law with a federal regulation. The ques-
tion, then, became whether the provision fell in a third class of federal
statutes-those that commandeered state legislatures to make law.
The Court explained that Congress does not have power to "comman-
deer" States to enact legislation.47 If the take title provision fell in this
third category, it was unconstitutional.
So, the Court had to determine whether the take title provision
commandeered the States.48 The provision confronted States with the
following choice: either regulate low-level radioactive waste as Con-
gress has prescribed, or take title to all such waste within your bor-
ders.49  The Court concluded that this choice effectively
commandeered the States because each option standing alone was im-
permissible commandeering.50 Consider each option in turn. First,
Congress could not simply direct States to enact regulation of low-
level radioactive waste; that would be a straightforward case of corn-
46 The Supreme Court had previously held that the dormant Commerce Clause,
U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, d. 3, prevents a State from prohibiting disposal of out-of-state
waste. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). Congress,
however, can authorize States to take actions that would othenise violate the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S.
159, 174 (1985). The access incentives, then, authorized conduct-denial of access to
out-of-state low-level radioactive waste-that was othenise prohibited by the Court's
prior decision in City of Philadephia v. New Jerse):
47 505 U.S. at 158-65. Part II of this Article revieus the reasons for the anti-
commandeering rule.
48 505 U.S. at 174-77.
49 The Act stated the choice as follows:
If... a State... in which low-level radioactive wvaste is generated is unable to
provide for the disposal of all such waste generated within such State ... by
January 1, 1996, each State in which such waste is generated, upon the re-
quest of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to the uste, be
obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence
of the fallure of the State to take possession of the waste as soon afterJanu-
ary 1, 1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is
available for shipment.
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1994).
50 505 U.S. at 175-76.
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mandeering.51 Second, Congress could not simply direct States to
take title to the low-level radioactive waste within their borders. By
shifting the financial burden of the waste from private waste genera-
tors to the States, the law effectively directed the States to subsidize
private waste generators. 52 And, such a subsidy is no different from a
state law either appropriating funds, granting tax relief, or some simi-
lar act.53 Because Congress could not enact either option standing
alone, it could not force States to choose between the two.5 4 Thus,
the take title provision unconstitutionally commandeered the States,
In concluding its analysis, the Court observed: "The take title pro-
vision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited
which offers a state government no option other than that of imple-
menting legislation enacted by Congress."55 As the next Section ex-
plains, this is not so. Rather, the districting requirement poses the
same choice as the take title provision and, in doing so, commandeers
the States.
B. The Districting Requirement
The current districting requirement commandeers the States in
the same way that the take title provision did. Congress enacted the
first requirement in 1842, and such a requirement has been in effect
on-and-off since that time. The Statutory Appendix at the end of this
Article sets forth the various versions of the districting requirement
and explains when each was in force. As codified, the current district-
ing requirement reads:
In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subse-
quent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under
an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a)
51 Id. ("[The command of] regulating pursuant to Congress's direction-would,
standing alone, present a simple command to state governments to implement legisla-
tion enacted by Congress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Con-
gress to subject state governments to this type of instruction.").
52 Id. at 175 ('[The take title provision's] forced transfer, standing alone, would
in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state gov-
ernments to radioactive waste producers.").
53 See id. (stating that the requirement of taking title "would 'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this rea-
son be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and
state governments").
54 Id. at 176 ("[Congress has] held out the threat, should the States not regulate
according to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another
federal instruction. A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory tech-
niques is no choice at all.").
55 Id. at 177.
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of this title, there shal be established by law a number of districts
equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so
entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so
established, no district to elect more than one Representative (ex-
cept that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative
and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at
Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first
Congress).56
Section 2c expressly commands the States to make law. As empha-
sized above, States "shall... establish[] by law a number of districts
equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so enti-
tled.. . ."-57 Consequently, the States are commanded ("shall") to
make law ("by law") by drawing congressional districts. As with the
command to regulate low-ilevel radioactive waste in New York v. United
States, this is commandeering.
Section 2c could also be read as posing States an impermissible
choice: either draw districts, or the House will not seat your represent-
atives.58 As with the take title provision in New York v. United States,
Congress could not enact either option standing alone. First, Con-
gress could not direct state legislatures to draw congressional dis-
tricts-this is straightfonard commandeering. 59 Second, Congress
could not refuse to seat a State's representatives, unless the represen-
tative did not have the constitutional qualifications.60 Consequently,
the districting requirement forces States to choose between two op-
tions, neither of which Congress could enact standing alone. As with
the take title provision, this choice is tantamount to commandeering.
So, the districting requirement operates in a way similar to the
take title provision. In short, both commandeer the States to enact
legislation. The next Section draws the implications of this similarity.
C. Initial Implications
New York v. United States missed an important piece of constitu-
tional history. Recall that the Court said it was not aware of any prior
56 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994) (emphasis added).
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 The statute does not expressly make this threat, but the history of the district-
ing requirement shows that the refusal to elect by districts would be a ground for
refusing to seat a State's representatives. See infra notes 455-69 and accompaning
text.
59 Of course, this statement assumes, for purposes of exposition, the answer to
the question that takes up Part III of this Article: Whether Congress can commandeer
the States under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
60 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969).
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instance where Congress had commandeered the States.6' Yet, on
and off since 1842, Congress has commandeered the States into draw-
ing districts for election of the House of Representatives. The ques-
tion is what to make of this historical omission. I suggest three
options.
Option One: The Court's reasoning in New York v. United States is
weakened. If the Court relied heavily on the absence of prior congres-
sional commandeering, then the opinion could be fatally flawed.
Even if that factor was a subsidiary point, it is still a piece of the opin-
ion's overall supporting structure, and that piece's load bearing capac-
ity is weakened because the Court failed to deal with critical contrary
precedent.62 In that event, the Apportionment Act of 1842 and its
progeny are the correct precedent, and Congress may properly com-
mandeer the States.
Option Two: The Court got it right in New York v. United States, and
the districting requirement is an unconstitutional commandeering of
state legislatures. Under this option, the existence of the districting
requirement does not weaken the Court's rationale one bit. Rather,
the districting requirement has always been unconstitutional (as a
congressional committee actually concluded in 1844), and the Court's
(and the litigants') failure to address that law in New York v. United
States does not change that fact.
Option Three: While the Court got it right in New York v. United
States, the districting requirement is nonetheless constitutional. New
York v. United States simply held that Congress cannot use its Com-
61 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62 Professor Martin Flaherty makes this point well in critiquing various constitu-
tional theorists' use of history. See Martin S. Flaherty, Histoy "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). Professor Flaherty r6cognizes that
few, if any, constitutional theorists rest their arguments solely on history. Id, at
528-29. As he explains in critiquing Richard Epstein's work:
[N]one of this may matter much for Epstein's ultimate theoretical conclu-
sions, if those conclusions in the end do not rest on his views of the Found-
ing or of history generally. But even if they do not, this hardly means that
the problems with Epstein's appeals to the past themselves do not matter.
To the contrary, they count precisely to the extent that Epstein himself-
righty -invokes the authority of history to enhance, reinforce, and embel-
lish his prescriptions. Any failure to make the relevant historical assertions
in a credible fashion diminishes his overall project in just the proportion he
hoped to strengthen it.
Id. at 557. The same goes for the Supreme Court's use of history-or, perhaps in this
case, absence of history-to support its holding in New York v. United States. To
whatever degree the Court relied on the absence of prior congressional comman-
deering, the Court's opinion loses that degree of support.
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merce Clause power (or presumably any other power enumerated in
Article I, Section 8) to commandeer the States. The districting re-
quirement, however, was enacted under the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause of Article I, Section 4, which grants Congress the power to
"make or alter" the "Regulations" of "the Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives ... ."6 History,
text, structure, precedent, and other sources of constitutional argu-
ment might show that the Times, Places and Manner Clause, unlike
the Commerce Clause, granted Congress the authority to comman-
deer the States.
Part III discusses the issue raised by Option Three: Can Congress
commandeer the States under the Times, Places and Manner Clause?
Whether we must make the further choice between Options One and
Two is contingent on the answer to this question. If Congress can
commandeer the States under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
New York v. United States and the districting requirement can peace-
fully coexist and no further choice is required. If, however, Congress
cannot commandeer the States under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause, we face a choice: either New York v. United States or the district-
ing requirement must go-Option One or Option Two.
As a prelude to Part I's discussion of commandeering under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause, Part H reviews the reasoning be-
hind New York v. United State? anti-commandeering rule. The Court
appealed to precedent, history, structure, and prior government prac-
tice in support of its holding. These arguments, in turn, will inform
Part II's discussion of commandeering under the Times, Places and
Manner Clause. The Conclusion then considers whether and, if so,
how we should choose between Option One (keeping the districting
requirement) and Option Two (keeping New York v. United States).
11. NEW YoP v. UNmI STATES ANALYZED
All parties in New York v. United States acknowledged that Con-
gress could regulate disposal of low-level radioactive waste under the
Commerce Clause.6 For example, Congress could regulate where
and how private waste generators dispose of their waste.6 Thus, New
63 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
64 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992).
65 Under the Court's prior decision in Garda v. San Antonio MAropolitan Transit
Authorty, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Congress can regulate both primte and state conduct
in the same law. For example, a Iaw that required all waste producers to dispose of
their waste in a certain manner would validly apply to both prinite v.aste producers
and state governments. Because the take title provision solely regulated state govern-
ments, and effectively commanded them to legislate, that provision did not come
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York v. United States was not about what subjects Congress could regu-
late.6 6 Rather, the case considered how Congress could regulate those
subjects. Specifically, could Congress command the States to make
law, instead of making the law itself?67
Unlike conduct listed in the Bill of Rights, commandeering of
state legislatures is not prohibited by the Constitution's text. For ex-
ample, the First Amendment expressly prohibits Congress from,
among other things, making any "law respecting an establishment of
religion."68 Conversely, no provision of the Constitution says "Con-
gress shall make no law directing the States to make law," or some
wording to that effect. Indeed, the only text usually trotted out on the
issue-the Tenth Amendment-provides no answer: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. '69 The Tenth Amendment merely begs the question: Is the
power to commandeer the States a power "delegated to the United
States by the Constitution"?
Absent helpful text, the Court in New York v. United States rightly
turned to accepted methods of constitutional interpretation: history,
within the Garcia rule. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160 ("This litigation
presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of [ Garcia and related cases], as
this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation appli-
cable to private parties.").
66 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), addressed what subjects Congress
could properly regulate. Specifically, the Court held that Congress could not use its
Commerce Clause power to regulate mere possession of a firearm near a school. See
id. at 559-68.
67 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 159-60.
Petitioners do not contend that Congress lacks the power to regulate the
disposal of low level radioactive waste.... Regulation of the... interstate
market in waste disposal is. . . well within Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. Petitioners likewise do not dispute that under the
Supremacy Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt state radioactive
waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amendment lim-
its the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen. Rather than
addressing the problem of waste disposal by directly regulating the genera-
tors and disposers of waste, petitioners argue, Congress has impermissibly
directed the States to regulate in this field.
Id. (citations omitted).
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ."); id. amend.
III ("No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent
of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law."); id.
amend. VIII ("Excessive ball shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
69 Id. amend. X.
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precedent, structure, and prior government practice.70 The remain-
der of this Part reviews the Court's arguments under each method.
This review shows the various methods in action and provides back-
ground for the discussion in Part III about whether Congress can
commandeer under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. The fol-
lowing discussion is not an exhaustive review or critique of the Court's
reasoning.71 Rather, review and critique are pursued only insofar as
necessary to the issues discussed later in this Article.
A. Precedent
New York v. United States used precedent for two main purposes.
First, the Court argued that two of its prior cases established an anti-
commandeering rule. Second, the Court cited a series of older cases
as establishing background principles of federalism that, in turn, sup-
ported the anti-commandeering rule. This Section examines each use
of precedent.
1. Cases Establishing an Anti-commandeering Rule
This Subsection assesses the Court's use of precedent, but not in
order to criticize the Court's holding in New York v. United States.
Rather, this discussion identifies the attitude the Court brings to its use
of precedent. As any student of the law knows, judges can read a pre-
cedent either broadly, extending its reach beyond the narrow issue
decided in that case, or narrowly, limiting its holding to the issue, or
even the facts, of that case. This is what I mean by the "attitude" a
court brings to precedent-the Court's predisposition to read a case
or line of cases narrowly or broadly. This Subsection reviews the use
of precedent in New York v. United States to determine the Court's atti-
tude toward federalism precedents.
New York v. United States pointed to two prior decisions, Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n72 and FERC v. Missis-
70 Of course, other methods of interpretation, such as prudential concerns, could
have been brought to bear on the question. See infra notes 437-42 and accompanying
text.
71 For more exhaustive treatments of New York v. United Stales, see Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995);Jackson, supra note 27; Rich-
ard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent,
Histog, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KN. L REv. 493
(1993); Edwvard L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalim: Some Notes on a NationalNaro-
sis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1995); Yoo, supra note 36.
72 452 U.S. 264 (1981). For a similar critique of the use of precedent in New Moi
v. United States, see Levy, supra note 71, at 502-10.
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sippi,7 as recognizing an anti-commandeering rule.74 Neither case,
however, did so. Instead, each case carefully set aside that issue for
future decision, though each opinion contained loose language that,
taken out of context, could support an anti-commandeering rule.
Simply put, New York v. United States mischaracterized prior precedent.
The remainder of this Subsection explains how the Court did so and
concludes by suggesting what this use of precedent tells us about the
Court's attitude toward its federalism precedents generally.
Hodel involved a challenge to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.75 In pertinent part, the Act regulated the
mining and reclamation of steep slopes,76 requiring a company min-
ing a steep slope to return the site to the "approximate original con-
tour. '77 The Act was challenged as infringing a State's right to
regulate an area of traditional state interest: land use.78 The Court
disagreed, explaining that this argument misunderstood the nature of
state sovereignty protected by the Constitution. The Constitution pro-
tects against Congress regulating the States themselves, but not
against federal regulation of private conduct.79 The Act did not regu-
late the States or direct them to act, but rather regulated private be-
havior-mining of steep slopes.8 0 While the Act did pre-empt state
land use laws, state sovereignty is not violated when Congress simply
pre-empts state regulation of private behavior.81
Since the Act did not regulate the States themselves, the Court
never had to address the issue of commandeering. Indeed, the Court
said as much:
73 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
74 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1992).
75 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
76 See id. § 1265(d) (4) (1994) (defining "steep slope" as "any slope above twenty
degrees or such lesser slope as may be defined by the regulatory authority after con-
sideration of soil, climate, and other characteristics of a region or State").
77 Id. § 1265(d)(1).
78 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 284-85
(1981) (noting that the district court had "concluded that the Act contravenes the
Tenth Amendment because it interferes with the States' 'traditional governmental
function' of regulating land use").
79 Id at 286-87.
80 Id. at 288 ("[T]he steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only
the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and businesses.").
81 Id. at 289-90 ("To object to [the Act], appellees must assume that the Tenth
Amendment limits congressional power to pre-empt or displace state regulation of
private activities affecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect.").
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Moreover, the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope
standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal
regulatory program in any manner whatsoever.... Thus, there can
be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.8 2
Immediately after this passage, the Court cited three court of appeals
cases that also noted but did not decide the issue of comman-
deering. 3 Each of these cases was appealed to the Supreme Court,
where the federal government made pertinent concessions that
mooted the appeals and led the Court to vacate and remand each
case.8 4 Thus, neither Hodel nor the court of appeals cases cited
therein analyzed or addressed the issue of commandeering. Each
case left that issue for another day.
While a careful reading of Hodel shows the Court bracketing the
commandeering issue, New York v. United States transmogrifies the case
into precedent for an anti-commandeering rule. Consider the follow-
ing paragraph from the Court's opinion.
As an initial matter, Congress may not "commandee[r] the legisla-
tive processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program." In Hodd, tie Court upheld
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely
because it did not commandeer the States into regulating rnining83
Both sentences in this passage are misleading. First, the Court in-
troduces its quote from Hodel as if those words stated the rule from
the case. This is the ordinary import of beginning the sentence with
the phrase "Congress may not"; it tells the reader that what follows
that phrase will identify what Congress may not do-here, comman-
deer the States. Yet, in context, that quote merely described the federal
statute under review. The full quote is: "Thus, there can be no sugges-
tion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."86 As dis-
cussed above, this observation led the Court to leave aside the issue of
82 Id. at 288.
83 Id. (citing Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train,
521 F.2d 971, 990-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Browm,
431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 837-42 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)).
84 See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1977).
85 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted).
86 Hode, 452 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
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commandeering: Since the Act did not commandeer the States, the
issue of Congress's power to commandeer was not properly before the
Court. Thus, by quoting Hodel out of context, the Court transforms a
passing observation into a rule of law.
The second sentence of the above-quoted passage also misleads.
According to that sentence, Hodel upheld the Act "precisely because"
the Act did not commandeer the States.87 This language suggests that
the absence of commandeering itselfprovided the reason for the Court's
decision to uphold the Act. The Court means to give the impression
that Hodel set forth an anti-commandeering rule, and that the Act sur-
vived that rule because it did not commandeer. But, once again, the
Court mischaracterizes Hodel. Hodel observed that the Act did not
commandeer in order to place the Act in a category of clearly consti-
tutional federal law making-federal statutes that regulate private be-
havior. 8 Further, that observation meant that the Court did not have
to decide whether commandeering was constitutional. Thus, rather
than forming the basis of Hodel, the fact that the Act did not comman-
deer merely clarified and limited the issue before the Court.
New York v. United States gave the same misleading treatment to
FERC v. Mississippi8 9 as it did to HodeL FERC v. Mississippi involved a
federal statute that required the States to "consider" enactment of cer-
tain federally prescribed legislation, but stopped short of requiring
the States to enact the provisions. 90 New York v. United States claimed
that FERC v. Mississippi "reached the same conclusion" as Hodel,9' pre-
sumably that commandeering is unconstitutional, and that FERC v.
Mississippi "upheld the statute at issue because it did not view the stat-
ute as such a command."92 But, just as in Hodel FERC v. Mississippi
never decided whether commandeering was permissible. Indeed, the
Court explicitly reserved that issue: "[I]t plainly is not necessary for
the Court in this case to make a definitive choice between competing
views of federal power to compel state regulatory activity."95 Yet, New
York v. United States portrays EERC v. Mississippi as making just that
choice against commandeering.
New York v. United States shows the Court exaggerating precedent
to support a pro-federalism result. Alden v. Maine,94 one of the
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 456 U.S. 742 (1981).
90 Id. at 745-53 (describing operation of the statute at issue).
91 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161.
92 Id. (emphasis added).
93 FERO v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 764.
94 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Court's most recent Eleventh Amendment cases, shows the Court do-
ing just the opposite when precedent does not support a pro-federal-ism result. As discussed further in Part M, Alden held that States
entered the Union with an immunity from private damages suits in
state or federal court.95 The main issue in the case was whether Con-
gress could use an Article I power-for example, its power to regulate
interstate commerce-to abrogate that state immunity. 6 As in New
York v. United States, the Alden Court faced several pnor decisions that
contained loose language bearing on the issue.97 Specifically, Hilton
v. South Carolina Public Railways Conmission98 contained language sup-
porting congressional abrogation of the States' immunity. There, the
Court wrote that when "a federal statute does impose liability upon
the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every
State, fully enforceable in state court."99 The Court in Alden distin-
guished Hilton, writing, "Hilton... did not squarely address, much less
resolve, the question of Congress's power to abrogate States' immu-
nity from suit in their own courts."100 But, the same could be said of
Hodel and FERC v. Mississipp4 the two cases New York v. United States
used to support its anti-commandeering rule. Nonetheless, Alden dis-
tinguished Hilton and boldly declared that the issue was one of "first
impression" allowing the Court to write on a clean slate. 01
95 Id. at 709.
96 The Court had previously held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996),
that Congress could not use its Article I powers to abrogate state immunity from suit
in federal court. Id. at 72-73. The Court has recognized, however, that Congress can
abrogate state immunity to suit in federal court under its power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Seminole Tibe, 517 U.S. at 59
(citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). But see Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642-43 (1999) (holding that
federal patent laws did not abrogate state immunity to suit in federal court because
they were not a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition of deprivations of "property" without due process of law); Coll.
Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690-91
(1999) (holding that federal trademark laws did not abrogate state immunity to suit
in federal court because they were not a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of deprivations of "property" without due
process of law).
97 Alden, 527 U.S. at 735 ("There are isolated statements in some of our cases
suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in state courts.").
98 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
99 Id. at 207.
100 Alden, 527 U.S. at 737.
101 Id. at 741 ("Whether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a
State's immunity from suit in its own courts is, then, a question of first impression.").
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So, the Alden Court faced the mirror-image type of precedent
faced by the Court in New York v. United States. In New York v. United
States, the Court faced precedent that did not address its issue, but
contained language favorable to the Court's pro-federalism result. The
Court seized on the favorable language, claiming the precedent di-
rectly supported the Court's holding. Conversely, in Alden, the Court
faced precedent that did not address its issue, but contained language
adverse to the Court's pro-federalism result. The Court diminished
the unfavorable language, claiming the precedent did not control the
issue before the Court. These two cases reveal the Court's attitude to-
ward federalism precedent. When dicta supports the Court's pro-fed-
eralism agenda, the precedent is embraced, and its authority
exaggerated. But, when dicta contradicts the Court's desired result,
the precedent is marginalized, and its authority minimized.
Two questions arise from the Court's treatment of precedent in
federalism cases: (1) Why did the Court do it?; and (2) What are the
implications, if any, for the analysis in this Article? We can never
know subjectively "why" the justices did so,102 but objectively New York
v. United States reads as if the Court had a conclusion in mind-com-
mandeering is unconstitutional-and read precedent through the
lens of that conclusion. As with any lens, it bent and distorted that
which passed through it so that the Court saw an altered version of
what was really there. It was only through thick federalism spectacles
that the Court could see an anti-commandeering rule in Hodel and
FERC v. Mississippi.
For purposes of our present analysis, precedent should be re-
viewed through the same lens of federalism. 03 This lens would con-
centrate and focus the state sovereignty aspects of the Court's
opinions and filter out any of the qualifying language or, still worse,
language supporting stronger national power over the States. Practi-
cally speaking, this attitude toward precedent yields a sort of default
102 Unless, of course, either ajustice reveals the reason to a biographer, or a Su-
preme Court clerk working for the Court at the time writes a book that brings new
information to light. See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FiPs'T EYENvT-
NESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
103 Cf LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OFJUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 37-42 (1997) (review-
ing research on the goals, policy-related and otherwise,judges pursue in making deci-
sions); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrrrUDnAL MODEL 73 (1993) (discussing the "attitudinal model" of judicial deci-
sion-making, which "holds that justices make decisions by considering the facts of the
case in light of their ideological attitudes and values"); Ann Woolhandler & Michael
G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 618
(1999) (arguing that the Court at one time took a "Nationalist" attitude toward issues
arising from federal judicial review of state administrative agency actions).
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presumption-read precedent to give the strongest support to feder-
alism that the opinion's language will allow. When a case is ambigu-
ous on an issue of federal versus state power, read the case to support
the States.
That judicial attitude affects the reading of precedent should not
be surprising. Because the methods of legal argument do not always
(or often) yield determinate answers, judges will decide close cases
based on background beliefs about "what is fair or otherwise desira-
ble."10 4 If a pro-federalism principle is one of those background be-
liefs, judges will comb cases for snippets of language, however out of
context, that will support greater state sovereignty. As with Hodel and
EERC v. Mississipp4 dicta and passing observations can be converted to
holdings and rules. And, precedent squarely contrary to the Court's
federalism values can be distinguished or, if absolutely necessary, ig-
nored or overruled.
2. Cases Establishing'Background Principles
In discussing a second group of precedents, New York v. United
States reviewed cases that presage the discussion of history in Section
B. The Court cited these cases for two basic propositions. First, both
the state and national governments were to retain respective areas of
sovereignty under the new Constitution that could not be invaded or
destroyed by the other.10 5 Second, the Constitution created a na-
tional government that would regulate individuals directly, as opposed
104 Richard H. Fallon,Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cu. L REv. 535,
567 (1999); see also B. igiw N. CARuozo, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICLAL PROCESS 12
(1921) (discussing the effects of "subconscious forces" on judicial decision-making);
Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Thery, 87 CAjL. L REV. 593, 609 (1999)
(discussing the form of constitutional argument thatjudges use when "coherence can-
not be achieved").
105 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). On this point, the
Court cited Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) ("[T]he preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of
the National government. The Constitution... looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States."), Metcalf&Eddy, Ina v. Mitdd4 269 U.S. 514,523
(1926) ("[N]either government may destroy the other or curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers."), Taffin v. Leuitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)
("[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of
the Federal Government."), and Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) ("The
States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers
with which Congress does not readily interfere."). New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
at 162-63.
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to the Articles of Confederation, where the national government regu-
lated indirectly through the States. 10 6
These two propositions complement one another. The first pro-
position holds that States entered the union with certain aspects of
their sovereignty intact, and that the federal government cannot in-
vade or destroy the remaining aspects of state sovereignty. This is an
unwritten principle derived from the Constitution's structure. The
second proposition uses the history of the Articles of Confederation to
show that commandeering of state legislatures would improperly in-
vade the States' remaining sovereignty. This history is discussed at
greater length in Section B.
In the end, none of the cases cited or discussed in New York v.
United States directly supported the Court's anti-commandeering rule.
Indeed, none of the cases even addressed the issue. Instead, Hodel
and FERC v. Mississippi reserved the issue for future resolution. 1°0
The remaining cases discussed background federalism principles con-
sistent with an anti-commandeering rule. Under no conventional use
of the term precedent, then, could one say that these cases required
the outcome in New York v. United States.
So, of what use were these precedents? Consider two possible
uses. First, to show that the anti-commandeering rule was not rejected
by prior precedent. Second, to establish background principles from
which one could deduce an anti-commandeering rule. And, as dis-
cussed above, the Court's pro-state-sovereignty attitude affected its use
of precedent, leading the Court to overstate the effect of those prece-
dents. Part III.D.1 will incorporate these lessons in reviewing Su-
preme Court precedent on the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
B. History
New York v. United States used history to make two related points.
First, government under the Articles of Confederation was flawed be-
cause Congress regulated through the States.l08 Second, the Framers
corrected this flaw by creating a national government that regulated
106 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 162-63. On this point, the Court
cited Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911), and Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("Both the States and the United States existed before the Consti-
tution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by
substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citi-
zens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly re-
stricted, only upon the States."). 505 U.S. at 162.
107 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-64 (1981); Hodel v. Va. Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288-89 (1981).
108 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 163.
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individuals directly, not through States.10 9 The remainder of this Sec-
tion outlines the Court's historical evidence on each point.
The Articles of Confederation hamstrung the national govern-
ment by making its laws dependent upon the States.1 10 Alexander
Hamilton made the familiar point in Federalist No. 15: "The great and
radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the
principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their
CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contra distin-
guished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist."111 Under the
Articles, Congress could ask States to provide funds to the national
government, but the States were largely free to ignore the request, as
they often did." 2 Similarly, when Congress concluded treaties with
other nations, many States ignored those documents unless a particu-
lar treaty happened to coincide with their economic interests.'13 And,
when other nations took coordinated action against the United States,
Congress could not reliably enlist the States in a common response.114
All of these problems stemmed from Congress's dependence on the
States to implement national policy and law.
Having identified the problem, the Court's next step was to deter-
mine how the Framers solved the problem. The Constitution did so
by creating a national government that regulated individuals directly
109 Id. at 164-66.
110 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalhnm, 96 YALE UJ. 1425, 1447
(1987); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalismn, 79 VA. L RE%. 1957,
1963-66 (1993).
111 THE FEDmRAu" No. 15, at 108 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
112 SeeJAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLrCAL SYSTNI OF THE UNT'rI STATES
(1787), repinted in 1 THE FouNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 166-67 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (complaining of the "(f]ailure of the States to comply vith
the Constitutional requisitions"); THE FDERAusT No. 15, supra note 111, at 106-07
(Alexander Hamilton).
113 SeeMADtsON, supra note 112, at 167 (complaining of States' "[v]iolations of the
law of nations and of treaties"); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 111, at 106-07
(Alexander Hamilton).
114 Shortly after the Revolutionary War, Britain closed its ports to American ships.
To regain access, the United States wanted to implement a national response, closing
its ports to British ships until such time as Britain re-opened its ports. Since the fed-
eral government did not have power over the subject, the coastal States acted in their
best interests by keeping their ports open, and the United States could not coordinate
a successful response. SeeJAcK N. RAKoVE, OjucAI. MEANINcs: POLncs AND IDnMS IN
THE NMKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1996).
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instead ofregulating through the States."15 The remainder of this Sec-
tion outlines the historical evidence the Court offered on this point.
The Court began with debate in the federal drafting convention
over the Virginia and New Jersey plans, comparing the relevant as-
pects of the two plans. Consider the following passage from the
Court's opinion:
Under the Virginia Plan, as first introduced by Edmund Randolph,
Congress would exercise legislative authority directly upon individu-
als, without employing the States as intermediaries. Under the New
Jersey Plan, as first introduced by William Paterson, Congress would
continue to require the approval of the States before legislating, as
it had under the Articles of Confederation.116
In choosing the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey Plan, the Framers
rejected commandeering of the States. 117 The main reason for this
choice was the impracticability of commandeering; the Framers were
not willing to create a government that could make commandeering
work.
The Framers saw that enforcing laws against an individual was
much easier than enforcing laws against a State. When a government
commands individuals to act, as with the income tax laws, the govern-
ment can easily arrest, try, and imprison any individual who refuses to
comply.118 When one government commands another government to
act, however, as with congressional commandeering of the States, con-
ventional law enforcement methods simply will not work. Rather,
115 One dissent argued that the Constitution created a national government that
would regulate individuals in addition to regulating States. New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For
a brief critique of this position, see infra note 134.
116 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 164. For the Virginia Plan, see 1 THE
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
For the NewJersey Plan, see id. at 242-45. The Virginia Plan would give Congress the
power to "legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individ-
ual Legislation." Id& at 21. While the NewJersey Plan would have authorized Con-
gress to raise revenue through charging for postage, id. at 243, it still had Congress
making requisitions from the States. Id. at 243-44.
117 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 165 ("In the end, the Convention
opted for a Constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority
directly over individuals rather than over States; for a variety of reasons, it rejected the
New Jersey Plan in favor of the Virginia Plan."); see also I THE REcoRDs OF THE FM.
ERAL CONvENrION OF 1787, supra note 116, at 313 (listing vote on motion "not to
agree to the Jersey proposition but to report those offered by Mr. Randolph").
118 THE FEDERAIST No. 15, supra note 111, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton).
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compliance can be gained only by military force.'19 So, if the Framers
wanted Congress to commandeer the States, they faced the following
choice: If commandeering were to succeed, Congress would need to
raise a standing army in peace time to enforce its commands against
the States; if Congress was not prepared to wield military force against
the States, its commands would be ignored, as under the Articles of
Confederation. 120
Neither choice was acceptable to the Framers. First, given the
Framers' well-known fear of a national standing army, 21 it was un-
thinkable that Congress could raise and keep such an army for the
express purpose of coercing the States.122 The colonists had consid-
ered the English standing army a significant threat to their liberty.'2
In their mind, a professional army was only loyal to whomever paid
them124 and could be used to silence political dissent or harass politi-
119 Commenting on Congress's dependence on the States under the Articles of
Confederation, Hamilton remarked, "It has been seen that delinquencies in the mem-
bers of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they
happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use
of it, civil war." Id. at 111. Hamilton stated further.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a
law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or pun-
ishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience,
the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount
to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it
may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and
ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magis-
tracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only
to men; the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or
communities, or States.
Ia/ at 110.
120 THE FunmD ..usr No. 45, supra note 111, at 293 (James Madison) (stating that
the situation under the Articles of Confederation would have been different "[h]ad
the States complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation, or could their com-
pliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success to-
wards single persons").
121 See BERNARD BAILwN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE A.tiuiCc,'z REVOLUTION
61-65 (2d ed. 1992).
122 SeeTHE FEDERA=ST No. 16, supra note 111, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It
seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national
Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large
army continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the gov-
ernment."); see also STANLEY EulNs & EmC McKrrcK, THE ACE OF FEDERA .-tI
593-99 (1993) (describing political problems Presidents George Washington and
John Adams faced regarding raising a standing army).
123 See BAmYN, supra note 121, at 61-65.
124 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Riglts as a Constitution, 100 YLE U. 1131,
1168-69 (1991).
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cal opponents. Indeed, this lingering fear lay behind the Second
Amendment, which protects the citizen militia-neighbor fighting
alongside neighbor-as "necessary to the security of a free State."' 25
And, the Constitution itself protects against abuse of a national stand-
ing army by placing power to initiate use of the army-the power to
declare war-in civilian hands,126 and by limiting appropriations for
raising and supporting a standing army to two years, thereby requiring
each new Congress to renew the appropriation after an election by
the People.127
But, commandeering without a standing army would simply set
up Congress for continued failure, as under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. This too was unacceptable. A main impetus for the new Consti-
tution was Congress's weakness under the Articles. 128 The work of the
drafting and ratifying conventions would have been for naught if that
important failing went unaddressed. Also, an important part of the
Constitution's structure was the vertical division of power between na-
tional and state governments. Each level of government was to pro-
tect the people from abuse by the other and, in doing so, protect
individual liberty.12 9 If the national government was stillborn under
125 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
126 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power... To declare War....
see also Tim FEDERALISr No. 46, supra note 111, at 298-99 (James Madison) (explain-
ing how the States could guard against the national government raising a standing
army to be used to harass the States). The Framers considered Congress to be a
civilian branch of government, while the President, as commander in chief of the
armed forces and as the national officer empowered to wage war, was considered to
be part of the military in the exercise of those powers. See Amar, supra note 124, at
1174; John Dwight Ingram & Alison Ann Ray, The Right(?) to Keep and Bear Arms, 27
N.M. L. REV. 491, 498 (1997) (noting that the Framers gave Congress authority to
raise an army, but subject to civilian control).
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 ("The Congress shall have Power... To raise and
support armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years .... ."). If the people were upset by a particular appropriation to
that purpose, they could express their opinion in the next congressional election and
send back a Congress that would not renew the appropriation. The immensely politi-
cal nature of the issue is illustrated by the partisan fighting that took place over an
appropriation for raising troops passed during President John Adams's administra-
tion. See ELIUNS & McKrrRICK, supra note 122, at 595-618.
128 See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
129 THF FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 111, at 323 (James Madison).
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allot-
ted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments




the new Constitution, this important structural safeguard would not
exist.
So, commandeering posed an unacceptable choice: To be effec-
tive, it would require a standing army during peace time; to be palat-
able to the people, there could be no standing army in peace time,
and Congress would retain its former impotence. Speaking in the
New York ratifying convention, Alexander Hamilton described the
choice as follows:
But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as
an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream, it is impossible.
Then we are brought to this dilemma-either a federal standing
army is to enforce the requisitions, or the federal treasury is left
without supplies, and the government without support.'" 0
Other Framers, at both the drafting and state ratifying conventions,
echoed this concern over the workability of commandeering. 13 1
In the same speech, Hamilton concluded that commandeering
must be abandoned: "What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? Noth-
ing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the
same manner as those of the states do." -32 When two types of sover-
eigns, one national and one local, rule the same territory, both must
act upon the individual citizens within that territory, and neither
should act upon the other. To do otherwise would invite a cruel di-
lemma: a standing army in peace time to enforce one sovereign's
edicts over the other, or effective destruction of the sovereign who can
only act through the other. So, as many of the Framers explained at
the drafting and ratifying conventions, the Constitution chose direct
I. This structural point is discussed further at infra notes 363-66 and accompanying
text.
130 2 Ti DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CoNsTrrrION 233 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (1891)
[hereinafter Eu-ioT's DEBATES].
131 See 2 i& at 56 (Statement of Rufus King at the Massachusetts ratiffing conven-
tion) ("Laws, to be effective, therefore, must not be laid on states, but upon individu-
als."); 2 Ti RECORDS OF Ti FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, supra note 116, at 9
(Statement ofJames Madison at the drafting convention) ("The practicability of mak-
ing laws, with coercive sanctions, had been exploded on all hands."); 1 id. at 256
(Statement of Randolph at the drafting convention) ("There are but two modes, by
which the end of a Genl. Govt. can be attained: the 1st. is by coercion as proposed by
[the NewJersey Plan, the 2nd] by real legislation as propd. by the other plan. Coer-
cion he pronounced to be impradiable, expensive, crued to individuaLs.").
132 2 ELuOT'S DaATES, supra note 130, at 233.
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congressional regulation of private behavior over commandeering of
the States.' 33
In sum, the Court used history to make the following point: Con-
gressional commandeering of the States would not establish a worka-
ble national government, and thus the Framers empowered Congress
to regulate individuals directly and not through the States.'3 4 In Part
III.C.2, we will see how this point bears on Congress's power to com-
mandeer under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
133 New York v. United States, 505 U.S 144, 166 (1992) ("In providing for a
stronger central government, therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States."). The
Court cited to the following statements from the state ratifying conventions: 4 EL.
LOT'S DEBAES, supra note 130, at 153 (statement of Samuel Spencer at the North
Carolina ratifying convention) ("[A] U the laws of the Confederation were binding on
the states in their political capacities .... but now the thing is entirely different. The
laws of Congress will be binding on individuals."), 2 id. at 197 (statement of Oliver
Ellsworth at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention) ("This Constitution does not at-
tempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity .... But this legal
coercion singles out the guilty individual."), and 4 id. at 256 (statement of Charles
Pinckney to the South Carolina ratifying convention) ("[T]he necessity of having a
government which should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states,
was conceived to be indispensable by every delegation present."). See also THE FErea.
Ausr No. 16, supra note 111, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (For the new national
government to succeed, "[i]t must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It
must stand in need of no intermediate legislations, but must itself be empowered to
employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions."); id. No.
45, at 293 (James Madison) ("The powers relating to war and peace, armies and
fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in
the existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change does
not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering
them."). 1
134 One dissenter in New Yor* v. United States reviewed the same history and con-
cluded that while the Framers believed that commandeering alonewould not establish
a workable national government, commandeering coupled with the power to legislate
for individuals would do so. See 505 U.S. at 210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). I will not venture here a critique of the Court's and the dissent's
relative arguments on this point. For purposes of the present analysis, however, it is
sufficient to note that the dissent's argument recognizes only one objection to com-
mandeering-that it reduces the effectiveness of the national government. See id.
("Because that indirect exercise of federal power [under the Articles of Confedera-
tion] proved ineffective, the Framers empowered the Federal Government to exercise
legislative authority directly over individuals within the States .... ."). If that were the
only objection, then allowing commandeering along with direct regulation of individ-
uals would be a benign result. But, as the Court explained, the Framers actually feared
commandeering because it required a standing army to enforce national mandates
against the States. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. Considering this
objection, we can see why the Framers would have rejected commandeering at the




New York v. United States also made a structural argument in sup-
port of its anti-commandeering rule. Structual arguments in consti-
tutional law generally follow four steps of analysis. 135 First, identify
the constitutional structure to be used. Second, infer a relationship
that exists within that constitutional structure. Third, make a factual
statement about the world that bears on the relationship inferred
from the constitutional structure. Fourth, draw on the first three
steps to formulate a rule that applies to the issue at hand. Of course,
when these arguments are made in practice, lawyers generally do not
speak in these terms. Rather, they just go ahead and make the argu-
ments, not stopping to label each step in the chain of logic. But, as
with any practice, it is helpful for purposes of initial explanation to be
artificially formal about the method so readers unfamiliar with this
type of argument can follow and critique its logic.
The canonical constitutional law case McCullocl v. Marland'36 of-
fers an excellent illustration of structural argument. One issue in Mc-
Culloch was whether the States could tax the national bank.13 7 Chief
Justice John Marshall analyzed this issue using the following structural
argument.138 First, the constitutional structure involved was federal-
ism, the system of government under which the People govern them-
selves through both national and state governments. Second, within
this structure, we can infer a relationship between the national and
state governments, namely that the national government is supreme
within its limited sphere of power.' 39 Third, we can make several fac-
tual statements about how the power to tax operates in the world. If
135 In this discussion, as well as the discussion on structure in Part III, I follow
Professor Philip Bobbitt's outline of structural analysis in his book Constitutional Inter-
pretation. See Pmnu BOBBrrT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 16 (1991).
136 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
137 Id. at 425. The first issue in the case was whether Congress had the power to
create a national bank. Id. at 401. In deciding this first issue in the aflirmative, Chief
Justice John Marshall held that Congress possessed implied powers to do all things
convenient to implementing its enumerated powers. &e id. at 422.
138 Professor Bobbitt summarizes this anal)sis in PHIP BOBBrrr, CoNsTrronOuAL
FATE: TBioRY OF THE CONSTITUTION 79 (1982).
139 This inference, of course, is made explicit in the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
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one government can tax another government, the taxing government
can alter the policy choices of the taxed government. Policy choices
are made, in part, based on the relative costs and benefits of different
law making options. If a State can tax one option under consideration
by the national government, a national bank for example, then the
State could change the cost-benefit calculus of that option and, in do-
ing so, alter the national government's decision. If the state tax alters
the national government's decision, the state tax effectively makes the
state government supreme on that decision. Fourth, we can formulate
a rule to answer the issue in McCulloch: States cannot tax the national
government because such a tax would violate the structure of federal-
ism in which the national government has limited but supreme power.
In New York v. United States, the Court used a structural argument
to support its anti-commandeering rule. While the Court did not walk
through the four steps of a structure analysis, 140 we will do so here.
First, the Court relied on the structure of representative govern-
ment.' 41 Second, from that structure, one can infer something about
the relationship between the electorate and their representatives.
Specifically, representatives are held accountable to the electorate at
periodic elections. This accountability allows the electorate to check
their representatives' use of government power, preventing govern-
ment tyranny.142 Third, we can make several factual observations
about how accountability works in practice. If Congress can comman-
deer the States, Congress can effectively blur the lines of accountabil-
ity and insulate their decisions from popular review. The Court
explained that when Congress regulates private behavior directly,
it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in the full view
of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the conse-
quences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.
But where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it
may be state officials who bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.
Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion,
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal
regulation.' 43
140 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
141 See id. at 168.
142 See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 CoLuM. L,
REV. 531, 565-71 (1998).
143 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
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Fourth, the Court derived a rule that decided the case: Congress can-
not commandeer state legislatures because such action interferes with
the constitutional structure of accountable representation.144 Part
Ill.E.1 will show how this structural argument applies to comman-
deering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
D. Past Government Practice
Past government practice can serve as precedent that supports or
undermines challenged government action. McCulloch again offers a
helpful illustration. Another issue in McCulloch was whether Congress
had the power to create the Bank of the United States.147 The bank in
McCulloch was actually the second national bank; Congress had first
chartered a national bank about thirty years before, during George
Washington's first term as President. 146 Chief Justice Marshall used
the first bank as precedent that supported the constitutionality of the
second bank. According to Marshall, the first bank was passed after
thorough discussion in both Congress and the executive branch over
Congress's power to do so. 147 Also, at that time, many members of
Congress and the executive branch had participated in the drafting
and ratifying conventions only a short time before. Thus, the people
who enacted and implemented the first bank had peculiarly intimate
knowledge of the Constitution's meaning. For all these reasons, the
first bank was strong precedent for the constitutionality of the second
bank.148
In New York v. United States, the Court noted the absence of prior
government practice. The Court concluded its analysis of the take
title provision with the following paragraph.
The take title provision appears to be unique. No other federal stat-
ute has been cited which offers a state government no option other
than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress.
Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Con-
gress's enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is in-
144 1&
145 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819).
146 For a discussion of creation of the first national bank, see Etwmcs & McKrriumc,
supra note 122, at 226-33; Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Pia'ground, 68 FORDHuA.t L RE%,.
1107, 1119-21 (2000).
147 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401-02.
148 A representative arguing against the 1842 districting requirement referenced
McCulloch's discussion of the bank bill as an example of prior government practice
serving as constitutional precedent. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 372
(1842) (statement of Rep. Pope of Kentucky).
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consistent with the federal structure of our Government established
by the Constitution. 149
As discussed below, it is unclear from context exactly what weight the
Court placed on the absence of a prior statute commandeering the
States. It suffices to note that the Court found the fact important
enough to mention, especially in the paragraph that restated the
Court's holding. Government practice is another brick in the wall of
the Court's argument. As discussed shortly, however, this brick can
bear no weight because the Court was wrong-prior government prac-
tice exists in the congressional districting requirement.
E. Coda: Commandeering State Executive Branch Officials
Before moving on, I briefly pause to note that five years after New
York v. United States, the Court extended the anti-commandeering rule
to state law enforcement officials. Printz v. United States'50 involved a
challenge to the Brady Act, which required state law enforcement offi-
cials to conduct federally mandated background checks in connection
with certain firearms sales.' 51 The United States tried to distinguish
New York v. United States, arguing that Congress could commandeer
the state executive branch even though it could not commandeer
state legislatures.' 5 2 The Court disagreed, explaining that the reason-
ing from New York v. United States equally applied to commandeering
of state executive branch officials. 153
The congressional districting requirement does not commandeer
state executive branch officials into enforcing federal law, so Printz is
not immediately relevant to this Article. But, Congress could attempt
to do so under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, as it has done in
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.154 One Supreme Court
opinion suggests that Congress may exercise power over state election
149 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177.
150 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
152 For the government's arguments on this point, see Brief for Respondent
United States at 10-11, Printz (Nos. 95-1478 & 95-1503). Several commentators have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infra-
structure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REv. 111, 112 (1998); Prakash, supra note 110,
at 2033; Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory ofJudicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71, 73 (1998).
153 Printz, 521 U.S. at 927-33.
154 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Several provisions
of the Act require state law enforcement officials to implement and enforce specific
voter registration rules. See, e.g., id. § 1973gg-3 (setting forth requirements for voter
registration simultaneous with driver's license application).
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officials as an incident to enforcing its own regulations of the election
process' 5 5 and that state officials owe a duty to the national govern-
ment to administer federal elections.15 6 None of these cases, however,
have either approved federal control over state legislatures or charac-
terized state legislatures as federal officials on matters related to fed-
eral elections.'1' We will not consider whether the Court was correct
to suggest that Congress can direct state election officials under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause, though analysis of that issue would
undoubtedly draw in part on arguments made in this Article regard-
ing commandeering of state legislatures.
III. COMMLNDEERING UNDER THE Twms, PLACES AND
MANNER CLAUSE
This Part uses accepted methods of constitutional interpretation
to determine whether Congress can commandeer the States under
the Times, Places and Manner Clause.158 Specifically, I examine argu-
ments from text, history, precedent, structure, and prior government
155 See Ex pane Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-87 (1879).
156 See id. at 387-89; Evan H. Caminker, Printz, Stale Soverdgnt, and the Limits of
FormalisA 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 199, 237 ("A fair reading of this text suggests that Con-
gress may still require the same state election officers to implement the federally al-
tered scheme, unless Congress chooses instead to replace them by authorizing the
appointment of federal election officials.").
157 In some cases, it may be a dose call whether a federal statute only comman-
deers enforcement of state law or also commandeers state law making. For example,
Congress could pass a statute that requires States to provide detailed information
about polling places and ballot contents to voters in federal elections. On its face, this
law appears to only command States to enforce a federal mandate. But, to do so,
some States might need to enact legislation approving funds for enforcement, allocat-
ing responsibility for enforcement within the state government, or establishing guide-
lines for enforcement. Thus, commandeering of state law enforcement officials may
require some incidental legislation by the State. The question is when, if ever, such
incidental law making should be considered commandeering of state legislatures.
This question need not be addressed presently, as the congressional districting re-
quirement is a straightforward commandeering of state legislatures. See supra Part I.B.
158 I do not here join the debate concerning the proper methods for interpreting
the Constitution. The nature and propriety of using these methods is discussed in
BOBBrrr, supra note 135, BOBBrrr, supra note 138, DEN~is PATrr o N, Lxw ,N
TtrH (1996), Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HAIR%. L. Rw. 747 (1999) [here-
inafter Amar, Intratextualism], J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topits: The Reason of Legal
Rhetorik and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in Lw's SToRiEs: NmITvE ANo RHETORuC iN
THE LAw 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996), McGreal, supra note 146, and
Symposium, Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TmL. L RE,. 1703 (1994).
Rather, this Article practices constitutional law by doing interpretation. Cf. Akhil
Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualisin, and Populism, 65 Forwamr
L. R v. 1657, 1657 (1997).
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practice. Instead of re-opening the debate in New York v. United States
over Congress's power to commandeer under any circumstances, this
Part accepts the Court's holding that Congress cannot commandeer
under the Commerce Clause and asks whether any of the sources of
constitutional argument suggest a different result under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. 159 Thus, the analysis will take two main
forms: analysis of the Times, Places and Manner Clause itself and com-
parison of the Times, Places and Manner Clause to the Commerce
Clause. As a preface to this analysis, Section A reviews one of the
Court's most recent federalism decisions, which sets forth a sort of
federalism standard of review.16
0
A. State Sovereignty and a Federalism Standard of Review
In Alden v. Maine,I 61 decided in 1999, the Court brought some
welcome structure to its federalism analysis. Up until Alden, the
Court's recent federalism decisions had taken on a somewhat ad hoc
flavor, though with a decided preference for greater state autonomy.
Read separately, each decision seemed to stand on its own, largely in-
dependent of parallel developments. Only by lining up the decisions
next to one another did the trend become clear. 16 2 But, then, the
Court tied it all together in Alden. Section A explains how Alden did
so, setting the stage for the remainder of Part III's analysis.
At first,.blush, Alden seemed to raise the issue whether the Elev-
enth Amendment barred private suits against a State in its own state
courts. Under the Amendment's text, this argument is patently ab-
surd: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States, by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
159 See Fallon, supra note 104, at 575 (noting that in practice constitutional schol-
ars often "assume obligations of consistency"); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108
YALE L.J. 1311, 1351-54 (1999) (applying a standard of consistency to arguments over
whether judges ought to consider the "judicial history" of a court opinion, meaning
the private papers of individual judges created or exchanged during deliberation over
a case).
160 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
161 Id.
162 In chronological order, the main constitutional decisions in this trend have
been: New York v. United States, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Seminole Tribe
v. F/orida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Pintz, and City ofBoerne v. FRores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Of course, others might add to or subtract from this list, as is the nature of the debate
over the canon of constitutional law. SeeJ.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons
of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1016 (1998). The main point is that an
identifiable trend had emerged. SeeJames W. Torke, Enumerated and Reserved Powers:
The "Perpetually Arising Question, "32 IND. L. REV. 3, 8 (1998); Yoo, supra note 36, at 27.
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Subjects of any Foreign State."163 The text refers solely to the "Judi-
cial power of the United States," saying nothing about suits in state
court. But, in Alden, the Court explained that the Eleventh Amend-
ment stood for more than just its literal text. It was evidence of a
larger principle of state sovereignty,'6 and that principle extended
far beyond private suits in federal court. It is this larger principle that
can inform our analysis of commandeering under the Times, Places
and Manner Clause.
To understand the lessons of Alden, we need to ask three ques-
tions: how, what, and when. Specifically, we must ask how the Court
derived its principles of state sovereignty, what those principles are,
and when those principles must yield to federal power. We will con-
sider each question in turn.
First, let us examine the "how" question. The Court found its
federalism principles in the history of the Eleventh Amendment,
which had three main components. First, the Framers assumed that
the Constitution left the States with a substantial residual of state sov-
ereignty, which included, among other things, immunity from suit by
private individuals in state or federal court.1 65 Federal courts must
protect the States by striking down federal laws that unduly encroach
on that sovereignty. Second, in Chisholm v. Georgia,166 the Court held,
contrary to the intentions of the Framers, and thus the manifest
meaning of the Constitution, that States were subject to suit in federal
court.167 Third, Congress, in a fit of outrage over Chisholm, quickly
proposed the Eleventh Amendment 6 to overrule Chisholm and con-
firm that state sovereignty included immunity from suit in federal
court; 69 the States quickly ratified the proposed Amendment. 70 To
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
164 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-14.
165 See id. at 715. ("The generation that designed and adopted our federal system
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.").
166 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
167 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 719.
Despite the persuasive assurances of the Constitution's leading advocates
and the expressed understanding of the only state conventions to address
the issue in explicit terms, this Court held, just five years after the Constitu-
tion was adopted, that Article II authorized a private citizen of another State
to sue the State of Georgia without its consent.
Id. (construing Chisholm).
168 See id. at 721 ("Each House spent but a single day discussing the Amendment,
and the vote in each House was close to unanimous.").
169 Id. at 722 ("The text and history of the Eleventh Amendment... suggest that
Congress acted not to change but to restore the original constitutional design."); see
also P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
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the Alden Court, this history shows that the Eleventh Amendment did
not create a new state immunity, but rather confirmed one aspect of a
larger notion of state sovereignty that underlies the Constitution.1 1
The first part of Alden's history lesson, that the Constitution es-
tablishes judicially enforceable state sovereignty limits on federal
power, marks another, unsurprising turn in the Court's overall feder-
alism jurisprudence. No one in the federalism debate disputes that
the Constitution recognizes two levels of government, state and fed-
eral, and relies on the continued existence and proper functioning of
each level of government as a safeguard against abuse of government
power.172 All agree that the Constitution allocates power between the
two levels of government, giving some powers to one or the other and
giving both levels concurrent power on other matters.173 Of course,
the boundaries between state and federal power will not always be easy
to discern, and Congress (and the President) and the States may disa-
gree in specific cases. When disagreements arise, the question arises:
Who is to decide precisely where the boundary lies? Over the last
twenty-five years or so, the Court has divided sharply over whether the
courts should play any role in defining the boundary between federal
and state power. A brief description of this struggle is in order before
completing the discussion of Alden.
The modem saga began with National League of Cities v. Usery, 174
where the Court addressed the constitutionality of applying the fed-
eral minimum wage to state employees. 175 The federal minimum
("The [Eleventh] Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a
union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity.").
170 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1191-92 (1988).
171 Alden, 527 U.S. at 728-29 ("The Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than
established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope
of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment
alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.").
172 See, e.g., id. at 713-15 (discussing division of power between state and federal
government); id. at 799-800 (Souter, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the importance
of division of power between state and national governments); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59 (1992) (same); id. at 206-07 (White, J., dissenting)
(same).
173 When power is concurrent, the Supremacy Clause requires that federal law
trumps conflicting state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
174 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
175 This requirement, along with an overtime wage requirement, was enacted




wage applied equally to private and public employees, 17 6 so there was
no argument that Congress was targeting the States. Yet, the States
argued that even generally applicable federal laws could violate state
sovereignty by unduly affecting how the States made decisions. 17 For
example, the federal minimum wage affected a State's decision of how
much to pay its employees, which decision was the product of various
policy considerations. The Court agreed, holding that generally appli-
cable laws violate state sovereignty when those laws regulate "a tradi-
tional government function" of the State. 78 Since setting employee
wages was a traditional government function, the federal minimum
wage was unconstitutional as applied to the States.17 9 Thus, in Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court decided that it would police the
boundary of federalism under the "traditional government function"
test. 8 0
After living under National League of Cities for a little under a dec-
ade, the Court reversed course in Garda v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.18' Garcia again raised the constitutionality of apply-
ing the federal minimum wage to state employees. The Court recon-
sidered and ultimately rejected the holding of National League of Cities
that courts could enforce federalism limits on federal power.182 In-
stead, Garcia held that the Constitution established the national politi-
cal process as the States' main protection. 83 According to the Court,
the Constitution gave States much input into the federal law maldng
176 See id. § 203(c) (1994) (defining employer to include state governments).
177 Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847-48.
178 Id. at 852.
179 See id,.
180 NationalLeague of Citieswas actually read to state a four part test. In Garia, the
Court summarized the test as follows:
First, it is said that the federal statute at issue must regulate "the 'States as
States.'" Second, the statute must "address matters that are indisputably 'at-
tributes of state sovereignty.'" Third, state compliance with the federal obli-
gation must "directly impair [the States'] ability 'to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions.'" Finally, the rela-
tion of state and federal interests must not be such that "the nature of fed-
eral interests... justifies state submission."
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (citations omit-
ted) (construing National League of Cities).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 548-49.
183 See id. at 550 ("Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress's Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of
the Federal Government itself.").
2001]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
process, 84 such as the power to regulate federal elections and the
equal representation of the States in the Senate. 8 5 It was this process,
and not judicial review of federal law, that would guard the border
between federal and state power.'8 6
Then-Justice William Rehnquist dissented in Garcia,187 also join-
ing dissents by Justices Lewis Powell' 88 and Sandra O'Connor.1s 9 All
three Justices argued for a judicially enforceable federalism, as in Na-
tional League of Cities. Rehnquist ended his brief dissent with the omi-
nous warning that judicial enforcement of federalism "will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court."'90 Rehnquist proved prescient, as the Court has since gradu-
ally formulated new judicial doctrines to protect the States from fed-
eral intrusion. New York v. United States and Printz created judicially
enforceable anti-commandeering rules.191 Seminole Tribe v. nlorida se-
verely restricted Congress's power to abrogate state immunity from
suit in federal court.192 And, the Court has used its power to interpret
statutes to protect States, holding that it will not read federal statutes
184 See id. at 550-51 ("[It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreach-
ing by Congress.").
185 Id. at 551. This same argument had been made by constitutional commenta-
tors and had earned the label "the political safeguards of federalism," derived from
the classic article of that title by Professor Herbert Wechsler. SeeJEsSE H. CHoPEm,
JuDICIAL RmEVIv AND THE NATIONAL Pou-rIcAL. PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rnv. 543 (1954). Of course, any
proponent of the political safeguards of federalism must account for the Seventeenth
Amendment, which removed state legislatures from selection of the United States
Senate and, in doing so, reduced state influence in the federal law making process.
See Garda, 469 U.S. at 554; CHOPER, supra, at 176; Wechsler, supra, at 546-47.
186 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 ("[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal com-
merce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that
our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promul-
gated."). Garcia acknowledged some role for courts for defining the federal-state
boundary. First, as none of the Justices disputed in National League of Cities or Garcia,
the Court could review whether a specific statute was within one of Congress's enu-
merated powers. Id. Second, Garcia said that the courts could step in to impose "af-
firmative limits" on Congress's power, but refused to "identify or define" what those
limits might be. Id.
187 Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 557-79 (Powell, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 96.
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to apply to the States unless the statute's text unmistakably requires
such a reading.193 Alden ties these developments together, firmly re-
jecting Garcid's hands-off approach to federalism issues. Alden makes
explicit what had become apparent in New York v. United States and
Pintz: The Court has re-entered the business ofjudicially enforceable
rules of state sovereignty.
Now on to the "what" question: What are these larger principles
of state sovereignty that the Court will henceforth enforce? The
Court explained that the Constitution protects state sovereignty in two
ways.194 First, the Constitution delegates certain limited, enumerated
powers to Congress, reserving the remainder of government power to
the People in their states.' 95 If Congress's enumerated powers are
properly construed, the States will have a substantial area of autono-
mous power, free from federal interference. 19 6 Second, even when
Congress acts within one of its enumerated powers, it may not use
those powers to invade a State's sovereignty.19 7 For example, Con-
gress may not commandeer the States to enact or enforce federal
law'98-the holdings of New York v. United States'9 and Printz,200 re-
spectively. Alden added to this second category, holding that Congress
cannot commandeer state courts into hearing private damages suits
193 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 456-63 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act did not apply to state judges).
194 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999).
195 1& (stating that the Constitution "reserves to [the States] a substantial portion
of the Nation's primary sovereignty").
196 During the recent federalism revival, the Court has begun to constrict the
reach of Congress's enumerated powers. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
535-36 (1997) (holding that Congress is limited to enforcing existing constitutional
rights under its power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress's Com-
merce Clause power does not extend to possession of a gun near a school).
197 Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
198 Id.
[E]ven as to matters within the competence of the National Government,
the constitutional design secures the founding generation's rejection of "the
concept of a central government that would act upon and through the
States" in favor of "a system in which the State and Federal Governments
would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who were, in Hamil-
ton's words, 'the only proper objects of government."
Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (quoting THE FrnR.
Ausr No. 15, supra note 111, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton))).
199 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
200 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
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against their States.201 After Alden, one task is to identify other federal
actions that violate this state sovereignty.202
The Court readily acknowledged that these principles of state sov-
ereignty must, at times, yield to federal authority.203 After all, the
Constitution declares the federal government supreme within its lim-
ited sphere of power.204 This brings us to the "when" question: When
do the principles of state sovereignty that underlie the Constitution
give way to supreme federal power? Alden offers a sort of constitu-
tional burden of proof: The principles of state sovereignty remain in-
tact and protect States from the federal government, unless "there is
'compelling evidence' that the States were required to surrender this
power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional design. 20 5 And, the
Court declares that it will look at the traditional sources of constitu-
tional argument-text, history, past government practice, precedent,
and structure-to determine whether such evidence exists.206 Follow-
ing the Court's latest prescription, the remainder of Part III analyzes
whether "compelling evidence" exists such that the Times, Places and
Manner Clause abrogates a State's sovereign right against comman-
deering by the federal government.
One last word before turning to the analysis. Now, of course,
what constitutes "compelling evidence" is just about anybody's guess,
and Alden offered no further elaboration on the phrase.20 7 The
201 Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 ("A power to press a State's own courts into federal
service to coerce the other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to
turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machin.
ery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals."); id. at 758-60.
202 A prime candidate is a generally applicable federal law (that is, a federal law
that applies to both the States and private actors) that regulates traditional state func-
tions, like the federal minimum wage. While Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985),
held that Congress could enact such laws, the federalism views of the Garcia dissenters
are now ascendant, and Garcids days appear to be numbered. See Torke, supra note
162, at 8.
203 Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
204 U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
205 Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-31 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 781 (1991)).
206 Id. at 741.
207 It reminds one of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), where the Court held that a State cannot place an "undue burden" on a wo-
man's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 876. Of course, the first ques-
tion that arises is, "What is an 'undue burden'?" Well, probably trying to be helpful,
the joint opinion offered a definition of undue burden: A restriction that places a
"substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking to exercise her right to choose.
Id. at 877. Hmmm. Has that really advanced the ball any? Probably not, as litigants,
and lower courts, have been left scratching their heads while trying to determine
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Court's application of that standard, however, suggests two important
points. First, the Court will presume that a State retains the attributes
of state sovereignty that Alden identified: no commandeering of a state
legislature or executive, and immunity from a private damages suit in
state or federal court. Second, the party seeking to overcome that
presumption has the burden to identify specific evidence in the Consti-
tution's text, structure, history, precedent, or prior government prac-
tice that the Constitution authorizes the specifc abrogation of state
sovereignty.
To illustrate these tvo points, consider the issue to be discussed
shortly- Whether Congress can commandeer the state legislatures
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. First, the Court will pre-
sume that the Times, Places and Manner Clause does not authorize
commandeering unless "compelling evidence" to the contrary is
brought forth. Second, the Court will look for evidence specifically
bearing on commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. Evidence that Congress was to have ultimate control over the
times, places, and manner of federal elections, that such power was
important to the functioning of the new national government, or that
Congress's power under the Clause was plenary simply does not speak
to the issue. Each piece offers some inferential evidence, but the
Court has rejected such inferences elsewhere because they do not
speak directly to the issue posed 208-the evidence does not compel
the conclusion. In the last section of Part III, we will return to these
two guidelines from Alden and see if the evidence under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause measures up.
when a burden becomes undue, or when an obstacle becomes substantial. The bot-
tom line is that most doctrinal catch phrases and buzz words are merely labels for
analysis that must take place on different grounds. We can say we are looking for an
"undue burden" or a "substantial obstacle," but, in reality, we are really trying to fig-
ure out what key factors or facts controlled the Court's decision, and whether those
factors or facts apply to our case.
208 For example, the Court has acknowledged that Congress was to have ultimate
control over interstate commerce, that such power was important to the functioning
of the new national government, and that Congress's Commerce Clause power is ple-
nary. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,553 (1995); NewYorkv. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1992). Yet, the Court has also concluded that Congress cannot
use that power to abrogate state immunity against commandeering or against private
damages suits. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. at 188.
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B. Text
Depending on the author consulted, textual analysis can take
many forms.20 9 This Section will examine text in two main ways. First,
it will examine how ordinary speakers of the language used the words
of the text at the time the Constitution was drafted. Dictionaries from
the founding era are possible sources of usage, as are other contempo-
rary writings. Often, usage of some words at the time of the founding
will not differ materially from the usage of those words today. Where
a word or phrase had more than one usage, one must use context to
decide among the different usages. Also, in determining whether a
word or phrase can bear a particular usage, one can consider whether
alternate words or phrases would more naturally convey that meaning.
For example, if the Framers wanted the Time, Places and Manner
Clause to grant Congress the power to commandeer the States, would
there have been a clearer way to say so?
Second, one can examine how the word or phrase under consid-
eration was used (or not used) in other portions of the Constitu-
tion.210 The various uses may shed light on how the document uses
the phrase or word generally. Conversely, the use of different words
or phrases in other parts of the Constitution may shed light on the
meaning of the word or phrase under consideration. For example, if
another portion of the Constitution grants Congress (or someone
else) power to commandeer States, and that other portion uses words
or phrases different from the Times, Places and Manner Clause, one
could infer that the Times, Places and Manner Clause does not au-
thorize commandeering. Otherwise, the Constitution would have
used the same commandeering language in the Times, Places and
Manner Clause. This Section will use both types of textual argument
209 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw 23-41 (1997) (reviewing different aspects of textual interpretation); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HAv. L. REv. 26, 28-33 (2000).
210 Professor Akhil Amar refers to this method as "intratextualism'"-searching a
document to see how its authors used words throughout the text. Amar, Intratextual-
ism, supra note 158, at 748. Some commentators have criticized this approach as rest-
ing on the erroneous assumption that the Constitution is a tightly integrated
document. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
YALE LJ. 1225, 1287-95 (1999); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert,
and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000). Only a
tightly integrated document would justify careful intratextual comparisons of word
usage, Tushnet, supra, at 1288-89, and the Constitution is not such a document. Id.
at 1294.
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in analyzing whether the Times, Places and Manner Clause grants
Congress power to commandeer the States.
To start, let us get the text of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause out on the table: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators."21' The Clause gives States the power to "pre-
scribe[]" the "Times, Places and Manner" for electing representatives
and senators, and it gives Congress the power to "make" or "alter" the
States' "regulations." Consider what the words "regulation," "make,"
and "alter" can tell us about Congress's power to commandeer the
States.
First, the word "regulation" suggests a law made through ordinary
legislative processes.212 Dictionaries of the time of the founding bear
out this observation. 213 This usage makes sense in context, given that
the regulations are to be made "in each State by the Legislature
thereof," and that Congress-the federal legislative branch-is the
body to "make or alter" the regulations. Usage, then, suggests that the
power described in the Times, Places and Manner Clause is closely
akin to the other legislative powers granted Congress in Article I, Sec-
tion 8. Specifically, it is the same type of power that Congress is
granted by the Commerce Clause, only over a different subject matter
(times, places, and manner of federal elections, as opposed to inter-
state commerce). Thus, this legislative law making power, regardless
of its context, should be subject to the same limitations-namely, no
commandeering of the States.
Further evidence that "regulation" refers to legislative law making
can be found in other portions of the Constitution. For example, the
Commerce Clause, which was the very clause Congress used to enact
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cd. 1.
212 See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932).
213 See 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DianONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
Strahan, 4th ed. 1773) (listing "to adjust by rule" as a definition of "regulate"); 2 id.
(London, Strahan, 7th ed. 1785) (same); THo.As SHEm.%, A Co.tn-Ez Dicno~n.v
oF nE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia, W Young, Mills & Son, 6th ed. 1796)
(same); see also N. BAILEY, AN UNnRamA E-n7NoLocic. ENGUSH Dicno.px
(London, C. Elliot & T. Kay, 26th ed. 1789) (listing "to govern" as one of the defini-
tions of "regulate"); BAcLA'S UNnmysAL ENGLISH DicnoAR (LondonJames S. ir-
tue, B. Woodward rev. 1782); 2 NOAH WkasrER, AhwMic.A Dicno"ARY o'riT E.GCLISH
LANGUAGE 1913 (New York, S. Converse 1828) (listing the following as a definition of
"regulate": "to govern or direct according to rule... to bring under the control of law
or constituted authority").
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the take title provision struck down in New York v. United States,'- 4
grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. 2 15,
The Clause uses "regulate"-the power to make "regulations"-in re-
ferring to Congress's power to pass laws governing interstate com-
merce. The "regulations" Congress passes under the Times, Places
and Manner Clause should be of the same character. Thus, if Con-
gress cannot commandeer the States while "regulat[ing]" under the
Commerce Clause, it should not be able to do so in maldng or alter-
ing "regulations" under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. In
both contexts, the grant of power to regulate does not entail the
power to commandeer the States.
Next, consider the words "make" and "alter." On their face, these
words are i-suited to authorize commandeering. In the Times,
Places and Manner Clause, the object of the verbs "make" and "alter"
is the "regulations" that are made, or not made, by the States. In exer-
cising its power to "make or alter," Congress is to act on the regula-
tions, not the States. 216 This cuts against commandeering, where the
States, not Congress, would be "making" or "altering" the regulations.
Use of the word "make" parallels the text of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which was invoked in New York v. United States.217 The
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress power to "make all
Laws... necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."218 In New York v. United States, the Court held that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause did not give Congress the power to comman-
deer the States when acting in furtherance of an enumerated power;
commandeering was not a "proper" exercise of Congress's enumer-
ated powers.219 Just as Congress's power to "make" all laws necessary
and proper does not entail the power to commandeer, Congress's
214 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992).
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
216 Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 uses similar language, providing that all state
inspection laws "shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Again, it is the laws, not the States, that are subject to Con-
gress's control.
217 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
218 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
219 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel
the States to require or prohibit those acts.... [T]he Commerce Clause, for
example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it
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power to "make" regulations governing the times, places, and manner
of federal elections should not do so.
A more natural way to express commandeering would be a clause
providing, "Congress shall make or alter such regulations or direct the
States to make or alter such regulations according to rules prescribed by Con-
gress." This hypothetical text specifically grants Congress the power to
direct States to make law, not simply to make law itself. In this way,
our example resembles the Militia Clause, which specifically allows
Congress to direct state action. The Militia Clause grants Congress
power to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Mili-
tia," and reserves "to the States respectively.., the Authority of train-
ing the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."20 As in
our hypothetical example, the Militia Clause provides for federal di-
rection of state conduct. Indeed, the Militia Clause is a striking paral-
lel to the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Both Clauses grant the
States and Congress concurrent authority over a subject-militia and
federal elections, respectively. Yet, only the Militia Clause specifically
grants Congress the power to direct the States. Again, the inference is
does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of
interstate commerce.
Id. The Court further elaborated this point in Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
The dissent of course resorts to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra
vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reasons that
the power to regulate the sale of handguns under the Commerce Clause,
coupled with the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers," conclusively es-
tablishes the Brady Act's constitutional vlidity, because the Tenth Amend-
ment imposes no limitations on the exercise of ddegated powers but merely
prohibits the exercise of powers "not delegated to the United States." What
destroys the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument, however, is
not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper Clause itself.
When a "La[w] ... for carrying into Execution" the Commerce Clause vio-
lates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional
provisions we mentioned earlier, it is not a "La[w] ... properfor carr)ing into
Execution the Commerce Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federal-
ist, "merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be treated as
such."
Id. (citations omitted). One commentator has mistakenly argued that N'ew Yor: v.
United States did not explain how its anti-commandeering fiat might impact the scope
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast?
The Constitutionality of the .,ational Voter Registration Art of 1993, 22 J. LEcis. 45, 81
(1996). Thus, while this commentator argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause is
"dispositive" in favor of Congress's power to commandeer under the Times, Places
and Manner Clause, id. at 80, the truth is that the Necessary and Proper Clause un-
dermines such a power to commandeer.
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 16 (emphasis added).
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that the text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause does not grant
Congress power to commandeer the States.
The Supremacy Clause also contains language better suited to
commandeering. That Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in evey State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.22 1
The Supremacy Clause commands all state court judges to obey-"be
bound []by"-all "Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance" of the Constitution. Since Congress has power to "make"
such laws, we can infer that the Supremacy Clause commands state
judges to obey Congress when Congress acts within its constitutional
powers. Neither the Times, Places and Manner Clause nor the other
power-granting clauses of Article I, Section 8 (for example, the Com-
merce Clause), contain similar language commanding state legisla-
tures to obey Congress.2 22 Rather, these clauses simply grant
Congress power to regulate private conduct directly.
And, both the Extradition Clause 223 and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause224 provide further instances where the Constitution expressly
requires the States to obey the commands of other actors. The Extra-
dition Clause requires States to return fugitives who are charged with
a crime in another state:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which hefled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of
the Crime.2 25
221 Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
222 The Supreme Court relied on this textual observation in Print, 521 U.S. 898,
907 (1997).
223 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
224 Id. art. IV, § 1.
225 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The Fugitive Slave Clause contains
similar language:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
Id art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. This Clause effectively empowers the slave owner-a private cit-
zen-to commandeer a State into returning an escaped slave. This extraordinary
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The Clause commands States to obey a "Demand" by the executive
authority of another state under specific circumstances. In the par-
lance of New York v. United States and Printz, the executive authority of
one state can commandeer another State to act. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause acts similarly- "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."226 Here, the Clause empowers both
Congress and other States to commandeer a State. When a State gen-
erates "public Acts, Records, and Proceedings," it effectively comman-
deers other States to respect those matters in certain cases. Similarly,
when Congress prescribes "the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof," Congress
tells the various branches of state government how they must act when
faced with the "public Acts, Records, and Proceedings" of another
state. Thus, in both the Extradition and Full Faith and Credit Clauses,
the Framers expressly empowered some actor to commandeer the
States. The Times, Places and Manner Clause does not contain such
language.
The Articles of Confederation further illustrate how comman-
deering could be expressed. Comparing the text of the Articles to the
text of the Constitution is an accepted method of textual analysis.=
As discussed above, the Constitution was in large part a response to
the perceived flaws in government under the Articles. 2 So, in some
cases, we can better understand the Constitution's text by comparing
it to the Articles.
Chief Justice John Marshall made such a comparison in fcCul-
loc. 229 One issue in that case was whether Congress had power to
create a national bank.23 0 Beginning with the Constitution's text,
Marshall noted that none of Congress's enumerated powers specifi-
cally authorized Congress to charter a bank.2' Next, Marshall asked
whether Congress was strictly limited to those powers expressly enu-
merated, or whether Congress had implied power to do those things
breach of state sovereignty-granting a private citizen power to direct a State--shos
the lengths to which some Framers went to protect the slave trade.
226 IdL art. IV, § l.
227 See, eg., McCulloch v. Maryland., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
228 See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
229 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406-07.
230 I& at 401.
231 Id. at 406.
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helpful in the exercise of enumerated powers.232 In deciding this
question, Marshall compared the Articles of Confederation to the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.233 While the Articles of Con-
federation reserved to the States all powers not "expressly delegated" to
the United States, 234 the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States
only those "powers not delegated to the United States."235 Use of the
word "expressly" in the Articles suggested that Congress possessed
only those powers specifically listed. Conversely, omission of the word
"expressly" in the Tenth Amendment suggested that the Constitution
allowed Congress certain implied powers in addition to the enumer-
ated powers.236
The same type of comparison can be made on the comman-
deering issue.237 Several provisions of the Articles of Confederation
provided that Congress would act only through the States. For exam-
ple, Congress could raise revenue or troops only by maldng requests
to the States.238 Further, each State was directed to "abide by the de-
terminations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all ques-
tions which by this confederation are submitted to them."2 -9
Conversely, the Times, Places and Manner Clause does not contain
similar language granting Congress power to command or make a re-
quest of the States. Thus, comparison to the Articles of Confedera-
tion provides further textual evidence that Congress cannot
commandeer under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
232 Id. at 405-07.
233 Id. at 406-07.
234 ARTIc-Es OF CONFEDERATION art. II (emphasis added). Article II states specili-
cally- "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States, in Congress assembled." Id.
235 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the People.").
236 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406-07. This textual inference was supported
by arguments from history, prior government practice, structure, and other texts. Id.
at 401-25.
237 As discussed above, the Court made a similar analysis in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1992). See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
238 ARncL.as OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII (stating that all expenses "incurred for
the common defence or general welfare" were to be paid "out of a common treasury"
provided by the States "according to such mode as the United States in Congress
assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint"); id. art. IX (granting Con-
gress power "to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from
each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such
State, which requisition shall be binding").
239 Id art. XIII.
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This textual argument squares with constitutional history. The
Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation showed that
congressional commands to or requests from the States could not be
enforced.24 So, rather than carrying that pathetic power over to the
Constitution, the Framers granted Congress power to regulate private
behavior directly.
In sum, the text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause does not
support a power to commandeer. The words of the Clause----"regula-
tion," "make," and "alter-suggest that Congress must make and al-
ter the regulations, not command the States to do so. Also,
comparing the Clause to other texts, we see that there are better ways
to express commandeering.
C. Histoy
Constitutional commentators of all stripes recognize the rele-
vance of history to constitutional interpretation.2 41 Though many ra-
tionales or theories are offered for this recognition, the common
sense reason is that history can help us understand why our predeces-
sors did something. 42 After all, the Constitution is not merely a theo-
retical tract expressing abstract hopes and aspirations. 43 Rather, it is
an instrumental document-a charter for government aimed at con-
240 See supra notes108-14 and accompanying text.
241 Though, of course, commentators vary in the role they assign to this source of
meaning. See, e-g., ROBERT H. BoRix, Txm Th.irmG OF A.-imc. 143-60 (1990); Paul
Brest, The Msconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L Rxv. 204, 214
(1980) (describing as "moderate" those originalists who use "the framers' intent on a
relatively abstract level of generality"); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Nomative and De-
scriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEo. UJ. 1765, 1766
(1997) ("Although there are very few strict originalists, virtually all practitioners of
and commentators on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some rele-
vance to constitutional interpretation."); Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112
HARv. L Rxv. 611, 677 (1999) ("We are all originalists, we are all non-originalists' is
the order of the day, and everyone willing to tackle problems of constitutional law
consults sources beyond the Founding while still giving the historical evidence careful
consideration."); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. Rxv. 669, 718 (1991).
242 James Madison took this common sense view of the rele-ance of history to the
Constitution's meaning: "Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the
ominous prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which
ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the Constitutional Char-
ter the remedy that was provided." 3 THE RECORDS OF THE Fxt,.u COXEXnTION OF
1787, supra note 116, at 549 (quoting the draft of James Madison's Preface to his
notes on the debates of the federal convention).
243 At times, however, constitutional commentators treat the document that vay.
See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLMtATICS OF MORAL THEORY 144-46 (1999).
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crete challenges and problems. In interpreting that document, then,
we ought to understand the problems it addresses as well as how the
document does so.
This Section examines the history of the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause. As with much of the Constitution, this history shows ten-
sion between national and state interests. On the one hand, advocates
of national interests argued that Congress should have broad power to
regulate elections in the event that States either refused to do so or
did so negligently. On the other hand, advocates of state power ar-
gued that Congress's power over elections should be narrow, lest Con-
gress use such a power to harm the States. In short, it is a microcosm
of the federalism dilemma that ran throughout the drafting and ratify-
ing conventions: how to create a national government strong enough
to be effective, yet not so strong that it unduly threatened the States.
Subsection 1 reviews how the drafters and ratifiers addressed this di-
lemma in the Times, Places and Manner Clause. The second Subsec-
tion asks what this history means for congressional commandeering
under that Clause.
1. Drafting and Ratifying Conventions
We will look principally to the drafting and ratification debates to
discern the history and purposes of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. The canonical sources for this history are James Madison's
notes from the federal drafting convention,244 the collected notes
from the thirteen state ratification conventions, 245 and The Federalist
Papers, which are newspaper editorials that Alexander Hamilton, John
Jay, and James Madison wrote to convince New York voters to ratify
the Constitution.246 While some historians have criticized reliance on
244 I use Max Farrand's collection of Madison's notes in his three volume set on
the federal convention. See generally THE RECORDS OF THE FWEERAL CONVrNoN OF
1787, supra note 116. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School maintains a searchable,
on-line version of Madison's notes, see generally The Avalon Project, Notes on theDebates
in the Federal Convention, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/debates/deb-
cont.htm (last modified Sept. 15, 2000), as does the Library of Congress, see generally
Library of Congress, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at http://
lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lvfr.html (last modified Sept. 15, 2000).
245 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 130, is the standard source for the state ratifying
conventions. The Library of Congress also has an on-line version of this source. See
Library of Congress, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (last modi-
fied Sept. 15, 2000).
246 See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 111. Several sources maintain on-line
versions of The Federalist See generally The Avalon Project: The Federalist Papers, at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm (last modified Sept. 15, 2000); Library
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these sources, 247 the sources are part of the constitutional law canon
in that lawyers, judges, and constitutional law scholars treat them as
authoritative on the Constitution's history and purposes.2 48
Textually, the most striking thing about the Times, Places and
Manner Clause to the founding generation was that it granted the
national and state governments concurrent authority over federal
elections, with the national government getting the final word. When
we look at these sources, we see two main reasons for this division of
labor. First, it would have been impractical to set a single time, place,
and manner for federal elections in the Constitution. Because local
circumstances in each state might dictate different regulations, some
discretion was needed to tailor the elections to local needs.2 49 And,
of Congress, Federalist Papers, at http://lcveb2.loc.gov/const/fedquery.html (last
modified Dec. 25, 1996).
247 For example, some have criticized Madison's notes as incomplete, as they
surely were given that he hand wrote them during spoken debate, and as biased in
that he selectively recorded comments, ignoring unfavorable arguments and record-
ing favorable ones. See, eg., James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TLx. L. REv. 1, 24-35 (1986) (setting forth and
critiquing criticisms of Madison's notes). Similarly, The Federalist Papers are criticized
as mere political propaganda, which they surely were in the sense that they sought to
influence a political decision by New York's ratifying convention, that was calculated
to gain votes rather than offer a genuine interpretation of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualisn, 37 UCLA L REv. 621, 682 (1993) ("The
Federalist Papers were, after all, propaganda documents .... ."); Chase J. Sanders,
Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment 69 IND. I.J. 759, 765 n.25
(1994) ("For all the deference paid to the Federalist papers in two centuries of consti-
tutional interpretation, it is easy to forget that the essa)s were hardly a neutral exposi-
tion, but constituted, in effect, a brief in favor of ratification."); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Modd of Statutoly
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1316 (1990) ("[T]he Federalist Papers were not
even official statements of the framers. Rather, they were written as much to per-
suade as to explain."); James W. Ducayet, Note, Publius and Federalism: On the Use and
Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rr. 821, 850
(1993). We need notjoin this larger debate to assess the history of the Tunes, Places
and Manner Clause. Rather, the legal community's practice of using these sources
legitimates the arguments as "legal arguments," at least until the community's prac-
tices change.
248 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 162, at 975-81 (noting consensus, but also
that canons for practicing lawyers and academics might diverge at times). Of course,
the fact that these sources are canonical, meaning the legal community has accepted
resort to them in making constitutional arguments, does not mean that that commit-
nity has reached consensus on what weight to give those sources. &e BoBnrrr, supra
tiote 135; Dorf, supra note 104, at 602-05; Fallon, supra note 104, at 572-76.
249 See 3 ELUoT's DuEnxrs, supra note 130, at 367 (statement ofJames Madison at
the Vi-ginia ratifying convention) ("It was found impossible to fix the time, place, and
manner, of the election of representatives, in the Constitution."); TuE FEnn ELuisr No.
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between the federal and state governments, the state governments
were most familiar with the local circumstances and, thus, should reg-
ulate in the first instance. 250
Second, this method was more congenial to the States, whose ap-
proval the Constitution would need. Presumably, the States would
like to hold the new federal elections at the same times and places as
their existing state elections.251 If the Constitution or Congress had
set an uniform time, place, and manner for federal elections, either
the States would have to hold two sets of elections, incurring added
expense and inconvenience in the process, or the States would have to
change the time, place, and manner of their own elections to coincide
with the federal elections. This might be seen as an intolerable intru-
sion on state sovereignty.
State power over the times, places, and manner of federal elec-
tions, however, was a double edged sword. While that power enabled
States to meet local circumstances, the power could also hinder or
destroy Congress if abused. The Framers foresaw three main threats
from the States' times, places, and manner power: States refusing to
hold federal elections; States being unable, due to rebellion or inva-
sion, to hold federal elections; or States holding unfair federal elec-
tions.252 In the first two circumstances, if enough States were unable
or unwilling to hold federal elections, those States could deprive ei-
59, supra note 111, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It will not be alleged that an elec-
tion law could have been framed and inserted in the Constitution which would have
been applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will
therefore not be denied that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist
somewhere.").
250 THE FEDERALIST No. 59, supra note 11, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating
that it was "both more convenient and more satisfactory" for States to regulate federal
elections "in the first instance"); see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATS, supra note 130, at 367
(statement ofJames Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention) ("It was found nec-
essary to leave the regulation of these, in the first place, to the state governments, as
being best acquainted with the situation of the people.").
251 THE FEDERALjST No. 61, supra note 111, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton) (explain-
ing that States would want "the convenience of having the elections for their own
governments and for the national government at the same epoch").
252 See 2 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 130, at 440-41 (statement ofJames Wilson
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (describing how States might abuse power
over federal elections to the harm of the national government); 2 THE RECORDS OF
Ta FEDERAL CONvr.TxON OF 1787, supra note 116, at 240 Uames Madison) (arguing
that "[i]t was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discre-




ther or both houses of Congress of a quorum. 53 Without a quorum,
Congress would be dead.2 4 And, even if a quorum could be mus-
tered, Congress would not be the truly representative body it was in-
tended to be, as several States and their citizens would have no voice
in that body.
In the third case, States could enact election regulations that un-
fairly infringed on citizens' right to vote for representatives. While the
Framers did not define what they meant by "unfair" election regula-
tions, they did offer examples. An example cited by Madison wvas une-
qual allocation of representatives within a state.'-" Specifically, he
253 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("[A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business.").
254 See THE FEDERAisr No. 59, supra note 111, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton).
Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating
elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures,
would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could
at any moment annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the choice of per-
sons to administer its affairs.
Id.; see also 3 Eu-IoT's DEBATES, supra note 130, at 367 (statement of'James Madison at
the Virginia ratifying convention) ("Were [federal elections] exclusively under the
control of the state governments, the general government might easily be dissolved.").
In the Massachusetts ratifying convention, George Cabot argued,
[I]f the state legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively the elections of
the democratic branch, they may, by such an interference, first weaken, and
at last destroy, that check, they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate,
that control of the general government, which the people ought always to
have through their immediate representatives.
2 id. at 26.
255 3 id, at 367 (statement ofJames Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention)
("Some states might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others
might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust."); see 2 id. at
440-41 (James Wilson) (making a similar argument at the Pennsylvania ratif)ing con-
vention); 4 id. at 303 (Charles Cotesworth Pinckney) (making a similar argument at
the South Carolina ratifying convention). Hamilton offered another example: The
power over federal elections "might be employed in such a manner as to promote the
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others by confining the places of
election to particular districts and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to
partake in the choice." TmE FED.RA=ST No. 60, supra note 111, at 367 (Alexander
Hamilton). In context, Hamilton was stating an objection to Congress's ultimate
power over federal elections. But, the objection applies equally to state power over
the same subject. SeeTHE Far DERA No. 61, supra note 111, at 373 (Alexander Ham-
ilton). Hamilton states,
It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legisla-
ture of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York by con-
fining elections to particular places than for the legislature of the United
States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union by the like
expedient.
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referred to South Carolina, which had allocated two-thirds of the
State's representatives to the eastern seaboard even though that area
had only one-fifth of the State's population. 56 The eastern part of
the State, then, was substantially overrepresented in the State's
house. 257 If South Carolina apportioned its federal representatives in
a similar way, Madison believed it would be an abuse of the State's
time, place, and manner power.258
Id. And, the objection taps into the common fear of the time that physical distance
between the elected and the electorate, or between the electorate and the polling
places, threatened republican government. See ZAGARRI, supra note 4, at 8-35. At
that time, placing the polls at a distance of twenty miles could discourage voter turn-
out. See THE FEDERAIuST No. 61, supra note 111, at 373 (Alexander Hamilton)
("[W]hen the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the ef-
fect upon his conduct will be the same whether the distance be twenty miles or twenty
thousand miles.").
256 See ZAGARIu, supra note 4, at 48; see also 3 ELIoT's DEBATES, supra note 130, at
367 (statement ofJames Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention) ("Elections are
regulated now unequally in some states, particularly South Carolina, with respect to
Charleston, which is represented by thirty members."). In the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, Rufus King appealed to the same situation:
By the constitution of South Carolina, the city of Charleston has a right to
send thirty representatives to the General Assembly; the whole number of
which amounts to two hundred. The back parts of Carolina have increased
greatly since the adoption of their constitution, and have frequently at-
tempted an alteration of this unequal mode of representation; but the mem-
bers from Charleston, having the balance so much in their favor, will not
consent to an alteration; and we see [that] the delegates from Carolina in
Congress have always been chosen by the delegates of that city. The repre-
sentatives, therefore, from that state, will not be chosen by the people, but will
be the representatives of a faction of that state.
2 id. at 50-51. Professor Zagarri describes the political circumstances in South Caro-
lina that created and preserved this system of unbalanced representation. ZAaARRI,
supra note 4, at 46-53.
257 This problem was akin to the "rotten boroughs" that the Framers criticized In
England.. See BAILYN, supra note 121, at 166; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 170-73 (1969); see also 2 ELIuoT's DEBATES, supra note 130, at 49
(criticism from a member of the Massachusetts ratifying convention) ("A borough of
but two or three cottages has a right to send two representatives to Parliament, while
Birmingham, a large and populous manufacturing town, lately sprung up, cannot
send one.").
258 Several other Framers and ratifiers expressed the same concern. See 2 ELUOT's
DEBATES, supra note 130, at 49 (statement of a member of the Massachusetts ratifying
convention) (noting that Rhode Island was about to adopt an apportionment of the
state legislature that would "deprive the towns of Newport and Providence of their
weight, and that thereby the legislature may have a power to counteract the will of a
majority of people"); id. at 50 (statement of a member of the Massachusetts ratifying
convention) (noting that in Connecticut, "Hartford, one of their largest towns, sends
no more delegates than one of their smallest corporations").
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Given these three threats, 259 the Framers allocated Congress the
power of self-preservation 26 0-final say on the times, places, and man-
ner of electing its members. The Framers made this point repeatedly
in defending and explaining Congress's power under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause.261 If the States were unable or unvilling
to hold federal elections, Congress could provide for such elections
and ensure at least a quorum. If States passed unfair regulations, Con-
gress could "alter" those regulations to achieve fairness.
2. The Implications of History for Commandeering
One could argue that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
should allow commandeering because its grant of federal power was
in direct response to a threat posed by the States. To adequately meet
this threat, one could argue, Congress must have the power to com-
mandeer non-complying States.262 Indeed, the power to commandeer
Today, such an apportionment scheme would violate the Court's one-person-
one-vote line of cases. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-32 (1969) (apply-
ing the one-person-one-vote principle to congressional districts); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (same); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-76 (1964)
(applying one-person-one-vote principle to an election system for state legislature).
259 Hamilton emphasized that even the potential for abuse justified precautions
against destruction of Congress by the States. THE FEDERAuST No. 59, supra note 111,
at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is to little purpose to say that a neglect or omission
of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the
thing, without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection.").
260 See id. at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[E] ver government ought to contain in itself
the means of its own preservation."); see also 2 ELLIOT'S Dr. n.sm, supra note 130, at 440
(statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention) ("I hope, sir,
that it was no crime to sow the seed of self-presenration in the federal government;
without this clause, it would not possess self-preserving power.").
261 SeeTB- FEoaizAsT'No. 59, supranote 111, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (stat-
ing that the Constitution has "reserved to the national authority a right to interpose,
whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its
safety"); see also 3 ELLIoT's DmA-Es, supra note 130, at 367 (statement of James
Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention) (arguing that ultimate power over fed-
eral elections is "subject to the control of the general government, in order to enable
it to ... prevent its own dissolution"). Madison also made this point in the first
Congress when Representative Burke proposed a constitutional amendment to limit
Congress's power over federal elections. See 1 ANNALs OF Co. 768 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789). The proposed amendment read: "Congress shall not alter, modify, or in-
terfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections of Senators, or Represent-
atives, except when any State shall refuse or neglect, or be unable, by imasion or
rebellion, to make such election." Id. Madison opposed the amendment because it
"tend[ed] to destroy the principles and efficacy of the Constitution." Id. at 770.
262 Lower court cases reviewing the National Voter Registration Act have made a
version of this argument, see infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text, as has one
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is surely "necessary and proper" to Congress's power to keep the
States in line.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the Framers'
expressed fears about commandeering. Recall from the history dis-
cussion in New York v. United States that the Framers saw comman-
deering as an impracticable power.263  They argued that
commandeering was only enforceable by military force. Otherwise,
States could freely disobey Congress's commands, as they did under
the Articles of Confederation. 26 But, a credible threat of military
force would require a national standing army, which was an unaccept-
able threat to liberty.265 So, commandeering posed an unacceptable
dilemma: it was only workable through an unacceptable threat to
liberty.
This dilemma highlights the problem with commandeering
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Congress was granted
power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections
because States might neglect their constitutional duty to do so.266 The
need for congressional regulation, then, will be most acute precisely
when the States are least willing to comply. If States are already refus-
ing to follow the federal command set forth in the Constitution, why
commentator, see Green, supra note 219, at 80 ("The Framers believed substantial
authority in Congress was necessary in order to protect the right of the people to elect
the government, and to ensure that all provisions of the Constitution pertaining to
the electoral process were respected.").
263 See supra notes 108-34 and accompanying text.
264 See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 352 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Summers of Virginia) (asking in the debate over a districting requirement, "How
would this Government go about to force the States to supply Representatives in this
hall? What mandate could it issue? With what sanction or penalty would such man-
date be accompanied?").
265 See supra notes 118-27.
266 Again, Congress's power to act is not restricted to such cases. Indeed, six state
ratifying conventions proposed amendments that would have limited Congress's
times, place, and manner power to cases where states refused to act or enacted abti-
sive regulations. See Paschal, supra note 26, at 278; see also 3 ELLoT's DEBAT, supra
note 130, at 661 (reporting a proposed amendment in the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion that read, "Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or
manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or either of them, ex-
cept when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled, by invasion
or rebellion, to prescribe the same"). As these amendments were not adopted, one
can reasonably infer that Congress's power was not so limited. But, the history clearly
shows that such cases were the Framers' prime concern in giving Congress ultimate
say under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. See supra notes 252-61 and accom-
panying text. And, such "paradigm cases" are helpful in interpreting the reach of a
clause. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119,
1169-71 (1995).
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would an additional command from Congress fare any better? In-
deed, state intransigence further illustrates the problem with com-
mandeering: States could only be made to comply with their federal
duty-whether that duty be imposed by the Constitution or Con-
gress-through military force.2 67 But, as discussed above, the Framers
rejected the use of military force out of fear of a standing army.2 8
Thus, an impasse over the times, places, and manner of federal elec-
tions presents a paradigm case of the impracticability of
commandeering.
As under the Commerce Clause, direct congressional regulation
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause would be much more
effective than commandeering. Congress could enact all laws neces-
sary to hold elections for national office, leaving no role for the recal-
citrant state governments. If only one or a few States were
misbehaving, 269 Congress could target its regulation to the federal
elections in those states. 270 State executive branch officials could then
enforce the national regulations if they wanted. But, if the state exec-
utive also refused to cooperate, Congress could direct federal officials
to enforce the election regulations. By regulating federal elections
directly, Congress would avoid reliance on reluctant States (a flaw of
the Articles of Confederation) as well as the use of military force to
coerce the States (a flaw in commandeering).
The second reason to reject the historical argument for comman-
deering is that it ultimately fails to distinguish the Times, Places and
Manner Clause from the Commerce Clause. Consider the parallel be-
tween the two clauses. Like the Times, Places and Manner Clause, the
Commerce Clause was a response to state action that threatened the
267 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 360 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Payne of Alabama) (asking, if States refused to abide by the districting requirement,
"Would the President be called upon to send a military detachment into the State,
surround its capitol with an armed soldiery, and enforce legislation at the point of a
bayonet?").
268 See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
269 See Paschal, supra note 26, at 286 ("It certainly was not anticipated that there
would be a general failure on the part of the states to provide the Congress uith
Representatives but rather that now and then one state might fail to do so.").
270 See id. ("Nor does there seem to be any constitutional barrier to Congress exer-
cising its power in respect to a single state only."). Since the early apportionment
statutes, Congress has included exceptions or special regulations for indiidual states
or groups of states to meet the specific needs of those states. &e id. at 286 ("Congress
has made regulations in respect to the time of Congressional elections applicable to
particular states."); infra note 554.
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nation's well being. Under the Articles of Confederation, 271 Congress
did not have power to regulate interstate commerce. 272 Without any
central regulation, States waged economic warfare that threatened the
stability of the new nation.273 The Framers particularly focused on
conflicts between States that produced and exported goods and some
coastal States whose main commerce was the trade that flowed
through their ports.274 A State with few resources other than its loca-
271 See ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 137-47 (1935); RAKOVE, supra note 114, at 46-47 (discussingJames Madison's
critique of the Articles of Confederation); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 53 (1988) ("Interstate rivalry was the Con-
vention's greatest concern."); Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the
Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONsnTIUTION
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 72 (R. Beeman et al. eds., 1987). As Gordon
Wood points out, while the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation may explain
why the Philadelphia Convention convened to amend that document, those problems
do not fully explain the push for an entirely new document. See WOOD, supra note
257, at 403-25; Wood, supra, at 72; see also ELKINS & MCOTmICE, supra note 122, at 10
(stating that the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation probably formed a
lesser part of the urgency that led to drafting an entirely new Constitution). An addi-
tional impetus toward a new Constitution came from the petty politics practiced by
the state governments of the time. In the view of the Framers, state governments were
promoting personal, selfish interests at the expense of the public good. See McGreal,
supra note 146, at 1129-34.
272 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (setting forth the powers of "The
United States in Congress assembled").
273 As the Supreme Court has noted, the economic opportunism practiced by the
States after the revolution threatened the continuing survival of the newly-created
United States. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)
("When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had
exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began."). A
federal power over interstate commerce was thought necessary to keep the peace.
The sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ulti-
mately produced the Constitution was "to take into consideration the trade
of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of the said
States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations
may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony"
and for that purpose the General Assembly of Virginia in January of 1786
named commissioners and proposed their meeting with those from other
states.
Id. (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 38 (1925)).
274 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 29 n.1 (1963) (noting how New York took advantage of its status
as port of entry to NewJersey and Connecticut); MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF rtiE
CoNsTrrUTION 29-30 (1921); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVxMioN OF 1787,
supra note 116, at 519, 542; Collins, supra note 271, at 53; see also Albert S. Abel, The
Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN.
L. Rrv. 432, 448-49 (1941).
[VOL- 76:2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
tion as a trade center could exact a great toll to allow passage of goods
to other states or foreign markets. 275 And, many States did so, either
by closing their ports to or imposing prohibitive taxes on goods from
other states. 276 The Constitution responded, in part, by granting Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Commerce Clause, like the Times, Places and Manner
Clause, targeted a specific threat the States posed to the new nation.
Yet, as New York v. United States explained, commandeering was not
part of the power granted under the Commerce Clause. -77 In meet-
ing the States' threat to interstate commerce, Congress could only reg-
ulate individual conduct, not direct the States to regulate. So,
standing alone, the fact that the Times, Places and Manner Clause was
a response to potential state misconduct does not imply congressional
power to commandeer the States. And, nothing in the drafting or
ratifying debates discussed above suggest that the power to comman-
deer was granted in the Times, Places and Manner Clause but not the
Commerce Clause.
Two aspects of history, then, point away from commandeering
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. First, history shows that
Congress's power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause was
aimed at abuse of state power over federal elections. History also
shows that commandeering was not considered an effective wray to deal
with non-complying states. Second, history does not offer any reason
to distinguish commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause from commandeering under the Commerce Clause. Consis-
[T]he states were using their imposts as weapons against each other, either
offensively, as where the importing states imposed tariffs the ultimate inci-
dence of which was calculated to fall on otlers not blessed by geography
with as good and accessible harbors, or defensively, as by strengthening their
tariff-walls against each other to compensate for revenue deficiencies result-
ing from diversion of foreign shipments to the states with the least onerous
imposts.
Id.
275 See THE FEIEiaSr No. 7, supra note 111, at 62 (Alexander Hamilton) ('The
States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvan-
tages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate
neighbors."); see also id. No. 42, at 264-71 (James Madison) (discussing the impor-
tance of regulating commerce in relieving States "which import and export through
other states, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter").
276 2 ELUoT's DEzAI s, supra note 130, at 58-59; 4 id. at 254; 5 id. at 119; D.A1D
HUTCHISON, THE FoUNDAnoNs OF THE CONSTITUT[ON 102-04 (1975).
277 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
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tency demands that if commandeering is prohibited under one clause
it be prohibited under the other.278
D. Precedent
The Supreme Court has never addressed commandeering under
the Times, Places and Manner Clause. So, in legal parlance, we do
not have any four square, mandatory precedent on the issue. Instead,
we have two types of weaker precedent that illuminate the issue.279
First, we have a web of Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying
that Clause. These cases shed light on different aspects of the Times,
Places and Manner Clause and suggest approaches to our issue. As
the Court itself has recently stated, the "theory and reasoning of ear-
lier cases" can "suggest" the right approach to an issue, even if those
cases do not address that precise issue.280
Second, a line of recent lower federal court cases addresses the
constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act, or, as it is
more commonly known, the "Motor Voter Law." The Motor Voter
Law directs States to create and enforce a series of rules and regula-
tions regarding voter registration for federal elections.281 Congress
enacted the Motor Voter Law on the authority of the Times, Places,
and Manner Clause.282 Relying on New York v. United States, States
have challenged the Motor Voter Law as unconstitutional comman-
deering.283 Thus, the Motor Voter Law cases address the very issue
under consideration: Does Congress have the power to commandeer
the States under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause? We review
these cases not because they authoritatively settle the issue in the fed-
eral judicial system-only the Supreme Court can do so.2 94 Instead,
278 See Vermeule, supra note 159, at 1351-54.
279 Assuming that Congress cannot enact the districting requirement under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause, the Conclusion asks whether Congress could enact
the requirement under another power, such as Congress's power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5. Since the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to protect a right to vote, Con-
gress could try to enact a districting requirement under the guise of enforcing that
right. The Conclusion raises this potential defense of the districting requirement.
280 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745 (1999).
281 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 7 3gg to 1973gg-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
282 See Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir.
1997).
283 See infra notes 332-43 and accompanying text.
284 And, even the Supreme Court does not finally settle constitutional issues in the
federal system. For example, if the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Motor Voter law, the President, based on a contrary interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, could refuse to enforce the law. See McGreal, supra note 146, at 1114-19.
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these cases offer arguments, using the various methods of constitu-
tional interpretation, for our consideration. We review these cases for
their persuasive force, not their binding authority.
1. Cases Interpreting the Times, Places and Manner Clause
Generally
The first Times, Places and Manner Clause case dealt with a fed-
eral law that prohibited actions intended to disrupt federal elections.
In Ex parte Siebol4, 285 the Court reviewed criminal convictions under
federal laws prohibiting staffig the ballot box and interference with
federal elections officials.2 6 The defendants argued that Congress
could not regulate only part of the federal election process. If Con-
gress exercises its power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
it must "provide[] for the complete control over the whole subject
over which it is exercised."287 So, according to the defendants, Con-
gress must either regulate all aspects of federal elections-the time
and place for holding elections, how the elections shall be conducted,
bywhom, et cetera-or not regulate the subject at all. Congress could
not regulate only part of the election process, such as protecting elec-
tion officials or prohibiting ballot box stuffing. Congress's power was
all-or-nothing.
The Court rejected the defendants' argument; we will review two
of the Court's reasons for doing so. First, the Court turned to the text
of the Times, Places and Manner Clause.2as As discussed previously,
the Clause grants Congress the power to "make" or "alter" regulations
of federal elections.2 9 The Court explained how this text allowed
partial regulation:
"Make or alter": what is the plain meaning of these words? ... There
is no declaration that the regulations shall be made either wholly by
the State legislatures or wholly by Congress. If Congress does not
interfere, of course they may be made wholly by the State; but if it
chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its
285 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
286 One federal statute provided for appointment of "supervisors of election" in
certain elections for Congress. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 2, 16 Stat. 433, 433-34
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9 (1994)). These supervisors were to be present at
the polling places and to perform certain duties while there. Id. §§ 4-5. Some of the
defendants were indicted and convicted of preventing supervisors from getting to the
polling places or from performing their duties at the polling places. Sicbhod, 100 U.S.
at 377-82.
287 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 382-83.
288 Id. at 383.
289 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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doing so, either wholly or partially. On the contrary, their necessary
implication is that it may do either. It may either make the regula-
tions, or it may alter them. If it only alters, leaving, as manifest con-
venience requires, the general organization of the polls to the State,
there results a necessary co-operation of the two governments in
regulating the subject. 290
The plain meaning of "alter" shows that Congress can enact partial
regulations. While this passage does not address commandeering, tie
Court's language suggests an assumption about how Congress will
make or alter regulations. Notice first how the Court speaks of regula-
tions "made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by Con-
gress." The assumption here is that the state legislatures and
Congress act in a parallel fashion when "making" these regulations:
Each legislature will make the regulations itself, not command some
other body to do so. Commandeering was not anticipated.
Also, notice how the Court speaks of Congress altering some reg-
ulations, and then "leaving" other regulations to the States. This pas-
sage suggests that either one or the other-States or Congress-will
be making any specific regulation. If Congress regulates an aspect of
federal elections, it does so on its own. If not, then that aspect of
federal elections is "left" to the States. What the Court does not envi-
sion, however, is Congress regulating an aspect of federal elections by
enacting a command to the States and then "leaving" it to the States to
follow the command. Rather, the States are "left" to act when Con-
gress has not acted. Again, the Court's language does not anticipate
commandeering.
In a second argument, the Court analogized the Times, Places
and Manner Clause to the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Court
explained how both clauses give Congress and the States concurrent
authority over a subject:
The peculiarity of the case consists in the concurrent authority
of the two sovereignqes, State and National, over the same subject-
matter. This, however, is not entirely without a parallel. The regu-
lation of foreign and inter-state commerce is conferred by the Con-
stitution upon Congress. It is not expressly taken away from the
States. But where the subject-matter is one of a national character,
or one that requires a uniform rule, it has been held that the power
of Congress is exclusive. On the contrary, where neither of these
circumstances exist, it has been held that State regulations are not
unconstitutional. In the absence of congressional regulation, which
would be of paramount authority when adopted, they are valid and
binding.
290 Siebold 100 U.S. at 383.
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So in the case of laws for regulating the elections of representa-
tives to Congress. The State may make regulations on the subject;
Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or
add to those already made. The paramount character of those
made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the
State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther. There is no
such conflict between them as to prevent their forming a harmoni-
ous system perfectly capable of being administered and carried out
as such.2 91
Here, the Court explains that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
and the Commerce Clause reflect the same balance of state and fed-
eral power-each grants concurrent authority to Congress and the
States, allowing for the possibility that federal and state regulation will
each cover part of the same field."92 New York v. United States ex-
plained how the Commerce Clause reflected another aspect of the
federal-state balance of power: Congress cannot commandeer the
States.2 93 When Ex parte Siebold analogizes the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause to the Commerce Clause for one aspect of federal-state
balance (concurrent authority), we can infer that the clauses are anal-
ogous on other aspects of that balance, such as the anti-comman-
deering principle.294 Thus, Ex parte Siebold can be used to further
291 Id. at 384-86.
292 The Court analogized Congress's power over federal elections to Congress's
general Article I, Section 8 powers in Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,658-59 (1884).
In that case, the defendants challenged Congress's power to prohibit racially moti-
vated intimidation of voters in federal elections. Id. at 657-58. The defendants ar-
gued that the Constitution did not specifically grant Congress power to enact such a
prohibition. Id. The Court held that Congress's power to regulate federal elections,
like its other powers under the Constitution, extends to passage of all laws necessary
and proper to exercise of Congress's enumerated powers. Id. at 658-59; see also Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-24 (1819) (stating that Congress
has implied power to enact all laws useful and convenient to the full exercise of its
enumerated powers). In other cases, the Court has similarly upheld Congress's power
to regulate broadly under the Tunes, Places and Manner Clause. &4 e.g., Roudebush
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1972) (regulation of recount in federal elections);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318-20 (1941) (regulation of party primary
elections); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1917) (regulation of voter
registration and certification of election results in federal elections); United States v.
Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (regulation of tampering with ballots in federal
elections); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 404 (1879) (prescribing punishment for
state official's failure to abide by state laws governing conduct of federal elections).
293 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
294 Of course, as with any analogy, this analogy between the Times, Places and
Manner Clause and the Commerce Clause could be severed by showing that the two
clauses are different in a relevant respect. In this case, the relevant respect would be
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disapprove of commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause.
The Court has also made a relevant analogy between the Times,
Places and Manner Clause and the Commerce Clause in the separa-
tion of powers context. In Buckley v. Valeo,295 the Court held that the
method for selecting the Federal Election Commission violated the
separation of powers. At that time, the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives each ap-
pointed some members of the Commission.2 96 Because the Appoint-
ments Clause limited appointment of such officials to the President,
executive department heads, or judges,29 7 appointment by legislative
officials violated that Clause.298
In trying to get around the Appointments Clause, the govern-
ment argued that the Times, Places and Manner Clause granted Con-
gress plenary power over federal elections that overrode any
separation of powers limitations on Congress's power.29 9 The Court
summarily rejected this argument, sounding a note in tune with Ex
parte Siebold&
But Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substan-
tive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority
does not offend some other constitutional restriction. We see no
reason to believe that the authority of Congress over federal elec-
tion practices is of such a wholly different nature from the other
grants of authority to Congress that it may be employed in such a
manner as to offend well-established constitutional restrictions
stemming from the separation of powers.300
Again, the Court places the Times, Places and Manner Clause on the
same footing as Congress's other powers. Separation of powers limits
apply equally to Congress's Times, Places and Manner Clause power
Congress's power to commandeer the States. Thus, the strength of this analogy will
depend, in part, on the degree to which the other methods of argument show that the
two clauses are similar or different regarding commandeering.
295 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
296 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1994)).
297 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2 ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
298 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-31.
299 Id. at 131 ("Appellee Commission and amid urge that because of what they
conceive to be the extraordinary authority reposed in Congress to regulate elections,
this case stands on a different footing than if Congress had exercised its legislative
authority in another field.").
300 Id. at 132 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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as to Congress's other powers. And, the same principle should apply
to federalism limits on Congress's power. If the anti-commandeering
rule limits Congress's other powers, it should similarly limit Con-
gress's power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause."'
A third argument in Ex parte Siebold has led one commentator to
conclude that Congress can commandeer under the Times, Places
and Manner Clause. The Court cited the 1842 Apportionment Act,3 2-
the first law to require election of the House by districts, as an exam-
ple of Congress regulating only part of the federal election process:
Congress has partially regulated the subject heretofore. In 1842, it
passed a Iaw for the election of representatives by separate districts;
and, subsequently, other laws fixing the time of election, and di-
recting that the elections shall be by ballot. No one will pretend, at
least at the present day, that these laws were unconstitutional because
they only partially covered the subject 33
Citing this portion of the Court's opinion, the commentator asserted
that the argument that Congress cannot commandeer the States into
drawing districts "would not appear to be maintainable in light of the
language in Exparte Siebold"30 4 But, this misreads Exparte Siebold. The
passage just quoted cites the 1842 districting requirement for the pro-
position that Congress can enact partial regulations, not to support
commandeering. Indeed, commandeering"-or any argument or
issue resembling it-never appears in the Court's opinion.30
301 Indeed, the discussion below explains why commandeering violates separation
of powers concerns. Buddey would require that any separation of powers limit applies
to all of Congress's plenary powers equally, including the Tunes, Places and Manner
Clause. See id.
302 Act ofJune 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c (1994)).
303 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879) (emphasis added).
304 CONG. RESEARCH SFV., LmRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTED
STATES OF A~mCA: ANALSIS AND INTFRPRETATION 115 n.3 (Leland E. Beck &Johnny
H. Killian eds., 1987).
305 The same can be said of the Court's reference to the 1842 districting require-
ment in United States v. Gradwe, 243 U.S. 476 (1917). In Gradwdl, the Court men-
tioned the 1842 requirement as part of a general summary of statutes Congress had
passed under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Id. at 482-84. This summary
served solely as background to the Court's interpretation of a statute regulating con-
spiracies to defraud the government. Id. at 484-89 (holding that a general federal
statute prohibiting conspiracies to defraud the federal government did not apply to a
conspiracy to bribe voters in a federal election). No issue in Gradwdlraised the scope
of Congress's power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, not to mention
commandeering of state legislatures under that Clause.
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Thus, Ex parte Siebold does not settle the issue under considera-
tion.306
Smiley v. HolW?0 7 fills in another aspect of the Times, Places and
Manner Clause picture. Smiley involved Minnesota's attempt at dis-
tricting following the 1929 congressional reapportionment. Both
chambers of the Minnesota legislature had passed a bill that divided
the state into nine districts.308 In accordance with state law, the bill
was then sent to the governor for his signature.30 9 The governor re-
turned the bill without his approval, which constituted a veto. 10
306 Another passage from the Court's opinion bears on a related issue mentioned
above: whether Congress can commandeer state officials to enforce a federal election
law. The Court wrote:
As to the supposed conflict that may arise between the officers appointed by
the State and national governments for superintending the election, no
more insuperable difficulty need arise than in the application of the regula-
tions adopted by each respectively. The regulations of Congress being con-
stitutionally paramount, the duties imposed thereby upon the officers of the
United States, so far as they have respect to the same matters, must necessa-
rily be paramount to those to be performed by the officers of the State. If
both cannot be performed, the latter are pro tanto superseded and cease to
be duties. If the power of Congress over the subject is supervisory and para-
mount, as we have seen it to be, and if officers or agents are created for
carrying out its regulations, it follows as a necessary consequence that such
officers and agents must have the requisite authority to act without obstruc-
tion or interference from the officers of the State. No greater subordina-
tion, in kind or degree, exists in this case than in any other. It exists to the
same extent between the different officers appointed by the State, when the
State alone regulates the election. One officer cannot interfere with the du-
ties of another, or obstruct or hinder him in the performance of them.
Where there is a disposition to act harmoniously, there is no danger of dis-
turbance between those who have different duties to perform. When the
rightful authority of the general government is once conceded and acqui-
esced in, the apprehended difficulties will disappear. Let a spirit of national
as well as local patriotism once prevail, let unfounded jealousies cease, and
we shall hear no more about the impossibility of harmonious action between
the national and State governments in a matter in which they have a mutual
interest.
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 386-87. In this passage, the Court indicates that Congress can
make its own regulations to be implemented by federal officials, while States can make
their own regulations implemented by state officials. The passage supports an argu-
ment that the rule in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)-Congress can-
not commandeer state law enforcement officials under the Commerce Clause-
should extend to Congress's power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
307 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
308 Id at 361.
309 Id. at 361-62.
310 Id. at 363.
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Under the state constitution, a vetoed bill could not become a law
unless two-thirds of each chamber of the legislature voted to override
the veto.3 11 Without attempting to override the veto, however, the
state legislature sent the bill to the state secretary of state so that elec-
tions could be held pursuant to the bill.3 12 A state citizen then
brought suit to prevent elections under the vetoed bill.3 13 The ques-
tion before the Court was whether the Times, Places and Manner
Clause gave state lgislatures the power to regulate federal elections
on their own, or whether the State's general lawmaking processes-
which, in Minnesota, included a gubernatorial veto-governed the
making of such regulations.314
The state legislature relied on the text of the Times, Places and
Manner Clause in support of its power to regulate independent of the
State's governor. Recall that the Clause begins, "[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof"315 Accord-
ing to the State, the text clearly commits regulation of federal elec-
tions to the State's "Legislature," with no mention of any other branch
of the state government.316 Thus, the governor played no role in dis-
tricting the state, and his veto did not void the districting bill.317
The Court conceded that the text of the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause identified the state legislature as the proper "body" to reg-
ulate federal elections.318 But, that observation raised a further
question: In what capacity were the state legislatures to regulate fed-
eral elections? Was it in their capacity as the law making body of the
state? If so, then the law making processes of a State's Constitution,
including any role given to the State's governor, would govern the
legislature's actions. Or, was it in the legislature's capacity as the
State's designated agent to perform a special constitutional function
regarding the federal government? In that case, the Constitution has
committed that function solely to the legislature, notwithstanding any
provision in the State's constitution. The question, then, was in what
311 Id. at 361.
312 Id.
313 Id-
314 Of course, as the Times, Places and Manner Clause dictates, Congress could
replace or alter any such regulations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, ci. 1.
315 Id. (emphasis added).
316 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 362-63.
317 Id. at 364-65.
318 Id.
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capacity did the States act when regulating the times, places, and man-
ner of federal elections?31 9
In answering this question, the Court turned to the text and na-
ture of the regulations passed under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. First, consider text. The Court based its argument on the
words "such regulations" and "by law."320 In accord with this Article's
prior discussion in the Section on text,3 21 the Court concluded that
these words referred to laws or regulations enacted through a govern-
ment's ordinary law making processes.3 22 Thus, if the Minnesota Con-
stitution gave the Governor a role in the State's law making process,
the Governor's approval (or an override of the Governor's veto) was
necessary to any regulation of the times, places, and manner of fed-
eral elections.
Second, the Court explained the nature of the laws to be passed
under authority of the Times, Places and Manner Clause. The Clause
grants
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections,
not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registra-
tion, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in
short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to en-
force the fundamental right involved. And these requirements
would be nugatory if they did not have appropriate sanctions in the
definition of offenses and punishments.3 23
319 See id. at 365-66. The Court gave some examples of different capacities in
which state legislatures acted under the Constitution.
The use in the Federal Constitution of the same term ["legislature") in dif-
ferent relations does not always imply tie performance of the same function.
The legislature may act as an electoral body, as in the choice of United States
Senators under Article I, section 3, prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment. It may act as a ratifying body, as in the case of proposed
amendments to the Constitution under Article V. It may act as a consenting
body, as in relation to the acquisition of lands by the United States under
Article I, section 8, paragraph 17. Wherever the term 'legislature' is used in
the Constitution it is necessary to consider the nature of the particular ac-
tion in view. The primary question now before the Court is whether the
function contemplated by Article I, section 4 is that of making laws.
Id. (citations omitted).
320 Id. at 366-67.
321 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
322 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366-67.
323 Id. at 366.
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According to the Court, these types of legislation "involve[] lawmak-
ing in its essential features and most important aspect[s]." 324 This is
so because, in general, the types of laws necessary to regulate federal
elections mirror the types of laws that are the grist of the ordinary
legislative mill. In its ordinary business, a legislature enacts rules that
direct or prohibit individual conduct, set forth procedures for govern-
ment proceedings, and provide penalties for non-compliance. The
laws or regulations enacted under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause have the same cast and, thus, must be enacted under the state
constitution's ordinary law making procedures.32
Smiley teaches that state laws enacted under the Times, Places and
Manner Clause-in that case, a law establishing House districts-are
the product of the State's ordinary law making processes. This con-
clusion forecloses a significant argument for supporting comman-
deering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. If state action
under that Clause was not ordinary law making, but instead a special
function performed under the Constitution, one could argue that
Congress could direct the States in performing that function. Indeed,
in doing so, Congress would not be commandeering state law making
processes, but only directing performance of a special federal func-
ion. But, Smiley precludes this argument. Under the logic of that
case, the congressional districting requirement commandeers the
States into ordinary law making, the very conduct proscribed by New
York v. United States.5 26
In sum, neither Exparte Siebold nor Smiley address comman-
deering. Yet, each case contains discussions that bear on the issue.
Given the Court's pro-state sovereignty attitude towards its precedents,
we might expect the Court to seize on the language in each case that
casts doubt on commandeering.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 367 ("As the authority is conferred for the purpose of making las, for
the State, it follows ... that the exercise of the authority must be in accordance with
the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments."). The Court
has held elsewhere that districting (or, presumably, any other law passed pursuant to
the Times, Places and Manner Clause) could be done, in part, through referenda, if
that mechanism is part of the State's ordinary law making process. Davis v. Hilde-
brant, 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916).
326 See 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992).
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2. Motor Voter Law Cases: Commandeering Under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause
The National Voter Registration Act,327 more popularly known as
the Motor Voter Law, is a comprehensive federal regulation of voter
registration in federal elections.3 28 The relevant portion of the Act
requires States to establish procedures for registering voters by differ-
ent methods, such as by mail or with a driver's license application.32t
Several lower courts have characterized the Act as commandeering
the States330 and analyzed whether Congress may do so under the
327 42 U.S.C. §§ 197 3gg to 197 3gg-10 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
328 The Supreme Court has held that Congress does not have power under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause to regulate elections of state officials. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1970).
329 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Most of the Act's other provi-
sions set forth detailed regulations for States to implement or enforce. These provi-
sions implicate the Court's decision in Print; 521 U.S. 898 (1997), discussed above,
see supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text, which extended New York v. United
States's anti-commandeering rule to state enforcement or implementation of federal
law. Id. at 935. As discussed above, the Printz issue-Congress's commandeering of
state executive branch officials-raises slightly different concerns under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause than commandeering of state legislative officials. Thus,
this Subsection does not address lower court review of these sections of the Motor
Voter Law. See, e.g., Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 795
(7th Cir. 1995) (arguing that because the Constitution places a duty on States to ad-
minister federal elections under state laws, States continue to have a duty to do so
after Congress alters or makes those laws).
330 One could argue that the Act does not commandeer the States into enacting
registration procedures. Section 1973gg-2(a) of the Act provides that "each Sute
shall establish procedures to register to vote in elections for Federal office" relating to
registration by mail, in person, and along with a driver's license application. 42
U.S.C. § 1973gg-2(a) (1994). Subsection (b), however, exempts States that either do
not require registration to vote or allow registration at the polling place at the time of
voting. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2(b) (Supp. IV 1998). On the one hand, this choice could
be viewed as commandeering because it effectively requires States to enact one of
three federal registration processes: (1) mail, in person, or driver's license registra-
tion, (2) no registration, or (3) polling place registration.
On the other hand, the government could characterize the Act as threatening
pre-emption of state law, if States do not act as Congress has commanded. If States do
not enact procedures for in person, mail, or driver's license voter registration, the Act
effectively preempts state law by doing away with registration or allowing polling place
registration. See Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 964 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that
the "Act does not require states to adopt any legislation," because States may simply
refuse to have voter registration laws); Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller,
912 F. Supp. 976, 984 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (stating that the Act "does not require a state
to pass legislation," it merely pre-empts state voter registration laws), affd, 129 F.3d
833 (6th Cir. 1997). Which characterization of the Act is proper is not within the
scope of this Article. But, it is worth noting that the take title provision in New York v,
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Times, Places and Manner Clause.33' Predictably, the States have ar-
gued that New York v. United States prevents Congress from doing so;
each lower court has rejected this argument.3 32 This Subsection ex-
amines three court of appeals decisions that did so.s33
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Voting Rights Coalition v. 1ison-33
and the Sixth Circuit's decision in Association of Community Organiza-
tionsforReform Now v. Miller3 3 5 simply stated their conclusions without
explanation. As noted above, the States had argued that New York v.
United States prohibited the Act's commandeering.33, The Ninth Cir-
cuit responded as follows: "The flaw in the State of California's argu-
ment is that it ignores Article I, section 4, which, unlike the commerce power
in Article I, section 8, empowers Congress to impose on the states precisely the
burden at issu"337 Using similar language, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Article I section 4 explicitly grants Congress the authority either to
"make" laws regarding federal elections (similar to the authority
granted in the Commerce Clause), or to "alter" the laws initially
promulgated by the states. Thus, unlike the Commerce Clause at issue
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1992), offered States a similar choice to that in the
Act. Under the take title provision, States were given some discretion as to what laws
to enact, but were still commanded to regulate by Congress. &e 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1994). Similarly, the MotorVoter Law gives States some discretion
as to how they will regulate voter registration, but it requires regulation nonetheless.
331 SeeJonathan E. Davis, Comment, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: De-
bunking States'Resistance and the Pretense of VoterFraud, 6 TF.ip. PoL & Crv. R-rs. L RE%.
117, 133-34 (1996-1997) (noting the lower court cases).
332 See id. at 131; Green, supra note 219, at 75-76.
333 To date, only three federal appellate courts have decided the issue. While vari-
ous federal district courts have decided the issue, their opinions do not raise any
additional arguments and, thus, are referenced in the footnotes.
334 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
335 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997).
336 Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir.
1997); Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1415.
337 Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1415 (emphasis added). For its part, ie District Court for
the Western District of Michigan simply quoted this assertion in lieu of making its
own analysis. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 976, 984
(W.D. Mich. 1995). The District Court for the District of South Carolina made a
similar assertion: "Of necessity Congress, when it exercises its authority to regulate the
'time, place and manner' of federal elections, elections which are conducted by state
and local officials, requires state officials to adhere to federal laws. That in no way
exceeds Congressional authority or violates the Tenth Amendment." Condon v.
Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 965 (D.S.C. 1995). This court also conflated two separate
issues: first, whether Congress can commandeer state legislatures under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause and, second, whether Congress can do so to state executive
branch officials. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
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in New York, Article I section 4 specifically grants Congress the authority to
force states to alter their regulations regarding federal elections.558
And that is all either court said.3 39 No arguments were presented as to
why the two clauses are different on this score.340 No mention was
made of constitutional text, structure, history, precedent, or prior gov-
ernment practice. Just the bare, question-begging assertion that the
Times, Places and Manner Clause allows Congress to commandeer the
States under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Hopefully this
Article's discussion has persuaded the reader that many constitutional
arguments can be made on the issue and that resolution is not as self-
evident as the courts suggest. Indeed, on my analysis of this point, the
courts' assertions are very wide of the mark. Thus, Wilson and Miller
should hold no persuasive force outside their respective circuits.
The Seventh Circuit at least offered some explanation for its
holding in Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Ed-
gar.341 The court distinguished the Times, Places and Manner Clause
from other power-granting clauses. Specifically, the Times, Places and
Manner Clause already commands the States to act-"The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof"34--
whereas the power-granting clauses in Article I, Section 8, such as the
Commerce Clause, do not command the States.3 43 On its own, this
338 Miller, 129 F.3d at 836 (emphasis added).
339 The Ninth Circuit's only explanation related to Congress commandeering
States to enforce the voter registration requirements, not to the commandeering of
state legislatures into enacting procedures. Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1415 ("Congress may
conscript state agencies to carry out voter registration for the election of Representa-
tives and Senators."). As mentioned above, this issue is beyond the scope of the pre-
sent discussion.
340 Presumably, the Sixth Circuit assumes that the word "alter" standing alone
unambiguously authorizes Congress to commandeer the States. That court's own use
of language exposes the flaw in its textual argument. The second sentence of the
quote uses the words "force states to alter their regulations," Miller, 129 F.3d at 836, to
refer to commandeering. Thus, from a purely textual standpoint (and the Sixth Cir
cuit points to nothing outside the text), the word "alter" is not ordinarily used to refer
to commandeering. Instead, the phrase "force to alter" more naturally expresses that
idea.
341 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995).
342 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
343 Edgar, 56 F.3d at 796 (stating that Congress's power to compromise state sover-
eiguty through commandeering "is built into the Constitution, precisely in Article I
section 4, the first sentence of which places the burden of administering federal elec-
tions on the states"); see also Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Ridge, No.
CIVA94-7671, 1995 WL 136913, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1995) (stating that the "de-
fendants have not convinced me that there is any significant resemblance between
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observation is beside the point. The necessary assumption, which the
court made but did not defend, is that if the Constitution commands
the States to act, then Congress, when exercising power in the same
area, can do so. So, the question becomes whether commandeering
by Congress is no different than commandeering by the Constitution.
Once again, text cannot answer this question. To see this point,
consider the question whether States can commandeer Congress into
legislating on federal elections. We know that this argument is ab-
surd, but not because of anything in the text of the Times, Places and
Manner Clase.a 44 Rather, principles of federalism, which show that
the federal government is supreme over the state governments within
the federal government's limited sphere of action, preclude this back-
wards commandeering.34 So, to answer the question, we need to re-
sort to background principles and structure.
The question is whether commandeering by the Constitution is
the constitutional equivalent of commandeering by Congress. The
answer is "no" for two reasons. First, an affirmative ansver would
adopt the now bygone argument of the political safeguards of federal-
ism. Under the political safeguards argument, Congress defines the
constitutional boundary between state and federal power, without in-
terference from the judiciary.3 46 Consequently, on federalism mat-
ters, the Constitution effectively means what Congress says it means.
This argument assumes that state participation in the federal govern-
ment adequately protects state interests.M7 While this view had a brief
those cases deciding commerce clause issues and those deciding Article 1, section 4
issues"). The court also makes the converse observation that while several clauses in
Article I, Section 10 tell the States what not to do, the Tnes, Places and Manner
Clause tells the States what they must do. Edgar, 56 F.3d at 794 ("[T]he provisions of
the Constitution that relate to the states mostly tell them not what they must do but
what they can or cannot do. Article I section 4... is an exception.").
The court suggested that Congress might violate a State's sovereignty if it used its
Times, Places and Manner Clause power to "destroy" the State. Id. at 796 ("We sup-
pose ... that Congress might attempt to use the power granted in Article I section 4
to destroy state government, perhaps by constituting all employees of the state full-
time federal voting registrars in order to make sure that every eligible federal voter in
every state was registered.").
344 We could use the textual arguments set forth above in Section B to argue that
any grant of power to make "law" or "regulations" does not entail the power to com-
mandeer others to make law. See supra Part IU.B.
345 We saw a similar argument from structure on the issue whether States could
tax the national bank. See supra notes 136-39 and accompan)ing text.
346 The political safeguards of federalism argument is discussed at stpra notes
175-85 and accompanying text.
347 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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ascendancy in Garcia,348 the Court has since eroded it to a bare trace
in a recent line of decisions: New York v. United States, Printz, City of
Boerne v. Rores,349 Seminole Tribe, and Alden.3 50 Each decision, in its
own way, embraced the view that the political process does not suffi-
ciently protect States from the federal govemment.3 51 Current feder-
alism doctrine, then, rejects any view that effectively equates the
Constitution with Congress.
Second, equating commandeering by the Constitution with com-
mandeering by Congress fundamentally misconceives the nature of
American constitutional government. One of the founding genera-
tion's great innovations was a Constitution that defined and limited
government power. The innovation of an enforceable Constitution
followed from the twin innovation of locating ultimate sovereignty in
the People of the nation, not in any organ or agency of govern-
ment.352 As the Preamble tells us, the People exercised their sover-
eign power to create the Constitution,353 which stands above and
controls the national and state governments. Through this Constitu-
tion, the People chose to govern themselves through both the state
and national governments. As Justice Kennedy has described in a now
much invoked passage:
The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The
resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with
its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed
by it.354
Within American government structure, then, a clear hierarchy exists:
The People created a Constitution that allocated power between state
348 Id.
349 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
350 Despite the decision in New York v. United States three years before, the Seventh
Circuit did not recognize this trend, stating that after Garcia "the Tenth Amend-
ment... [was] put back in its bottle." Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar,
56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995).
351 This line of cases was discussed at supra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
352 This notion of popular sovereignty was opposed to the English notion of Par-
liamentary sovereignty under which Parliament alone determined the bounds of its
power. See BAILYN, supra note 121, at 69, 180-81; WooD, supra note 257, at 346-47.
353 U.S. CONsT. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States... do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.").




and national governments. The Constitution stands above the States
in the hierarchy, while Congress, unless the Constitution provides oth-
erwise, stands on the same level as the States. While federal law
trumps state law, neither governmnent stands over the other. Thus, a
command from Congress to the States does not derive from the same
authority as a command from the Constitution to the States.3a
To illustrate the point, take the following example. The Com-
merce Clause has both an affirmative and a negative component. On
the affirmative side, that Clause grants Congress power to regulate in-
terstate commerce. On the negative side, that Clause bars States from
placing an undue burden on interstate commerce3 56 In its negative
aspect, then, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution commands
the States not to do something. Now, consider a case where a State
has regulated interstate commerce in a way that does not place an
undue burden on interstate commerce, yet creates inefficiencies that
Congress would like to remove. For example, different States have
different truck length limitations. Congress could use its affirmative
power under the Commerce Clause to enact a law that pre-empts
those inefficient-state laws. In our example, Congress could pass a law
stating that there shall be no truck length limitation. But, after New
York v. United States, Congress could not pass a law that directed the
States to repeal their truck length limitations-that would be forbid-
den commandeering. This is so even though the Constitution itself
already commands the States in this area, directing the States to place
no undue burden on interstate commerce. Similarly, the Constitu-
tion's command that the States regulate federal elections does not,
standing alone, mean that Congress can use its power over the same
subject to commandeer the States. Rather, Congress ought to have
355 One member of Congress made a similar argument against the districting re-
quirement in the Apportionment Act of 1842. See CoNG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess.
app. at 318 (1842) (arguing that the people, through the Constitution, granted Con-
gress certain powers, and that Congress itself is to exercise those powers, not delegate
those powers to a body not designated by the people).
356 See ERWNIN CHE~mRiNsiw, CoNsTrrtrnoN aL Lx . PluNciPL.xs AND PoLCEs § 5.3.1,
at 306 (1997) ("The dormant commerce clause is the principle that state and local la
are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate commerce."); see also
Luan'-cF H. TRIBE, Ammc:Nc CoNsrrrtmo.AL Lmw § 6-2, at 403 (2d ed. 1988) (trac-
ing limitations on state interference with interstate commerce to "the Constitution's
negative implications"); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clatue to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982) (describing the Commerce Clause's limitations on state
regulation as being "implicit, silent, or negative"); Paul E. McGreal, The FRau'cd Eco-
nomks of the Donnant Commerce Caus=4 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191, 1192-93 (1998)
(discussing the "dormant Commerce Clause").
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that power only if history, text, structure, precedent, and prior govern-
ment practice point to that answer.
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Edgar, then, rests on a premise
that cannot be maintained. The court equated commandeering by
the Constitution with commandeering by Congress; this proposition is
not supportable. Thus, like the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh
Circuit ultimately offers no persuasive arguments for commandeering
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
E. Structure
As discussed earlier, the Court has drawn inferences from various
constitutional structures in deciding constitutional questions.3 57 Ar-
guments from structure follow four basic steps. 358 First, identify the
constitutional structure to be analyzed. Second, infer some relation-
ship that exists within that structure. Third, make an observation
about the world as it relates to the relationship identified within the
structure. Fourth, draw a rule for the decision of the issue at hand.
This Section applies this structure analysis to three constitutional
structures: representative government, federalism, and separation of
powers.
1. Representative Government
This argument parallels the structural argument in New York v.
United States359 that commandeering disrupts the system of representa-
tive government Let us walk through the four steps of the structural
argument. First, the structure is representative government. Second,
within this structure we can infer a relationship between the represen-
tative and the electorate. Specifically, the representative is to be ac-
countable to the electorate; in this way, the electorate can check
abuses of power by the representative. Third, we can observe that
commandeering interferes with accountability. If Congress comman-
deers the States to act, it will be the state governments that make the
ultimate laws and thus state officials who are blamed for those laws.
Through commandeering, then, federal officials can avoid accounta-
bility for their policy choices. Fourth, commandeering is unconstitu-
tional because it conflicts with the structure of representative
government.
357 See supra Part ll.G.
358 For an illustration of these four steps at work, see the discussion supra note 135
and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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The same argument applies to commandeering under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. To see how, consider step three of the
argument-that commandeering blurs the lines of accountability.
Under the districting requirement, state governments must draw a sin-
gle-member district for each of their House members. Due to pres-
sure from legal requirements regarding minority voting rights,30
these districts often take a bizarre shape and lump together non-con-
tiguous communities. 61 If the voters find these districts objectiona-
ble, they may hold the drafters of those districts-their state
governments-accountable at the next election. Yet, if the state gov-
ernments had a choice, they might have opted for an at-large system
of voting, or even a multi-member district system, that would not have
required bizarrely drawn districts.3 62 But, because they must draw dis-
tricts, the state governments may take the blame for doing so. State
governments are held accountable for a districting requirement im-
posed by Congress.
Thus, commandeering States to draw congressional districts
poses the same accountability problem as commandeering States to
regulate low-level radioactive waste. In both cases, the States may re-
ceive the blame for a federal policy choice. For this reason, both in-
stances of commandeering conflict with the constitutional structure of
representative government and are unconstitutional.
360 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (prohibiting any state election that "results in a
denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on ac-
count of race or color"); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). The Court
has summarized the vote dilution test under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as
follows:
Plaintiffs must show three threshold conditions: first, the minority group "is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district"; second, the minority group is "politically cohesive";
and third, the majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... to defeat
the minority's preferred candidate." Once plaintiffs establish these condi-
tions, the court considers whether, "on the totality of circumstances," minor-
ities have been denied an "equal opportunity" to "participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997) (citations omitted).
361 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993) (describing how one
House district in North Carolina "winds in a snakelike fashion through tobacco coun-
try, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of
black neighborhoods'" and how another district "has been compared to a 'Rorschach
ink-blot test' and a 'bug splattered on a windshield'").
362 The Conclusion raises the issue whether Congress could require districts
under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Se infra notes 542-48 and
accompanying text.
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2. Federalism
The constitutional structure of federalism also cuts against com-
mandeering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Under our
Constitution, federalism refers to the division of power between a su-
preme but limited national government and state governments that
hold all residual powers.3 63 Within this structure, we can infer that
when each government acts within its sphere of power it should be
free to set its own law making agenda.36 4 Deciding what issues to con-
sider, when to consider them, and for how long are all matters com-
mitted to the discretion of a sovereign's legislature.36 5 It would be a
gross violation of that sovereignty for one government to prescribe
any of these matters for another government's legislature.3 66 Thus,
we can infer autonomous national and state legislative processes as a
relationship within the structure of federalism.
Next, we can observe that the law making process, like all human
endeavors, is bounded by a scarcity of resources, namely time and
money.367 A legislature's law making capacity is a finite resource that
can be allocated to only so many proposals. If a legislature considers
one law making proposal, it must either forgo, postpone, or shorten
363 Again, the Tenth Amendment summarizes the point nicely. See supra text ac-
companying note 69.
364 Justice O'Connor made this argument in her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 776-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Given that that vision of federal-
ism has come to dominate the Court's recent cases, her dissenting opinion offers a
glimpse at where the Court may be heading.
365 See id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("State sovereignty" not only includes
"the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also includes the power to decide which pro-
posals are most worthy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken up,
and the precise form in which they should be debated.").
366 See id.
367 This observation lays the foundation for the science of economics. SeeWLumi
J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BUNDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND PoLIciEs 35 (3d ed. 1985).
Virtually all resources are scarce, meaning that humanity has less of them
than it would like. So choices must be made among a limited set of possibili-
ties, in full recognition of the inescapable fact that a decision to have more
of one thing means we must give up some of another thing.
Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 3 (1998)
("[Elconomics is the science of rational choice in a world-our world-in which re-
sources are limited in relation to human wants."). On the cost of the most recent
state legislative session in Texas, see Juan B. Elizondo,Jr., Legislative Session Price TagIs
Rising, AusTIN-Am. STATESMAN, July 6, 1999, at B1 (noting the argument that a $20
million legislative budget, in a state with an overall budget of $94 billion, strictly limits
what the Texas Legislature can do in any given session).
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consideration of other proposals. 3s The power to force a legislature
to consider a proposal, then, is the power to shape and alter the legis-
lature's law making agenda.
Commandeering violates the structure of federalism because it
gives Congress the power to control state legislative agendas. When
Congress commandeers a state legislature, Congress effectively directs
that legislature to place the federally mandated proposal on the
State's legislative agenda. Consideration and action on the federally
mandated proposal will take up part of the state legislature's scarce
resources, crowding out other business the state legislators would have
placed on the agenda instead. So, by commandeering state legisla-
tures, Congress exercises effective control over state legislative agen-
das and invades the autonomy of the state legislative processes. For
this reason, congressional commandeering of state legislatures vio-
lates the constitutional structure of federalism.
Another federalism argument derives from the principle that
Congress has only limited and enumerated powers. In dividing power
vertically between national and state governments, the Framers allo-
cated certain powers 'to the national government, leaving the States
largely free to exercise all other powers without federal interference.
Even within its enumerated powers, Congress would not have the time
or the interest to meddle in local matters. To do so, Congress would
have to learn about the local circumstances within each state and then
tailor its regulations to meet those circumstances. These activities are
both expensive and time-consuming. Commandeering, however,
reduces these costs: Congress makes the general policy choice and
then directs the States to perform the costly task of tailoring the policy
to local circumstances. Commandeering, then, enables Congress to
regulate local matters at a reduced cost.
To see how commandeering frees up Congress to regulate more
local matters, consider the districting requirement. By directing the
States to draw districts, Congress gets to make a general policy
choice-for example, districts over at-large-without doing the leg
work of drawing 435 individual districts in fifty states. Such a maneu-
ver circumvents one of the safeguards against Congress grabbing
power-local issues are too mundane and too time consuming for
Congress to regulate.3 69 But, if Congress can just address the big pic-
368 This problem will be particularly acute for states that have part time legisla-
tures, such as the Texas Legislature, which meets for only three months every tw.-o
years. See TEx. CoNST. art. 3, § 5 (Vernon 1997) (mandating that "[t]he Legislature
shall meet every two years" and providing for a "regular session" totaling ninety days).
369 See TIE FEDERAiusr No. 17, supra note 111, at 119-20 (Alexander Hamilton).
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tare question and leave implementation to the States, Congress can
suddenly engage in much more law making without the time or
money costs of the nitty-gritty details, which will be much less exciting.
If Congress were required to address both the big picture and the de-
tails if it chose to act at all, Congress might not legislate in the area.
The Framers knew this.370
Thus, commandeering violates another aspect of the federalism
structure. While the Constitution grants Congress supreme but lim-
ited power, commandeering allows Congress to expand its law maldng
ability by making broad policy pronouncements and leaving imple-
mentation to the state legislatures. New York v. United States did not
need to address this argument because in that case Congress specified
rather precisely what laws it wanted the States to enact.371 Conversely,
the congressional districting requirement leaves much work for the
States to do, allowing Congress to avoid the difficult detail work by
commandeering the States.
3. Separation of Powers
Last, the constitutional structure of separation of powers also cuts
against commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
Separation of powers refers to the division and allocation of power
among the three branches of the federal government.37 2 This struc-
ture recognizes two main relationships aihong the three branches.
First, each branch is largely given a separate task within the govern-
ment: The legislature is to make law, the executive is to enforce law,
and the judiciary is to decide cases. Second, and more relevant to the
present discussion, each branch is given sufficient power to check
abuses of power by the other branches.373 Specifically for our pur-
poses, the President can veto bills passed by both chambers of Con-
gress, subject to Congress's power to override any veto by a two-thirds
vote.374 The veto gives the President power to review and pass on the
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the
superintendence of the local administrations and which will form so many
rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be
particularized without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to
compensate for the instruction it might afford.
Id.
370 See id.
371 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
372 For a further discussion of separation of powers, see generally McGreal, supra
note 146, at 1134-46.
373 See id. at 1137-40.
374 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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constitutionality375 or advisability of Congress's final work product,
the bill. And, a bill cannot become law unless Congress has presented
the bill to the President and given the President an opportunity to
exercise the veto power.376 The veto, then, is an important structural
check on Congress's law making power.
Congressional commandeering of state legislatures circumvents
the President's veto power. Consider the congressional districting re-
quirement. The President reviewed and passed on the bills that made
the general choice between single-member districts and other electo-
ral systems, such as at-large voting. But, merely selecting single-mem-
ber districts leaves States much discretion over.how those districts are
to be drawn. What role will party affiliation play in drawing districts?
What role will traditional districting criteria, such as contiguity, com-
pactness, and communities of interest, play in the process? Will other
goals be sought in drawing districts? If these policy decisions were
made in a bill passed by Congress, the President would have an oppor-
tumity to review, and perhaps veto, the bill. In structural terms, the
President would have a chance to check any decisions made by Con-
gress. But, commandeering removes the President from the law mak-
ing process. State legislatures will make these policy decisions
through their law making processes, and the President will play no
role. Thus, commandeering violates the constitutional structure of
separation of powers by removing the presidential veto as a check on
law making.
Consider three possible objections to this structural argument.
First, because commandeering takes both the President and Congress
out of the law making loop, the President's veto is no longer needed
to check Congress. But, this objection misses an important difference
between the President and Congress regarding commandeering-if
Congress objects to a State's implementation of the command, Con-
gress can pass another law re-directing the State. And, if Congress
agrees with the State's implementation, Congress can simply not act.
So, Congress can effectively stay in the loop even after comman-
deering the States. The President, however, plays no role unless Con-
375 President George Washington reserved the veto for legislation he believed to
be unconstitutional. See FORRE.ST McDoNALD, THE LFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
184-85 (1974). More recently, however, Presidents have used the veto power as a tool
in forming public policy. See I BRUCE AcKERwNAN, NVE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDnIO.XS 63
(1991) ("Today's Presidents use their veto power to further their programmatic
ambitions.").
376 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983) ("Presentment to the President
and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took spe-
cial pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented.").
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gress acts first. For example, if Congress agrees with state
implementation but the President objects, the President has no power
to stop the State. Congress can acquiesce in state implementation,
and the President is neutralized by Congress's acquiescence.3 77
A second objection would note that commandeering under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause merely places the President in the
same position as if the States were regulating federal elections on
their own. Recall that that Clause places initial responsibility for fed-
eral election regulations on the States; the President would play no
role in making those regulations. So, if the President plays no role
when States initially make federal election regulations, it should not
matter whether the President plays any role when Congress com-
mands the States to do so. But, the objection makes an important
mistake by equating independent state action with state action under
the command of Congress. When States act independently of Con-
gress, as when they initially enact federal election regulations, Con-
gress has not acted, and thus there is no need for a presidential veto
to check congressional law making. When States are acting under a
congressional command, however, the States are effectively imple-
menting the policy directives of Congress. The state legislation
should be treated as an extension of Congress's law making power,
and that power should be subject to the check of a presidential veto.
A third objection would be that the President has waived any
right to veto by signing the prior bill that commandeered the
StatesA73 This argument ultimately fails because, as the Court has
held, no branch of the federal government can consent to a separa-
tion of powers violation. 379 The Framers divided and separated fed-
377 The legislative veto posed the same problem. Id. at 956-59. A legislative veto
is a device by which Congress grants an agency power to draft rules and regulations,
or to take some other action, but requires the agency to submit those rules, regula-
tions, or actions to Congress before they go into effect. Id. at 923-28. Congress can
then "veto" the rules, regulations, or action upon a majority vote, without any input
from the President. Id. Congress's veto is tantamount to a repeal of the rules, regula-
tions, or actions without giving the President an opportunity to veto Congress's re-
peal. Id. at 952-54. Thus, the legislative veto violates the separation of powers by
taking the President's veto out of certain law making decisions. Id. at 958-59.
378 Of course, this argument would not apply in cases where Congress passed a
commandeering law over the President's veto.
379 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States .... the departure
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state offi-
cials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the
Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's division of
power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the
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eral power among three branches to protect citizens from abuse of
that power. Those protections, then, belong to the citizens and not to
the branches of government. Thus, it is not the federal government's
place to waive those protections.
In sum, three structural arguments cut against congressional
power to commandeer state legislatures under the Times, Places and
Manner Clause. First, commandeering would undercut the structure
of representative government by blurring the lines of accountability
between representative and electorate. Second, commandeering
would offend the structure of federalism by giving Congress power to
control state legislative agendas and by allowing Congress to make
policy choices without doing detailed law making. Third, comman-
deering would undercut the separation of powers by effectively remov-
ing the check of a presidential veto from some national law making.
F Prior Government Practice
As discussed above, the Court and Congress have looked to prior
government practice in interpreting the Constitution.s80 Prior prac-
tice may be probative in two circumstances. First, if one of the first
several Congresses established the practice, the practice may reflect
the drafters' or ratifiers' understanding of the Constitution. Many of
the drafters and ratifiers were members of the first Congresses, and we
may presume that they acted on their understanding of the Constitu-
tion. Second, a long-time, unbroken government practice may evi-
dence a long-accepted meaning of the Constitution. Given the nature
of politics, one would expect that someone would suggest breaking
with the practice if it was to their political advantage. That the prac-
tice stayed intact for such a long time, impervious to the winds of po-
litical change, might show the breadth and depth of its acceptance.
territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves
the encroachment. In Buddey v. Vaieo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-137 (1976), for in-
stance, the Court held that Congress had infringed the President's appoint-
ment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his
consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. In
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-959 (1983), we held that the legislative veto
violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the
President, despite Presidents' approval of hundreds of statutes containing a
legislative veto provision. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot
be expanded by the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is
thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.
Id.
380 See supra Part I.D.
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The first type of prior government practice does not support
commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Con-
gress did not act under the Clause, moreover commandeer the States,
until 1842, over fifty years after ratification.381 By that time, the
founding generation had faded from the political scene, and a gener-
ation raised in post-ratification America largely held the reins of gov-
ernment. Thus, the 1842 passage of the first districting requirement,
standing alone, tells us nothing about the views of the Framers or ra-
tifiers on commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. Indeed, as some members of the 1844 Congress argued, the
failure of the first several Congresses to commandeer the States under
that Clause shows the Framers' understanding that Congress did not
have such a power.38 2
The second use of prior government practice, to show a long-
standing understanding of the Constitution, poses a more difficult
question. On the surface, Congress appears to have a long-standing
practice of requiring House districts, reflected in eight different ap-
portionment statutes spanning 157 years.383 Few government prac-
tices can claim such a pedigree. Upon closer inspection, however, this
practice loses much of its force. Congress omitted the requirement
from several apportionment statutes, leaving gaps of several decades
in the practice.384 And, even when the requirement was in effect, the
House consistently refused to enforce it, allowing representatives
elected under an at-large system to take a seat in that body, in direct
violation of the districting requirement.385 So, further discussion is
required to determine precisely what Congress's practice has been re-
garding the districting requirement.
This Section reviews three episodes in the districting saga. First,
we consider the congressional debates over the first districting re-
quirement in the 1842 Apportionment Act. These debates show Con-
gress actively engaging the issue of commandeering under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. By enacting the districting requirement,
Congress voted in favor of such power.
381 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 347 (1842) (statement of Rep. Clif-
ford) (discussing the districting requirement and noting that "the power is claimed,
for the first time in the history of the Government, to enforce a system upon the
States by Federal command").
382 See H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 9-10 (1844).
383 For the districting requirements in the various apportionment statutes, see in-
fra Statutory Appendix.
384 The Statutory Appendix, infra, indicates when the various districting require-
ments were in effect.
385 See infra notes 497-99 and accompanying text.
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Second, in the first federal elections under the 1842 Apportion-
ment Act, four states elected their representatives at large, in direct
violation of the Act. When the elections in these states were chal-
lenged in the House,386 the issue of commandeering was again de-
bated. If the districting requirement was constitutional, those
representatives elected at large were not entitled to their seats; if the
requirement was unconstitutional, they should have been seated. By
ultimately seating the challenged representatives, the House voted
against the power to commandeer.
Third, the House considered the constitutionality of the district-
ing requirement in three subsequent election challenges. In two of
the challenges, a House Report concluded that the districting require-
ment was unconstitutional commandeering, and in the third chal-
lenge a House Report reached the opposite conclusion.
Each of these episodes is reviewed in the following discussion.
Then, this Section concludes by drawing some conclusions about what
this practice means for Congress's power to commandeer under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause.
1. The Apportionment Act of 1842
As required by the Constitution, the Twenty-Seventh Congress set
to reapportioning the House of Representatives based on the results
of the 1840 Census.as 7 As with each prior reapportionment, Congress
debated the appropriate size of the House,a-a which would depend on
386 The Constitution grants each chamber of Congress the power to judge the
elections and qualifications of its members. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.").
887 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives... shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included in this Union, according to their respective
Numbers .... The actual Enumeration shall be made... within every subsequent
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Lav direct."); id. amend. XIV, § 2
("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed.").
388 This debate often echoed the Framers' concern that the House be neither too
large nor too small. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1842); id. at 549
(statement of Senator Bagby of Alabama) (arguing that "the number should be con-
fined to that which was best calculated to transact the business of legislation, while, at
the same time, it was sufficiently large to insure a safe representation"). If the House
were too large, meetings and debates would be unwieldy and no work could effec-
tively be done. I& at 436 (stating that Representative Thompson "opposed the in-
crease of the House as tending to make it unwieldy. he thought it ought rather to be
reduced"). If the House were too small, a cabal of factious interests could overtake a
majority of representatives and make law against the public interest. Id. Madison
expressed these same concerns in THE FE n Au=r No. 10, supra note 111, at 82
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the appropriate ratio of constituents to representatives.38 9 Also, Con-
gress debated how to account for fractional interests within a state.' 00
For example, if Congress designated one representative for every
70,000 people, and a state had 500,000 people, that would work out to
7 1/7 representatives.391 And, of course, whatever ratio Congress des-
ignated would result in fractional interests in each state. Should any
fraction be counted as a whole representative? If so, which fractions?
The answers to these questions would affect the balance of power be-
tween different regions, slave and free states,392 and large and small
states3 93 at a time when sectional conflict was becoming more
heated.3 94 Indeed, when one representative moved that the appor-
tionment bill be referred to a special committee before consideration
by the full House, many objected that committee consideration would
be useless because the issues would simply be re-hashed by the multi-
ple interests represented in the full House.395 As one might expect,
(James Madison) ("[T]he representatives must be raised to a certain number in order
to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.").
389 At one point in the debates, representatives voiced support for ratios spanning
from 141,000 to I all the way down to 30,000 to 1. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess.
436 (1842).
390 For a thorough explanation of this issue as well as the various methods for
addressing the issue, see generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Congressional Reapportion-
ment, 42 HARv. L. REV. 1015 (1929).
391 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1842) (listing fractional interests for
various states under a ratio of 62,000 to 1).
392 Id. (comparing the effects of different ratios on the fractional interests of "free
States" and "slave States").
393 Id. Representative Mason argued:
Another fact worthy of consideration was, that the large fractions under this
ratio [62,000 to 1] fell chiefly, excepting New York and Ohio, upon the
larger States; a result to be desired, as the larger States can much better bear
large fractions than the small States; as the weight of the fraction would, in
one case, fall on many Representatives, when, in the other, it would fall
upon a few.
Id.
394 See generally WitiAm LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY. THE GREAT BATrLE
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1995) (discussing sectional conflict over slavery in
Congress during the 1830s and 1840s).
395 See the CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1842), where Representative
C. Brown
observed that the question would be settled, not by a committee, but by
votes. He was opposed to a commitment (to committee], because no possi-
ble advantage could be gained by it. It would be impossible for a committee
to fix upon a ratio of representation that would please every body; and there-
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and the Framers certainly expected, debates about reapportionment
were debates about the allocation of political power.3 96
Amidst the usual reapportionment politics, Congress w Testled
with a proposal that the House be elected by single-member districts
drawn by the States. Once again, the impetus of the proposal %as a
push for political power, this time from two directions. First, in the
election of 1840, the Whigs had finally won a majority in both houses
of Congress, as well as the White House.397 The Whigs had coasted to
victory on the coattails of their war hero presidential candidate Wil-
liam Henry Harrison--"Tippecanoe and Tyler too"-and were poised
to enact their reform program into law.393 The Whig Congress was
especially energized because Harrison had made clear that he would
defer to Congress on most policy matters.3 99 With the country in eco-
nomic distress, the Whig Congress saw an opportunity to prove its
mettle through a wide-ranging program of reform legislation. 400
Then, President Harrison died. When John Tyler took over as
President, the Whig Congress learned not only that the new President
would not defer to Congress,401 but that he disagreed with many of its
reform proposals.402 Over the next two years, Congress and the Presi-
dent battled over several proposals, with little resulting legislation.403
fore he considered it best to have that matter considered in the House
where it must be finally settled.
Md By a vote of 105 to 75, the bill was ultimately referred to the full House sitting as
the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union. Id.; AbnerJ. Miksa & Eric
Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative Process 129-33
(1997) (describing the Committee of the Whole House).
396 See supra notes 241-61 and accompanying text.
397 MicHAF,- F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AsERIc' WHIG PWuM. JACESO-
NIAN PoLrncs AND THE ONsEr OF THE C]VIL WAR 122 (1999).
398 Id. ("With control of the presidency, a 29-22 majority in the new Senate, a 133-
102 margin in the new House of Representatives, and possession of a majority of state
governments, the Whig party stood poised to reform government and to promote
economic recovery."). Many of their "reforms" were simply reactions to President
AndrewJackson, which is not surprising given the origin of the party as a reaction to
Jackson. For example, the Whigs pushed for enactment of a new national bank,
which Jackson had successfully prevented through his veto power. Id. at 122-24.
Also, Whigs supported civil service reform, which was a reaction to Jackson's per-
ceived abuse of the spoils system. Id. at 28-30.
399 Id. at 122.
400 See id. at 122 ("The nation's desperate economic condition and the financial
disarray of state and national governments required new policies. Their promised
alternatives, they believed, would provide the necessary remedy.").
401 See i& at 128.
402 See id. at 128-29.
403 See id at 128-50.
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The Whigs were concerned that they had squandered their first big
chance to rule the nation and that the People would hold them ac-
countable at the polls. 40 4
As the 1842 elections approached, the Whigs identified what they
thought was another threat to their rule in Congress. Alabama had
chosen to elect its House members by at-large elections instead of dis-
tricts. 40 5 The Whigs worried that at-large elections would erode their
membership in the House.40 6 Under the then-pending version of the
Apportionment Act of 1842, Alabama was entitled to nine representa-
tives.407 If these representatives were elected by single-member dis-
tricts, the Whigs believed that they would win some, though perhaps
not most, of the seats.408 If, however, Alabama's representatives were
elected at large, with every voter voting for each representative, the
Whigs feared that the majority of Alabama voters were Democrats,409
and thus Alabama would return an all-Democrat House delegation.410
Given their political troubles with the President, the Whig Congress
sought every electoral advantage it could get.411 They believed that
404 See id. at 149-50.
405 ZAGARm, supra note 4, at 130 ("In 1840, Democrats in the Alabama state legisla-
ture had switched the state from district to at-large elections in an effort to get more
members of their party elected to Congress.").
406 Shields, supra note 10, at 362-63.
407 Act ofJune 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (1842) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c (1994)).
408 Representative Payne of Alabama argued that the Whigs could use the single-
member district system to elect a majority of the Alabama representatives even though
the Whig party was a minority in that state.
By placing the counties in which there are large Democratic majorities in
two or three districts, at most, every other district in the State might be so
organized by Congress as to be represented by Whigs. That it would be
done, I do not entertain a doubt. Under this state of things, the majority in
Alabama would be represented in Congress by three members, and the mi-
nority by six.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 361 (1842); see also id. app. at 354 (state-
ment of Rep. Summers of Virginia) (offering a similar example based on his home
state).
409 Id. app. at 361 (statement of Rep. Payne. of Alabama) (stating that in Alabama
"the Democratic party hats] a majority of quite ten thousand voters").
410 Id. (statement of Rep. Payne of Alabama) (claiming that under the at-large
system, the Democratic majority in Alabama "will be entitled" to all nine representa-
tives from Alabama).
411 See id. app. at 362 (statement of Rep. Payne of Alabama) (claiming that the
Whigs' "conduct in this matter looks as if they were conscious of receding power; and
this proposition to district the States must be regarded as the last effort to preserve
the existence of a mongrel political party, incapable of producing, but adequate to
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House elections by single-member districts offered one such
advantage.412
A second effect of the at-large versus district debate was renewal
of old rivalries between large and small States. Both large and small
States saw at-large elections as a potential threat to their relative power
in the House. Large States, which had historically elected their repre-
sentatives by single-member districts,413 felt at a disadvantage to small
States, which had historically elected their representatives at large.
Due to at-large elections, the small-state House delegations would re-
flect the will of single, unified state voices.4 14 Conversely, single-mem-
ber districts would mean that the large-state House delegations would
speak for varied, fractured interests. Thus, large States believed that
at-large elections gave small States a relatively greater voice in the
House, and a districting requirement would prevent this corruption of
the House.
prevent and destroy every measure intended and calculated to promote the public
welfare").
412 ZAGARI, supra note 4, at 130-31; sw also CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess.
app. at 350 (1842) (statement of Rep. Clifford of Maine) (arguing that the districting
requirement "is designed to arrest the progress of revolution, and to stay the torrent
of public opinion, which is about to move [Representative Daniel Barnard, a New
York Whig,] and his friends from their places, and to give them to others more worthy
of the trust").
413 Professor Zagari explains how, soon after ratification of the Constitution, the
large States gravitated toward districting while the small States stayed ith at-large
elections. ZAcGAmu, supra note 4, at 105-33. Small States stayed with at-large elections
because they saw themselves as relatively homogenous communities with relatively
uniform interests throughout. Id. at 108-11. Thus, there was no pressure from differ-
ent regions to have their "voices" heard in Congress through election of their ovn
representatives. Id. Conversely, the large States quickly saw development of various
interests tied to different regions within their own States. Id. at 111-12. These differ-
ent interests agitated for the right to select House members who would represent
their interests. Id.
414 Representative Summers of Virginia explained how at-large elections worked
in practice:
Each party in the States presents its ticket, made up of candidates holding
the opinions of such parties respectively. One or the other of these tickets is
elected, and the successful party in the States has secured an entire delega-
tion, holding the same opinion with itself. In this House, such a delegation
gives its vote-on all party questions, at least, (and most questions are now
made to partake of that character,)-with the same force as if given by one
man having a right to cast the entire vote of his State. What is the result?
Why, that a small State with the general-ticket system has a more potent
voice in the legislation of Congress than the largest States in the Union.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 353 (1842).
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Small States basically agreed that at-large elections gave them
some relative advantage over large States that elected by districts. The
small States, however, feared that their relative advantage would even-
tually push the large States to use at-large elections.415 If that hap.
pened, small States would once again be at a great disadvantage. 416
So, the question for the small States was which choice was worse: all
States electing at large, or all States electing by district. In the end,
many small States sided with districting to prevent undue influence
from the large States.
These were the political forces that propelled the districting re-
quirement onto the congressional agenda in 1842.417 And, these po-
litical considerations surfaced in the congressional debate.418 As with
most such debates, arguments about what was politically desirable or
expedient were met with arguments about what was constitutionally
permissible. 419 For example, members argued: Congress could not
act under the Times, Places and Manner Clause unless the States had
failed to do so;420 districting did not relate to the "manner of holding
the election";421 the Constitution required elections at large;42 2 and
415 Id. app. at 353-54 (statement of Rep. Summers of Virginia) ("While some
States adopt the plan of elections at large, and increase thereby their political weight
so largely, is it to be expected that other and more populous States will long tolerate
the mischief of such inequality? They will end it by adopting themselves the same
system."). But see id. app. at 343 (statement of Rep. Houston of Alabama) (arguing
that large States would find the at-large system too "unwieldy," and that multiple fac-
tions in large States would prevent adoption of an at-large system).
416 Id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Davis of Kentucky) (arguing that election by
districts protects "the safety of the small States" against the power of the large States);
id. app. at 343 (statement of Rep. Houston of Alabama) (discussing the argument
that at-large elections in large States pose a threat to small States).
417 A districting requirement had been proposed and debated in prior Con-
gresses, sometimes as a statutory proposal and sometimes as a proposed constitutional
amendment. See ZAGARRI, supra note 4, at 125-31.
418 See supra notes 408-16.
419 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch,
1801-1805, 33 WAKE FoREsT L. Rxv. 219, 220 (1998) ("And, as always, political differ-
ences often took the form of arguments over the meaning of the Constitution.").
420 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 339 (1842) (statement of Rep, Davis
of Kentucky) (addressing this argument).
421 Id.
422 This argument rested on U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, which states in pertinent
part, "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States." Some members argued that this
Clause requires that all"the People" of each state vote for-that is, "choose"-each of
the State's representatives. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 361
(1842) (statement of Rep. Payne of Alabama); id. app. at 352 (statement of Rep. Sum-
mers of Virginia). This argument had also been made by proponents of the at-large
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Congress had to either regulate all aspects of federal elections-time,
place, and manner all at once-or none at all.42
For present purposes, the pertinent constitutional objection was
that Congress could not commandeer the States under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause.4 4 This objection was made repeatedly, by
many different representatives. Consider the following examples.
Representative Clifford of Maine:
The odious character of the amendment consists in the star-
fling power which it assumes, to give direction to the members
of the States Legislatures as to the manner in which they shall
discharge their high functions as representatives of the
people.425
Representative Houston of Alabama:
[W]e are doing [districting] in the most obnoxious manner to
the States, by an order to them to do that which some of them
at least look upon as injurious and wrong.426
Representative Kennedy of Indiana:
The pending amendment proposes to issue an order to the
Legislatures of the different States of this Union, directing them
how, and commanding them, to do a particular thing, to wit: to
form their respective States into different Congressional dis-
tricts.., and to see that each district sends one member to this
body.4 7
Representative Payne of Alabama:
What does the amendment propose? Sir, nothing less than an
interference, by this Government, with the internal policy of
the States, by commanding the respective Legislatures thereof
to subdivide the said States into Congressional districts, from
which the members of this body are to be chosen.428
.system during the fifty years preceding passage of the districting requirement. See
ZAGARRI, supra note 4, at 109-11.
423 See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 339 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Davis of Kentucky) (responding to the argument that Congress can regulate the time,
place or manner of federal elections only "in the event of failure on the part of the
States").
424 Two other constitutional issues discussed were, first, whether Congress had the
power to regulate districting at all and, second, whether Congress could enact a par-
tial regulation of federal elections. See supra notes 420-23 and accompanying text. As
discussed above, the Court has ansvered the second of these questions in the affirma-
tive. See supra text accompanying note 290.
425 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 347 (1842).
426 Id. app. at 342.
427 Id. app. at 316.
428 Id. app. at 360.
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And, the Congressional Globe contains many similar statements.429
So, many members of the Twenty-Seventh Congress thought com-
mandeering unconstitutional, just as the Court did in New York v.
United States. And, even though 150 years separated that Congress
from the Court in New York v. United States, both bodies made many of
the same arguments, almost to the word, against commandeering.43 0
The following discussion traces the arguments made during the
House and Senate debates over the Apportionment Act of 1842,
pointing out pertinent similarities to the Court's reasoning in New
York v. United States as well as to arguments made in this Article.
As we did in the beginning of Part III, let us start with text. Some
representatives made an argument from the text of the Times, Places
and Manner Clause similar to a textual argument advanced above. 43 1
Recall that the Clause grants Congress the power to "make" or "alter"
federal election regulations. This Article has argued that these words
suggest that Congress ought to do the making or altering; comman-
deering would be better expressed by a power to "direct or command
the States to make or alter such regulations," or some such language.
Representative Houston of Alabama made the point in his speech op-
posing the districting requirement:
[U]nder the power to "alter," it is not competent or proper legisla-
tion for Congress to say a thing shall be altered. To alter, means,
when properly applied, to change something already in existence;
not to order that a thing shall be torn to pieces and changed; but to take
down and build up anew, to refix, to remodel, and in all cases of change
or alteration, to leave the thing perfect and complete.4 2
Representative Kennedy of Indiana made the same argument:
[I]f the State Legislatures have districted their States in a manner
that does not suit you, and you wish to "alter" them, you must make
the alteration... by an act of Congress, say that this county, which is
now in my district, shall in future be placed in the district of my
429 See, e.g., id. app. at 372 (statement of Rep. Pope of Kentucky) (arguing that
Congressional districting of states will "be a subject of perpetual controversy" as power
in Washington changes hands).
430 For example, Representative Clifford of Maine advocated an anti-comman-
deering rule in remarkably similar terms to the Court's rule. "The powers of Con-
gress, in their legitimate effect, when carried out into the form of legislative
enactments, were never intended to operate upon States, like the prohibitions of the
Constitution, but upon individuals." Id. app. at 348 (1842). Compare this statement
to the Court's conclusion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("In
providing for a stronger central government.... the Framers explicitly chose a Con-
stitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.").
431 See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
432 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 343 (1842).
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colleague; and so on through the State, so far as you wish to make
alterations. This you must do yourselves; and if you Cannot com-
mand the State Legislatures to "make" any district, you cannot com-
mand them to "alter" any district.4 s3
These opponents of the districting requirement recognized that a sim-
ple grant of power to make or alter regulations was not an apt way to
express commandeering.
Next, several members argued against the proposed districting re-
quirement based on the intent behind the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. Recall that the Framers and ratifiers viewed Congress's power
under that Clause as necessary to preserve the national govern-
ment.434 If States refused to hold elections, could not hold elections,
or did so negligently, Congress could step in to ensure elections were
held so that each state would be represented. Based on this history,
several members noted that Congress's power would be most needed
when the States were unwilling or unable to exercise that power them-
selves. In those cases, commandeering the States would be self-defeat-
ing. First, consider the statement of Representative Clifford of Maine,
who addressed the case of a State unable to hold federal elections:
If, in the progress of events, the time shall ever come when any one
of these States shall be unable... to obey the mandate of the Con-
stitution [to hold federal elections], in consequence of invasion or
rebellion, how utterly futile would be any command from this Gov-
ernment. It would neither drive out a foreign foe, nor restore do-
mestic tranquillity. It would amount to nothing but a solemn
mockery to the State.435
Second, consider the remarks of Representative Houston of Alabama
regarding a State unwilling to elect by districts:
Suppose this [districting requirement] be adopted and sent forth to
the States as a law of Congress. The States disobey .... If the
members elected by general ticket should appear, you would reject
them; and, if no quorum appeared besides them, the wheels of Gov-
ernment must stop. Then, sir, you will have defeated the very pur-
poses of the power; you will present to this country the strange
spectacle of a self-preserving [power] being applied in such a man-
ner as to make it a self-destroying power.43 6
433 Id, app. at 318.
434 See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
435 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 347 (1842); see also id. app. at 342
(statement of Rep. Houston) ("What! order a State laboring under an immovable
disability, which prevents her action, to adopt the necessary regulations for the elec-
tion of members? Such a course would seem to me to be worse than foolish.").
436 Id app. at 343.
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In either case, commandeering defeats the purpose of Congress's
power: to ensure the continued functioning of Congress itself.
A third argument spoke to the consequences of allowing Con-
gress to commandeer the States.437 By commanding a State to do
something, Congress sets up a potential conflict between the two
levels of government. If a State balks at Congress's command, the two
levels of government are at a standoff, unless Congress can muster the
oppressive means necessary to compel compliance. Either way, Con-
gress's authority is diminished. If the State does not comply and Con-
gress does nothing, Congress appears weak; if Congress uses force
against the State, Congress appears oppressive. Either appearance er-
odes Congress's support, and thus its authority, among the People.4 3 8
The Court's decision implementing Brown v. Board ofEducation439
rested on similar prudential concerns. Brown held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racially seg-
regated public schools.440 The following Term, the Court heard
arguments on how best to implement this holding. In a decision re-
ferred to as Brown I, the Court held that States need not integrate
their public schools immediately, but only with "all deliberate speed,"
taking account of local circumstances. 441 Some have argued that the
Justices took a go-slow approach in Brown II out of fear of state resis-
437 Some commentators refer to this as a "prudential" argument. See Bonurrr,
supra note 138, at 59-73; PATrERSON, supra note 158, at 128-50; Fallon, supra note
104, at 544-45. Professor Alexander Bickel creates a set of prudential doctrines he
labeled "the passive virtues." See ALEXANDER M. BiICEL, THE LEAST DANGERoUS
BRANcH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962). The passive
virtues described doctrinal devices, such as the political question doctrine or stand-
ing, that allowed the Court to avoid decisions that might threaten the Court's legiti-
macy and thus its authority. See BOBBrrr, supra note 138, at 72 (describing Bickel's
passive virtues as allowing "the Court to avoid going in the direction that unalloyed
principle might take it when this course was dangerous to the institution and that it
allowed accommodation with other branches that customarily act prudentially").
438 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 318 (1842) (statement of Rep. Ken-
nedy of Indiana) (arguing that a failed attempt at commandeering will "weaken your
authority, and render yourselves contemptible in the eyes of the world"). In more
grandiose terms, Representative Kennedy continued,
let Congress assume to command the States as to what they shall do in their
own limits; let us here assume this insolent superiority over our domestic
Legislatures,-and, as sure as that the great luminary of day is now rolling
down the western declivity to set in the briny sheet of the Pacific ocean, so
sure will strife, anarchy, and desolation follow.
Id.
439 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
440 Id. at 495.
441 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
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tance.442 If some States disobeyed the Court's order, what could the
Court do? If Congress or the President did not back up the Court, the
Court would appear weak. If Congress and the President coerced the
States and the States violently resisted, the national government would
appear tyrannical. Either way, the consequences of forcing a conflict
with the States appeared unacceptable at that time.
In the face of these arguments, proponents of the districting re-
quirement tried to diffuse the commandeering issue by denying that
the bill would commandeer the States. 43 The bill's supporters re-
peatediy argued that it was not the districting requirement that com-
manded the States to act, but rather the Constitution that did so.444
The Constitution required that States regulate federal elections in the
first instance. Thus, States are always under a constitutional duty to
make whatever laws necessary to hold federal elections. After passage
of the districting requirement, States remain under that duty, and
drawing districts is one of the laws States must enact to hold federal
elections. So, Congress merely states that the elections shall be done
by districts, while the Constitution directs the States to do so.
The proponents were working with a slippery distinction that
misses what commandeering is all about.L " Commandeering was re-
jected for all of the reasons discussed above under history and struc-
442 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistane, 92 YAE LJ. 585, 609-12 (1983).
443 The proponents of the districting requirement also responded to all the other
constitutional and non-constitutional grounds for opposing the districting require-
ment mentioned above. See supra notes 405-23 and accompanying text.
444 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 408 (1842) (statement of Rep. Pen-
dleton of Ohio) (stating that the apportionment act does not direct "that the State
Legislatures shall divide their States into districts; the obligation upon them to do that
comes from a higher source-the Constitution of the United States"). This argument
is different from the Seventh Circuit's argument discussed above. See supra notes
341-56 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the National
Voter Registration Act commandeers the States, but concluded that the Tunes, Places
and Manner Clause grants Congress power to do so. &e Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for
Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995). The proponents of the dis-
tricting requirement, on the other hand, argued that their bill does not commandeer
the States. Id. app. at 319 (statement of Rep. Butler of South Carolina) (stating that
the apportionment act did not "order the States what they shall or shall not do," but
that the Constitution imposed an obligation on the States to regulate federal elec-
tions). Rather, their bill merely set the ground rules for federal elections, as Congress
is authorized to do, and the Constitution commanded the States to act. Id. app. at
492 (statement of Sen. Huntington of Connecticut) (stating that "Congress may (as
they propose to do) make one regulation, and then the Constitution imposes the duty
on the States to make all other proper and requisite regulations to enable the people
to be represented in the National Legislature").
445 Of course we cannot fault the proponents for not addressing commandeering
as the Court has defined the problem over 150 years later. My criticism is rather
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ture.44 6  The proponents' verbal sleight of hand-that the
Constitution commandeers the States and not Congress-ultimately
fails because the districting requirement raises all the same problems
as commandeering. To see this point, consider three of the problems
associated with commandeering: it forces States to legislate when they
would not otherwise do so, it forces States to take responsibility for a
policy choice that they did not make themselves, and it is practically
unenforceable. The districting requirement raises all three problems.
States that had at-large election systems were forced to legislate when
they would not have otherwise done so, and those States were forced
to enact a policy-districts over at-large elections-they had not cho-
sen. And, as discussed at length above, 4 4 7 the command to elect the
House by districts is practically unenforceable if the States refuse. If it
walks like commandeering and quacks like commandeering, it is
probably commandeering.
After all of the proponents' and opponents' arguments were
made, and the debates were over, both houses of Congress ultimately
passed the Apportionment Act of 1842, section 2 of which required
election of the House by single-member districts.448 The House vote
was 101 to 99, 449 and the Senate vote was 25 to 19.450 Once passed,
the bill was off to President Tyler for his signature or veto.451 While
Tyler signed the bill into law, he did so reluctantly and with reserva-
tions about the constitutionality of the districting requirement. In a
message accompanying his signing of the bill, Tyler wrote:
One of the prominent features of the bill is that which purports to
be mandatory on the States to form districts for the choice of Repre-
sentatives to Congress in single districts. That Congress itself has
power, by law, to alter State regulations respecting the manner of
holding elections for Representatives, is clear; but its power to com-
mand the states to make new regulations, or alter their existing reg-
ulations, is the question upon which I felt deep and strong doubts.
intended to take the argument on its merits in the event that it is urged today In
support of the districting requirement.
446 See supra Part II.B-C.
447 See supra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
448 See infra Statutory Appendix for the text of the districting requirement.
449 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 471 (1842). This was the vote count on the
districting provision itself, which was only one section of the apportionment bill. Id.
The House later passed the entire bill, but no vote count was listed in the legislative
record. Id. The House later voted to concur in tvo Senate amendments to the bill,
Id. at 649-50.
450 Id. at 614.




I have yielded these doubts, however, to the opinion of the Legisla-
ture, giving effect to their enactment as far as depends on my appro-
bation, and leaving questions which may arise hereafter, (if
unhappily such should arise,) to be settled by full consideration of
the several provisions of the Constitution and the laws, and the au-
thority of each House to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifi-
cations of its own members.452
Despite reservations about the bill's constitutionality,453 Tyler felt
pressed to sign the bill. Undoubtedly, the fast-approaching elections
of 1842 had some influence on his decision. After all, the first section
of the bill apportioned the House among the several states, which was
a necessary prerequisite for the coming elections. Vetoing the Appor-
tionment Act could have wreaked havoc on the 1842 elections.
With apportionment and the districting requirement in a single
bill, Tyler appeared to face an unpleasant choice: disrupt the mid-
term congressional elections or accept the constitutionally disagreea-
ble districting requirement. Tyler's message, however, attempted a
middle ground: unconditionally accept the apportionment part of the
bill, and postpone ultimate consideration of the districting requirement
until after the 1842 election. Perhaps Tyler foresaw the political pos-
sibilities. First, the Whigs, who had pushed hard for the districting
requirement, would lose seats in the House, where the requirement
had passed by a narrow 101-99 margin. Second, some States would
keep the at-large system for electing House members, either because
time was too short to district their States before the 1842 election or
out of principled objection to the constitutionality of the districting
requirement. Third, when the representatives from the at-large states
arrived at the new Congress, the House would have the power to de-
cide whether to seat these new members, even though they were
elected in violation of the districting requirement. In making that de-
cision, the House could again consider the constitutionality of the dis-
tricting requirement. This is what Tyler meant when he wrote that the
constitutionality of the districting requirement would "be settled by
full consideration of the several provisions of the Constitution and the
laws, and the authority of each House to [be] judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members." 45
452 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 559 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Campbell) (quoting signing statement of President Tyler).
453 John Quincy Adams authored a committee report that responded to the con-
stitutional arguments in Tyler's signing message. See H.R. REP. No. 27-909 (1842).
454 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 559 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Campbell) (quoting signing statement of President Tyler).
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So, the Apportionment Act of 1842 could be seen as only the first
round in the fight over the constitutionality of the districting require-
ment. After sharp debates over the constitutionality of the require-
ment and a close vote in both chambers of Congress, President Tyler
reluctantly signed the law under a practical exigency and entreated
the country to take up the question anew after the next election. As
the next Subsection shows, President Tyler got his wish.
2. Election Contest of 1844
In 1842 and 1843, state voters once again went to the polls to
elect the House of Representatives. 455 This time, federal law required
that States hold House elections by using single-member districts. Re-
call that one political reason for this requirement was the Whig belief
that the district system favored their party, while the at-large system
favored the Democrats.456 The thought was that States with a narrow
Democrat majority would elect all Democrat representatives under an
at-large system, whereas those same States would have at least some
Whig districts under a single-member district system. Yet, in what may
rank as one of American history's great ironies, the district system con-
tributed to the Whigs suffering what one historian has called "one of
the most staggering reversals in off-year congressional elections ever
witnessed in American history. '457 The Whigs went from a 133-102
majority in the House to a 79-142 minority position in that body.458
But, how did things go so horribly wrong for the Whigs? The
seeds of their problem were sown in state elections held in 1842. Re-
call that state governments must do the districting; after all, they are
the ones being commandeered. The Whigs, however, lost miserably
in most of the state elections held prior to the districting.45 9 Thus, it
was Democrat controlled state legislatures and Democrat governors
that drew the district lines in most states. Not surprisingly, the Demo-
crats gerrymandered House districts whenever they could, just as
455 Given that the Apportionment Act was passed so late in the congressional term
(June 25, 1842), some States could not convene their legislatures to reapportion the
States in time to hold their elections in 1842. See HOLT, supra note 397, at 157. Also,
some districting battles were so divisive and protracted that they dragged on into
1843. Id. ("The political battle waged over reapportionment was so fierce that several
states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maine, and Vermont, which would have
held elections in 1842, were forced to postpone them until 1843.").
456 See supra notes 405-12 and accompanying text.





many feared the Whigs would do under a district system.460 In many
of these states, the Whigs maintained about the same percentage of
the total vote, but saw a decreased share of representatives. 461 And, in
one particularly stark example, Whigs actually increased their percent-
age of the total vote in North Carolina, "[b]ut because Democrats had
designed the districts, the Whig share of seats fell from seven of thir-
teen to four of nine."462
So, it was a Democrat controlled House that reconsidered the
constitutionality of the districting requirement. The issue arose
quickly. Despite the districting requirement, four States-Georgia,
Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire46 3-had chosen their rep-
resentatives in at-large elections. 464 When the Clerk of the House
called the roll at the opening of the Twenty-Eighth Congress, one
member objected to seating the representatives elected at large."1
The issue whether to seat these members ultimately turned on the
460 Id. at 157 ("Where Democrats controlled [state] legislatures, the Whigs were
the losers from the reapportionment process.").
461 Id. ("[R]elatively small declines in the Whig share of the total popular vote in
Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, and New York produced disproportionately large declines in
their share of seats.").
462 Id-
463 See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1843). Of course, a State with only
one representative would necessarily hold an at-large election for the House, and
such an election did not violate the 1842 Apportionment Act. Representative John
Jameson of Mifissouri explained that the districting requirement was unfair because it
was "passedjust upon the eve of a congressional election in two or three of the States,
against the solemn warning that there could not be time for complying uith its provi-
sions before the election." Id. at 45.
464 Although Ohio and New York had elected their representatives by districts,
their legislatures nonetheless passed resolutions condemning the districting require-
ment. Paschal, supra note 26, at 282 n.34; see Con. Res., 65th Leg., 1842 N.Y. Laws
420; H.R_, 41st Gen. Assem., 1843 Ohio Laws 239.
465 CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1843). The report states,
Mr. Campbell of South Carolina observed that, before the Clerk proceeded
to the call of the members from New Hampshire, he would, uith their per-
mission, take the liberty of directing their attention to the second section of
the apportionment act [requiring election by single-member districts], and
would respectfully inquire of them whether they had been elected in con-
formity with the provisions of that act.
Id. A representative from New York also objected to election of a Speaker of the
House unless those representatives elected at large were removed from the House.
See id. at 9-10 (remarks of Rep. Barnard). This objection supposedly had the support
of about fifty other House members. See id. at 10 (listing members supporting Repre-
sentative Bamard's objection).
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constitutionality of the districting requirement. 466 Instead of debating
the issue at the outset of the new Congress, 467 the House referred the
matter to the Committee of Elections, 468 which later issued a report
with its conclusions.469 The remainder of this Subsection considers
the Committee's majority and minority reports as well as House action
on whether to seat the members elected at large.
The Majority Report of the Committee of Elections concluded
that the districting requirement was "not a law made in pursuance of
the constitution of the United States, and valid, operative, and bind-
ing upon the States."470 Of all the constitutional objections to the dis-
tricting requirement mentioned above, 471 the Committee rested its
conclusion solely on the fact that Congress had commandeered the
States to act. In a brief report that reads like a judicial opinion, the
Committee raised several arguments against Congress's power to com-
mandeer the States, which we will consider in turn.
The Majority Report begins with the history and text of the
Times, Places and Manner Clause. It reviewed the history, discussed
above, showing that Congress's power under the Clause was intended
to protect against abuse, neglect, or disability of the States in regulat-
ing federal elections.472 Yet, the text does not limit Congress's power
0
466 See id. at 11 (statement of Rep. Kennedy of Indiana) (arguing that "[t]he Con-
gress of the United States had no power to pass any such law" requiring States to draw
districts). The Committee of Elections framed the issue as follows: "the State laws and
all the proceedings under them are void, or the second section of the apportionment
act [requiring election by districts] is invalid and inoperative." H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at
2 (1844). The report of a minority of the committee framed the issue similarly: "The
elections of New Hampshire, Georgia, Mississippi, and Missouri, must consequently
be void, unless the law of Congress is unconstitutional, or from some other cause is
inoperative." COMM. OF ELEcrnONS, REPORT or THE MINORITY, H.R REP. No. 28-60
(1844), reprinted in Comis. OF ELECTIONS, CoNTEsED ELEGTIONS IN CONGRESS FROM
1834 To 1865, INcLUsIVE, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 38-57, at 55, 56 (1865) [hereinafter
MINoRITY REPORT].
467 CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1843) (regarding the debate over
whether the House should refer to committee the question of whether representatives
elected at large should be seated).
468 Id. at 46 (setting forth the resolution referring the matter to the Committee of
Elections).
469 Id. at 173 (stating that the Committee of Elections referred its report to the
Committee of the Whole House).
470 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 10 (1844).
471 See supra notes 419-23 and accompanying text.
472 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 3-5 (1844) (stating that Congress should regulate only
"in the event that the States should refuse to act in the premises, or should legislate in




to those circumstances. 473 Thus, while history may bear on whether
Congress should exercise its power under the Clause, text shows that
Congress's power is broad enough to reach districting regardless of
what the States have done.474 Then, in an analytical move that fore-
shadowed the Court's analysis in New York v. United States, the Report
refrained the issue: "[S]till the question arises, whether the [district-
ing requirement] is an exercise of this power in a manner contem-
plated by the constitution, and binding by the States."475 Like the
Court in New York v. United States, the Majority Report concedes that
Congress has power over the subject matter being regulated-radioac-
tive waste in New York v. United States, districting in the Majority Re-
port. The question remains, however, whether Congress has the
power to regulate that subject in the manner that Congress has done
so-in both cases, by commandeering the States. The Majority Report
then turned to this question.
The Majority Report first discussed the relationship among Con-
gress, the States, and the Constitution. The Constitution grants both
the States and Congress power over federal elections, and each gov-
ernment acts autonomously within its respective sphere of power. 476
The Constitution, however, does not grant either level of government
the power to control or supervise the other. The following passage
from the Majority Report elaborates this point.
The right to change State laws, or to enact others which shall sus-
pend them, does not imply the right to compel the State Legisla-
tures to make such changes or new enactments. Whatever power
the Legislatures possess over elections, they derive from the consti-
tution, and not from the laws of the United States. Congress has no
more authority to direct the form of State legislation, than the
States have to dictate to Congress its rule of action. Each is supreme
within the sphere of its own peculiar duties; clothed with the power
of legislation, and a discretion as to the manner in which it shall be
exercised, with which the other cannot interfere by ordering it to be
exercised in a different manner.477
473 Id. at 5.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 This argument is similar to one of the structural arguments made above on
federalism. See supra notes 363-68 and accompanying text.
477 H.P RrP. No. 28-60, at 6 (1844).
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The Constitution stands above both Congress and the States, and,
with respect to the exercise of their respective powers, those two gov-
ernments stand independent, side-by-side.478
Next, the Report reviewed constitutional history, specifically the
problems with government under the Articles of Confederation. This
portion of the Report parallels the Court's opinion in New York v.
United States. Both review the same historical concern (flaws in the
Articles of Confederation), rely on the same historical source (Federal-
ist No. 15), and draw the same conclusion (Congress cannot comman-
deer the States). These striking resemblances show the Majority
Report applying the same anti-commandeering argument discussed in
New York v. United States to the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Fur-
ther, these similarities undercut any attempt to distinguish the Times,
Places and Manner Clause from the Commerce Clause regarding
commandeering. Now, consider the parallel more closely.
Recall that under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was
weak because it acted through the States, which routinely ignored
Congress's requests.479 The Report recounts this problem:
The great radical evil in the articles of confederation, which led to
the adoption of the present constitution, was the constant collisions
between the Federal and State Governments, produced by the laws
of the former operating upon the latter in their corporate and sov-
ereign capacities, instead of binding the people individually. The
consequence was, that, whenever Congress passed laws requiring
the States to furnish their quotas of men, munitions of war, or reve-
nue, or to perform any other act necessary to the defence of the
country, or the existence of the Government, those laws could not
be executed-were inoperative-a mere dead letter upon the stat-
ute-book, until the several Legislatures assembled, and gave them
life by enacting State laws to carry them into effect. If the laws of
the confederation were supposed to be unjust to a particular por-
tion of the country, or to operate unequally and oppressively upon
particular States, such States refused to make provision for their ex-
ecution, and thus suspended their operation.48 0
This passage contains strikingly similar wording to a passage from Fed-
eralist No. 15, which begins, "The great and radical vice in the con-
478 I emphasize the word "exercise" because the Constitution explicitly makes the
product of the federal law making processes supreme over the product of state law
making processes. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This point was discussed earlier in con-
nection with the Seventh Circuit's decision upholding the Motor Voter Law. See supra
notes 341-56 and accompanying text.
479 See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
480 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 6-7 (1844).
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struction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPO-
RATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished
from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist."481 Recall that Federal-
ist No. 15 is Hamilton's critique of Congress acting through the States,
of which he takes a dismal view.48 2 Herein lies the link to New York, v.
United States. The same passage from Federalist No. 15 figures promi-
nently in the Court's opinion in New York v. United States, which quotes
those words in full.483 Thus, both the Report and New York v. United
States identify the same historical problem confronting the Framers:
how to construct an effective national government given the abject
failure of commandeering under the Articles of Confederation.
Both the Report and New York v. United States identify the same
solution to the Framers' problem. The Report describes the solution
as follows:
To remedy these perilous evils, and to give force, vigor, and vitality
to the Government, the whole system was changed in the formation
of the constitution, by distinctly separating the powers of the Fed-
eral and State Governments-making each supreme in its appropri-
ate sphere, and giving the former, as well as the latter, the power of
executing its own laws, by making them operate upon the people
directly and individually, without the intervention of the State
Legislatures.484
New York v. United States made the same point.485 The Report, then,
applies the same anti-commandeering reasoning found in New York v.
United States to the Times, Places and Manner Clause.48 6 In the Com-
mittee's view, there was no good reason to distinguish Congress's
power under that Clause from Congress's other Article I powers.487
Indeed, its Report expressly analogizes Congress's Times, Places and
Manner Clause power to Congress's power under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 to regulate bankruptcy.488 The Report explains first that
481 THE FEDERAusr No. 15, supra note 111, at 108 (Alexander Hamilton). The
connection to Federalist No. 15 becomes explicit when the Report quotes that particu-
lar paper at length regarding the States' refusal to cooperate with Congress. See H.R.
REP. No. 28-60, at 7 (1844).
482 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
483 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992).
484 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 7 (1844).
485 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
486 See H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 8 (1844).
487 See id.
488 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 4 ("The Congress shall have the Power... To estab-
lish . . . uniform La1s on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States .... ."); H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 8 (1844).
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Congress cannot commandeer the States under the Bankruptcy
Clause, and then asks rhetorically: "If this cannot be done in a case of
bankruptcy, upon what principle is it that Congress may direct the
legislative discretion of the States in regard to elections?" 489 Again,
the Committee argues that an anti-commandeering rule applies to all
of Congress's powers.
The Report's final argument against commandeering relied on
the absence of prior government practice. As members of Congress
had done in the 1842 debates over the districting requirement, the
Report pointed out that Congress had never previously comman-
deered the States:
This view of the subject is strengthened and confirmed by the uni-
form practice of the Government from the time of the adoption of the
constitution to the passage of the act under consideration, a little
more than a year ago.
If the doctrine contended for in the [districting requirement]
be correct, it is a remarkable fact, that, during the whole period of
our constitutional history, Congress has never exercised, or claimed
the right to exercise, the power of directing the form of State legis-
lation. It is said that, in the exercise of doubtful powers under the
constitution, the safest rule of construction is to be found in the
practical exposition of the Government itself, in all its various
branches and departments, where the practice has been uniform,
and the acquiescence of the people general. 490
Congress's "uniform practice" was a "practical exposition" of the Con-
stitution that Congress could not commandeer the States, and this
"practical exposition" should be honored on close questions. As dis-
cussed above, the Supreme Court used this interpretative guide in
New York v. United States when it claimed that Congress had not previ-
ously commandeered the States. 491 With the single exception of the
districting requirement itself, the Report bolsters not only the Court's
historical claim, but also the use of past government practice as an
interpretive tool.
Based on these arguments, a majority of the Committee voted
that the districting requirement was unconstitutional and thus the
House should seat the members elected at large.492 A minority of the
Committee, however, submitted a report supporting the districting re-
quirement. 493 Most of the Minority Report addressed other objec-
489 H.R. R.P. No. 28-60, at 8 (1844).
490 Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
491 See supra text accompanying note 149.
492 H.R. REP. No. 28-60, at 10 (1844).
493 MINORrTY REPORT, supra note 466, at 69.
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tions to the districting requirement, such as Congress's power to
address districting at all.4 94 Commandeering 'was addressed only in
the following brief passage: "The Constitution of the United States,
(which every member of the State legislatures swears to support
before he enters upon his duties,) and not the law of Congress, is the
mandamus which, in silent but impressive language, perpetually holds
all to the performance of this duty."495 This is the same argument
made by proponents of the districting requirement in debates over
the Apportionment Act of 1842; the nature and weaknesses of this
argument are discussed above.496 Based on their view that the district-
ing requirement was constitutional, a minority of the Committee rec-
ommended that the members elected at large not be seated.497
After the Committee submitted its reports, the House took up
debate over whether to seat the members elected at large. The debate
focused on the constitutionality of the districting requirement, and
the members basically rehashed the arguments made during the origi-
nal debate over the Apportionment Act of 1842. Opponents of the
districting requirement labeled that law as a command to the States493
494 See id at 58. These other constitutional issues were described above. &ezsupra
notes 417-23 and accompanying text. For example, the Minority Report addressed
whether the districting requirement was unconstitutionally vague, MNoamn' REPORT,
supra note 466, at 65, whether Congress had to regulate all aspects of federal elections
or none at all, id. at 61-64, and whether prior government practice weighed against
the districting requirement, id at 65-66. The Minority Report also responded to the
non-constitutional argument that some state legislatures did not have time to meet
following passage of the Apportionment Act of 1842 and thus could not draw the
necessary districts. Id. at 66.
495 NiNoRrry REPORT, supra note 466, at 65.
496 See supra notes 443-47 and accompanying text.
497 MrNonm REPORT, supra note 466, at 69.
498 Se, &g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 243 (1844) (statement of Rep.
Woodward) (contending that Congress "had not the power to district the States them-
selves; and if they had, they had no right to coerce the legislation of the States"); id. at
237 (statement of Rep. Elmer) (arguing that "though [Congress] might pass a law
prescribing a rule of action for the people of the United States, they had no power to
pass a law directing the State legislatures to act in the matter, and, therefore, the law
of the last Congress was void, and not binding on the States"); id. at 266 (statement of
Rep. Rathbun) (arguing that "Congress had neither 'made' nor 'altered' regulations
for the election of members to this House by the second section of the apportion-
ment law, within the meaning of the clause in the constitution; and that no power
existed to control the obedience of the State legislatures"). Representative Catlin
argued:
But it is said that the second section of the act under consideration is not
mandator--that the States may pass the necessary laws to secure an election
by districts, or they may refuse to pass them; but if they refuse the people of
the States so refusing shall be shut out from a representation in this hall. If
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and argued that Congress could not issue such commands because
the Constitution broke with the Articles of Confederation by rejecting
such commands; such commands could not be enforced; and the text
of the Times, Places and Manner Clause granted Congress the power
to "make" or "alter" election regulations, not to direct the States to do
so. Proponents of the districting requirement argued that the Consti-
tution, not Congress, commanded the States to act. All familiar
arguments.
While none of the arguments were different, the outcome was.
On a largely party line vote, the House approved the seating of each
representative elected at large.49 9 Though the House neither ap-
proved the Committee's report nor adopted a resolution condemning
the districting requirement,500 its message was clear. The sole basis
argued for seating the members elected at large was that the district-
ing requirement was unconstitutional commandeering. By seating
those members, the House implicitly endorsed that rationale.
In sum, the House proceedings of 1844 provide a second prece-
dent on commandeering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
this time against that power. In trying to embrace either the 1842 or
1844 precedent, the temptation might be to over- or under-emphasize
the role of politics. While one could deride the 1844 outcome as
merely partisan politics, that same charge could be made against the
1842 passage of the districting requirement itself. Unless we have
some reason to give Whig politics greater weight than Democratic
politics, both precedents, however political, ought to carry the same
force. Conversely, one ought not give greater weight to the 1844judg-
ment of the House. On the surface, one could argue that the House
in 1844 suddenly realized that commandeering could not be effec-
tively enforced and, on that basis, implicitly repudiated any claim to
that power. Yet, that reading ignores politics-the Whigs supported
the power when they controlled Congress, the Democrats opposed it
this is not the language of a mandamus, it is the language of the highway--
"your money or your lifer-"your legislation or your liberties." Is this the
language which Congress may address to the sovereign States in this confed-
eracy? Is this the tone and bearing with which Congress may approach the
people of the States? No, sir.
Id. at 259.
499 Id. at 279-80, 283.
500 The legislative record shows that there were enough votes to pass such a resolu-
tion, if it had been properly put before the House. When the resolution was offered,
however, it would have required a two-thirds vote to suspend the House's rules and
proceed to consideration of the resolution. See id. at 283. While a majority of the




when they took over the House.50 1 The reality lies somewhere in be-
tween: Two opposing parties held opposite views on a divisive constitu-
tional issue, which they implemented when given the chance. Thus,
government practice from this initial period is equivocal: approval fol-
lowed immediately by rejection of commandeering.
3. Subsequent Reapportionment
The House returned to the constitutionality of the districting re-
quirement in three subsequent election contests. We consider each
contest in turn.
First, in the election contest styled Phelps and Cavanaugh, the
House considered whether to seat two members from Minnesota.502
In 1857, in anticipation of gaining statehood, the Territory of Minne-
sota held congressional elections using the at-large system. 503 When
the State's two representatives appeared at the Thirty-Fifth Con-
gress,5 0 4 the question arose whether Minnesota's at-large election vio-
lated the districting requirement of the Apportionment Act of
1842.505 The Committee of Elections report resolved this question
based on House precedent and prior government practice. The re-
port explained:
The obligation of [the districting requirement] wras brought in
question by the next Congress after it was passed, in a contest of the
seats and the members returned from the States of New Hampshire,
Georgia, Mississippi, and Missouri; and the Committee of Elections,
to whom the subject was referred, reported a resolution as follows:
501 See it at 236 (describing a statement of Representative Kennedy of Indiana
"that... he would venture to make one prediction, and that was, when the vote came
to be taken, all the Whig members would vote against the gentlemen who were
elected under the general-ticket system, and all the democratic members would vote
for them").
502 See D.W. BARTm'rr, CASES OF ComTS= ELECT[ONS IN CONCa.SS, FRO.t 1834
TO 1865, INcLuSIVE, H... Misc. Doc. No. 38-57, at 248 (1865).
503 Id. at 248-49. Another issue was the validity of a congressional election held
prior to statehood. Id- at 249. The Report of the Committee of Elections stated, "An
objection is urged to the right of the claimants to their seats on the ground that their
election was prior to the admission of the State into the Union." Id. The Committee
of Elections concluded that pre-statehood elections were %alid. Id.
504 The territory had elected three representatives, but only two were sent to Con-
gress when Minnesota was allocated two representatives upon statehood. Id. at 250.
505 See id at 249 ("Another objection urged against the admission of the members
who claim seats in the House of Representatives from Mlinnesota is, because of their
election by general ticket instead of districts.").
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Resolved, That [the districting requirement] is not a law made
in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, and
valid, operative, and binding upon the States.
Upon the question of the admission of members of the States
named which had so elected their representatives by general ticket,
and not in accordance with the law, it was decided in the affirmative
by ayes 127, noes 57. This disposition of the question has never
been disturbed, although members elected under the general ticket
system have been upon this floor (with the exception, it is believed,
of three Congresses) ever since, and without objection. It seems
now too late to reopen the question.506
In this passage, the Committee used precedent and prior government
practice to conclude that the districting requirement was unconstitu-
tional. The precedent was the House's decision in the 1844 elections
contest, in which, as was discussed above, the House decided to seat
representatives who had been elected at large.50 7 The prior govern-
ment practice was the routine seating, without contest or opposition,
of representatives elected at large. In light of these two constitutional
arguments, it was "too late to reopen the question" whether Congress
could commandeer the States into drawing districts.508 The House
concurred, voting 135 to 63 to adopt the Committee's resolution seat-
ing the members from Minnesota. 509
The House reached the same conclusion in the second contested
election case, Davison vs. Gilbert.510 This election contest challenged
House elections in Kentucky.511 The Apportionment Act of 1872 had
restated the districting requirement, this time inserting an additional
requirement that the districts "contain[], as nearly as practicable, an
equal number of inhabitants."5 12 The challenged Kentucky district al-
legedly failed this test.5 13 In rejecting the election contest, the Com-
506 Id. at 249-50.
507 See supra notes 495-500 and accompanying text.
508 BARTLEr, supra note 502, at 250.
509 Id. at 251. The Committee's report concluded with a resolution that read In
pertinent part, "Resolved That W.W. Phelps and James M. Cavanaugh, claiming seats
as members of this house from the State of Minnesota, be admitted and sworn as
such .... " Id. at 250.
510 COMMrrMEE ON ELEaCToNs No. 1, DAvisoN VS. GILBERT, H.R. RE'. No. 56-3000
(1901).
511 Id. at 1.
512 For the full text of the Apportionment Act of 1872, see infra Statutory
Appendix.
513 See Comn-irrEE ON ELECTIONS No. 1, DAviSON VS. GILBERT, H.R. RE,. No. 56-
3000, at 1 (1901) (noting that the election contest alleged that the challenged district
.was contrary to the act of Congress apportioning Representatives among the States").
[VOL, 76 :2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
mittee once again concluded that Congress did not have the power to
direct the States to act. Consider the following passage from the Com-
mittee's report:
A remarkable and convincing speech is that made in the 27th Con-
gress by Nathan Clifford, then a Representative from Maine and af-
tenvards a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr.
Clifford argued with great cogency against the theory that Congress
had any such power as the act of 1842 undertook to express, and in
our opinion those arguments have never been satisfactorily
answered.514
Though the report does not cite to specific remarks of Representative
Clifford, it is likely the reference is to his remarks that Congress did
not have power to commandeer. Representative Clifford spoke force-
fully against Congress's power to commandeer the States.5 -5 The
Committee concluded that these arguments had never been satisfacto-
rily answered and that they overrode the fact that "Congress had legis-
lated" a districting requirement "for the last three decades."51
The third election contest, Parsons v. Saunders, generated the only
Committee report to support the districting requirement.- 17 That
contest challenged two Virginia congressional districts as violating the
then-existing requirement that congressional districts be compact,
contiguous, and, as nearly as practicable, contain equal population. - 8
Before the Committee on Elections, the contestee cited the election
contest in Davison vs. Gilbert as prior Committee precedent that the
districting requirement was not constitutional. - 19 The Committee re-
port rejected this argument on two bases.
First, the Committee cited the Supreme Court cases Ex parte Sie-
bold520 and Ex parte Yarbrougl, 21 as supporting the districting require-
514 Id. at 3.
515 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 347 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Clifford).
516 COM-MTr.E ON ELECTIONS NO. 1, DAVISON VS. GI.BERT, H.R. REP. No. 56-3000,
at 3-4 (1901). The Committee's report was presented to the House, see 56 CONc.
REC. 3478 (1901), but no further action appears in the legislative record.
517 See Co~mffrrEE ON ELECnONS No. 2, PARSONS V. SUNDERS, H.R. Doc. No. 64-
2052, at 49 (1917).
518 Id. at 43. For the full text of the districting requirement then in effect, see the
Apportionment Act of 1901 injra in Statutory Appendix.
519 CositnTrEE ON ELECrIONS No. 2, PARSONS V &AUNDERS, H.R. Doc. No. 64-
2052, at 48 (1917).
520 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
521 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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ment.522 But, as discussed above in Section D on precedent, neither
case decided whether Congress could commandeer under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause.5 23 Further, both cases contain language
that cuts against such a power, especially given the pro-state attitude
with which the Court currently reads its precedent. 24
Second, the Committee argued that Congress's continued enact-
ment of the districting requirement showed that body's belief in its
power to do so.525 But, each of these districting requirements was en-
acted without any debate on the issue. Also, during that time, Con-
gress had not enforced the provision, with members elected at large
seated in several Congresses.5 26 These statutes hardly count as a con-
sidered, firm judgment in favor of commandeering under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause.
In the end, the post-1844 government practice was just as equivo-
cal as that from the 1840s. Congress seemed to endorse the districting
requirement by including it in seven different apportionment statutes.
Yet, when the rubber met the road, in election contests or when mem-
bers arrived at each new Congress, the House repeatedly left the re-
quirement unenforced. 27 Either the House decided to seat members
elected at large, or those members' rights to their seats went unchal-
lenged.5 28 The requirement existed on paper, but not in practice; and
it is practice that is perhaps our best guide to Congress's understand-
ing of the Constitution.529 As our parents taught us when we were
children, sometimes actions speak louder than words.
522 COMMITrE ON ELECTONS No. 2, PARSONS V. SAUNDERS, H.R. Doc. No. 64-
2052, at 47-48 (1917).
523 See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
524 See Siebold 100 U.S. at 386-87.
525 COMMrrrEE ON ELECrIONS No. 2, PARSONS V. SAUNDERS, H.R. Doc. No. 64-
2052, at 48 (1917).
526 Elmer C. Griffith, Congressional Representation in South Dakota, 75 THE NATION
343, 343-44 (1902) (noting that at the time of writing, Washington and South Dakota
both elected House members at large even though both States were entitled to more
than one representative and that the House had repeatedly seated their members
nonetheless).
527 See Paschal, supra note 26, at 285 ("[A]Ithough the requirement for election by
districts was on the statute books for nearly ninety years, Congress never denied seats
to representatives elected at large.").
528 The one Committee report that upheld the districting requirement did not
turn away a member elected at large, but rather challenged the composition of the
State's districts. See supra notes 517-18 and accompanying text.
529 See Paschal, supra note 26, at 285 (stating that based on the fact that the House
never enforced the districting requirement, "it might be argued that the 1842 Act
was... null and void").
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G. Conclusion: A Return to Alden
Having considered the issue under several methods of interpreta-
tion, let us take stock of where we have been and where we are. We
started this Part with one of the Supreme Court's most recent federal-
ism cases, Alden v. Maine,530 which gave us a sort of federalism stan-
dard of review. According to Alden, States retained certain aspects of
sovereignty even after joining the Union. These aspects at least in-
clude a trio of protections against Congress commandeering state leg-
islatures,531 executives, 53 2 or courts.5 33 And, Congress cannot intrude
on these aspects of sovereignty unless there is "compelling evidence"
that the Constitution gives Congress the power to do so.5s4 New York
v. United States found no such evidence that Congress could comman-
deer state legislatures under its Commerce Clause power.537 The
question we are investigating is whether compelling evidence exists
that Congress can commandeer under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause.
None of the sources reviewed above-text, history, precedent,
structure, or prior government practice-provides much evidence,
much less "compelling" evidence, that Congress can commandeer
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. The Clause's text-Con-
gress can "make" or "alter" election "regulations"-suggests that Con-
gress must do the making or altering, not command others to do so.
History suggests that Congress's power over times, places and manner
was intended to help Congress overcome inaction or malfeasance by
the States; commandeering is ill-suited to serve this function. Prece-
dent offers dicta cutting against commandeering, but no Supreme
Court holding is directly on point. Structure reveals that comman-
deering under the Times, Places and Manner Clause would violate
principles of federalism, separation of powers, and representative gov-
ernment. And, prior government practice is at best equivocal, with
Congress and the House coming to conflicting decisions at different
times. On balance, even without Alden's presumption, these sources
of argument support extending New York v. United States's anti-com-
mandeering rule to the Times, Places and Manner Clause. When we
overlay Alden's state sovereignty presumption, this conclusion seems
unavoidable.
530 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
531 See UdL at 714 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
532 See id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
533 See id. at 759-60.
534 See id at 730-31.
535 505 U.S. 144, 162-66 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
In concluding, let us look both backward and forward. Looking
backward, we will ask the question that ended Part I: Should the Court
strike down the districting requirement, or should the Court use the
districting requirement as a reason to overrule New York v. United
States? Looking forward, we will consider some implications of strik-
ing down the districting requirement, identifying issues for further
study.
Given Part III's conclusion that Congress cannot commandeer
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, we return to the options
posed at the end of Part I. Recall that we identified three options.
Briefly restated, they are:
Option One: The Court's reasoning in New York v. United States is
weakened by the Apportionment Act of 1842; New York v. United States
should be overruled.
Option Two: The Court got it right in New York v. United States, and
the districting requirement is unconstitutional commandeering of
state legislatures.
Option Three: When it comes to commandeering, Congress's
Times, Places and Manner Clause power is different from its other
Article I powers. Thus, the Court got it right in New York v. United
States, and the districting requirement is constitutional.
Part III eliminates Option Three; none of the sources of constitu-
tional argument support distinguishing commandeering under the
Times, Places and Manner Clause from commandeering under Con-
gress's other Article I powers. So, do we extend New York v. United
States to the Times, Places and Manner Clause or discard it?
The answer should be apparent from both the weight of the argu-
ments in Part III as well as the Court's pro-state attitude in Alden. All
sources of constitutional argument considered in Part III indicate that
the districting requirement, not New York v. United States, is out of
place in the federalism universe. Alden's pro-state presumption only
bolsters this conclusion. Thus, when the Court acknowledges the dis-
tricting requirement as a prior instance of congressional comman-
deering, it should hold that Congress has no authority to pass that
requirement.
And now, looking to the future, a few words about what it might
mean for the Court to strike down the districting requirement. First,
consider the position of the States after such a holding. While they
would no longer have to elect their House members by districts, all
current state laws providing for election by districts would remain in
effect until the States changed those laws. So, immediately after the
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holding, nothing would change and no elections would need to be
postponed. The States would simply have the option, if they desired,
to change their election system to an at-large, multi-member district,
or some other system. Legislative inertia would probably result in
many States not even considering the issue. States either gaining or
losing representatives after the 2000 apportionment, however, would
have to confront the issue: either keep the district system and draw
new districts, or scrap that system in favor of another system.
States would not have an entirely free hand in deciding whether
to change from the single-member district system. First, States face
several constitutional restrictions on their choices. The Supreme
Court has held that the Apportionment Clause guarantees a principle
of one-person, one-vote.536 Under this line of cases, a State that uses
some form of a district system would have to ensure that the allocation
of representatives among those districts was, as nearly as practicable,
in proportion to the population of those districts. 537 For example,
consider a State that had six representatives to be elected in two dis-
tricts, one district electing four and the other electing two. To satisfy
the one-person, one-vote rule, the district electing four representa-
tives would have to have roughly (as nearly as practicable) twice the
population as the district electing two representatives. Othenvise, the
people of one district would be over-represented.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments place further restric-
tions on state choice of an electoral system. Generally speaking,
neither Amendment prohibits the use of an at-large or multi-member
district in state-ran elections. But, the Court has held that these
Amendments prohibit a State from using at-large or multi-member
district election systems with the intent to discriminate against voters
based on their race.538 In practice, however, such intent is hard to
prove. And, no inference of intentional discrimination should arise
simply from the fact that a State has changed from the single-member
district system for congressional elections. Indeed, given that the
States have not had a choice to change for over 150 years, many rea-
sons could explain a State's desire to experiment given its newfound
freedom.
Beyond the Constitution lies a second set of restrictions on a
State's power to change its electoral system-the Voting Rights Act of
536 SeeKirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,531 (1969) (appl)ing the one-person-
one-vote principle to congressional districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964) (same).
537 See Kirkpatrck, 394 U.S. at 530-31.
538 See White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
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1965.539 This statute requires that certain States submit any changes
in their electoral laws for "preclearance" by the Department of Jus-
tice.540 Department of Justice review is to ensure that none of the
changes dilutes or otherwise harms the voting power of racial
minorities.
Despite these constitutional and statutory protections, some
might fear that leaving States free to choose at-large or multi-member
districts might still leave minorities vulnerable to vote dilution and
other types of discrimination. As the ethnic and racial makeup of
many states changes, however, one must ask whether giving more
power to the States over congressional elections might not empower
racial and ethnic minorities. For example, consider an at-large system
where each party puts up a slate of representatives for an all-or-noth-
ing election. If a racial minority group is perceived as the swing vote
in an all-or-nothing election, that constituency could exert a powerful
influence over the parties' entire slate of candidates. In single-member
district elections, however, minorities could be corralled into a few
districts, with their influence limited to those districts. Whether this
scenario is likely or atypical is an empirical question for further study.
Another question for further study is what types of systems States
could enact with their newfound freedom. For example, consider an-
other proposal offered to enhance the voice of minority constituen-
cies: cumulative voting.541 Under a cumulative voting system, each
voter is entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of repre-
sentatives to be elected, and she may allocate her votes among the
different candidates. So, if a State were entitled to twelve representa-
tives, each voter would get twelve votes in that election. Each voter
then could allocate those twelve votes among the candidates as she
pleased, perhaps giving one candidate five of the votes and a second
candidate seven of the votes. By allocating their votes to a favored
candidate, minority constituencies could use cumulative voting to
elect that candidate. The question for further study is whether States
could enact cumulative voting or other non-traditional voting schemes
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
Another question for future study is whether Congress can invoke
another of its powers to commandeer the States to draw districts. One
obvious candidate is Congress's power to "enforce" the Fourteenth
539 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973c (1994).
540 Id. § 1973a(a).
541 See LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY FUNDAMENTAL FAiRNEss IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 14-16 (1994).
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and Fifteenth Amendments by "appropriate legislation."542 This
power itself raises important questions. A first issue is whether Con-
gress can use these enforcement powers to commandeer the States.r 3
In a related context, the Court has held that Congress can use its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate a State's
immunity from private damages suits in state and federal court.54 Re-
call that this immunity is part of the larger state sovereignty that in-
dudes the anti-commandeering rule. On this basis, one could
conclude that Congress should be able to overcome the anti-comman-
deering rule when using that power. Conversely, one could try to ar-
gue that the anti-commandeering rule is a different aspect of state
sovereignty and, on that basis, should not be subject to abrogation.
And, Alen would require "compelling evidence" that either the Four-
teenth or Fifteenth Amendments were intended to abrogate the
States' immunity from commandeering. 45 Further analysis is re-
quired to fully assess the extent of Congress's power here.
Even if Congress could commandeer under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments, the question remains whether a districting re-
quirement would be a law "enforcing" either Amendment. In the re-
cent case City of Boerne v. Flores,54 6 the Court read Congress's
enforcement power narrowly, holding that a law enforces those
Amendments only if the law is logically related to a violation of either
Amendment.547 Yet, neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibit all uses of at-large or multi-member district elec-
tions; neither type of election is unconstitutional unless intended to
discriminate against voters based on race. Thus, on its face, a blanket
districting requirement is not logically related to preventing or reme-
dying a constitutional violation. Instead, Congress would have to tar-
get uses of at-large or multi-member district systems that do or are
542 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). The Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees equal protection of the law, and the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits denial of the right to vote on account of race.
543 Caminker, supra note 156, at 238 (raising the question "whether Congress's
Section 5 power to 'enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions' of the Four-
teenth Amendment also authorizes Congress to conscript state officials to implement
federal mandates").
544 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
545 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999).
546 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
547 Id. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
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likely to discriminate against voters based on race.5 48 Whether Con-
gress could tailor a law to do so requires further study.
A final question for further study is whether state experimenta-
tion with voting systems would be constitutional or politically desira-
ble in the America of today. On the constitutional side, we could ask
whether intervening events over the last 150 years have somehow
transformed the districting requirement from a statutory requirement
into a constitutional mandate. Have events outside of an Article V
amendment enshrined districting in the Constitution?549 On the po-
litical side, we need to ask whether the upheaval of putting the dis-
tricting question back on the table would have a salutary or malign
effect on American politics. Would raising the question anew merely
distract and divide American government at a time when focus and
consensus building is needed? Or, at a time when we constantly gripe
about issues such as campaign finance, would debate over the district-
ing requirement compel us to take stock of where our politics are and
where they are going?
With that, we end the first part of my project. In this part, we
confronted a long-ignored question in constitutional law: Can Con-
gress require House districts? This question allowed us to explore the
Supreme Court's emerging federalism jurisprudence, exercise the
tools of constitutional argument, and raise the implications of even
asking the question. And, it is the implications raised in this Conclu-
sion that chart the future direction of the larger project.
548 The City of Boerne Court noted that the Voting Rights Act was so targeted be-
cause (1) the Voting Rights Act applied to voting regulations, like literacy tests, that
had often been used to discriminate against African-American voters, and (2) the Act
only applied to States with a history of discriminating against voters based on race. See
id. at 525-26, 532-33.
549 This type of extra-Article V constitutional change is explored in Professor
Bruce Ackerman's recent work. See generally AcKERMAN, supra note 375; 2 Bucm A.




This Appendix sets forth the text of each congressional district-
ing requirement enacted in the various apportionment statutes. Also,
when a districting requirement was not included in the next appor-
tionment statute, the text explains whether the prior districting re-
quirement nonetheless continued in effect.
1. Apportionment Act of 1842, Section 2
And be it further enacted, That in every case where a State is enti-
tled to more than one Representative, the number to which
each State shall be entitled under this apportionment shall be
elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in
number to the number of Representatives to which said State
may be entitled, no one district electing more than one
Representative.55 0
As section 2 applied only "under this apportionment," its districting
requirement lapsed upon the next apportionment unless carried for-
ward in the next apportionment law.5 51 The apportionment laws en-
acted after the 1850 census did not contain a districting
requirement,552 thus the States were free to choose the method of
election-at large, single-member districts, multi-member districts-
that they preferred.553
2. Apportionment Act of 1862
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That in each State entitled
in the next and any succeeding Congress to more than one rep-
resentative, the number to which such State is or may be here-
after entitled shall be elected by districts composed of
contiguous territory, equal in number to the number of repre-
sentatives to which said State may be entitled in the Congress
for which said election is held, no one district electing more
than one representative .... 554
550 Act ofJune 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c (1994)).
551 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3117 (1862) (statement of Sen. Trum-
bull) (stating that the 1842 apportionment "law which required the election by single
districts was a temporary law. It applied only to one census").
552 See Act of July 30, 1852, ch. 74, 10 Stat. 25 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)); Act of May 23, 1850, ch. 11, §§ 20-26, 9 Stat. 428, 432-33 (current version at
2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994)).
553 See Wesberryv. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 42 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (noting
that the 1842 districting "requirement was later dropped" in the 1850 apportionment
laws).
554 Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)). The size of the House and apportionment of its members were set forth in a
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3. Apportionment Act of 1872, Section 2
That in each State entitled under this law to more than one
Representative, the number to which said States may be enti-
tled in the forty-third, and each subsequent Congress, shall be
elected by districts composed of contiguous territory, and con-
taining as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants,
and equal in number to the number of Representatives to
which said States may be entitled in Congress, no one district
electing more than one Representative .... 5
4. Apportionment Act of 1882, Section 3
That in each State entitled under this apportionment the num-
ber to which such State may be entitled in the Forty-eighth and
each subsequent Congress shall be elected by Districts com-
posed of contiguous territory, and containing as nearly as prac-
ticable an equal number of inhabitants, and equal in number
to the Representatives to which such State may be entitled in
Congress, no one District electing more than one
Representative .... 556
5. Apportionment Act of 1891, Section 3
That in each State entitled under this apportionment the num-
ber to which such State may be entitled in the Fifty-third and
separate statute. See Act of Mar. 4, 1862, ch. 36, 12 Stat. 353 (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 26 (1994)). The remainder of the Act made special exceptions to the dis-
tricting requirement for elections of representatives from Illinois and California to
the Thirty-Eighth Congress. Id. These exceptions were needed because neither State
would have an intervening state legislative session between apportionment and the
next federal election in which to draw new districts. See CONc. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3117 (1862) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that the exception for Cali-
fornia is "[flor the next Congress only. It is made for the reason that California has
not districted, and I understand her Legislature does not convene in time"); id. (state-
ment of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that the exception for Illinois was made "[tio avoid
convening the Legislature for th[e express purpose" of re-districting to accommo-
date an additional representative apportioned to that State).
555 Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28, 28 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2C
(1994)). The remainder of the statute provided for the contingency that a state legis-
lature would not be able to draw new districts before the next federal election under
the new apportionment. Id. Under those circumstances, a State whose number of
representatives increased could elect those additional representatives at large. Id.
556 Act of Feb. 25, 1882, ch. 20, § 3, 22 Stat. 5, 6 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)). The remainder of the statute provided for the contingency that a state legis-
lature would not be able to draw new districts before the next federal election under
the new apportionment. Id. Under those circumstances, a State whose number of
representatives remained the same could elect under existing districts (even though
population shifts since the last apportionment might have made the districts unequal
in inhabitants); a State entitled to additional representatives may elect those addi-
tional representatives at large; and a State entitled to fewer representatives may elect
all its representatives at large. Id.
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each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts com-
posed of contiguous territory and containing as nearly as prac-
ticable an equal number of inhabitants. The said districts shall
be equal to the number of the Representatives to which such
State may be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more
than one Representative.5 57
6. Apportionment Act of 1901, Section 3
That in each State entitled under this apportionment, the num-
ber to which such State may be entitled in the Fifty-eighth and
each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts com-
posed of contiguous and compact territory and containing as
nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The said
districts shall be equal to the number of the Representatives to
which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one district
electing more than one Representative.558
7. Apportionment Act of 1911, Section 3
That in each State entitled under this apportionment to more
than one Representative, the Representatives to the Sixty-third
and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts com-
posed of contiguous and compact territory, and containing as
nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The said
districts shall be equal to the number of Representatives to
557 Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 116, § 3, 26 Stat. 735, 735 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c (1994)). Section 4 provided for the contingency that a state legislature would
not be able to draw new districts before the next federal election under the new ap-
portionment. Id. § 4, 26 Stat. at 736. Under those circumstances, a State whose num-
ber of representatives remained the same could elect under existing districts (even
though population shifts since the last apportionment might have made the districts
unequal in inhabitants), and a State entitled to additional representatives may elect
those additional representatives at large. Id. The statute did not address the case of a
State entitled to fewer representatives, in all likelihood because the 1891 apportion-
ment did not reduce the representation of any state. Compare Act of Feb. 25, 1882,
§ 1, 22 Stat. at 5-6 (setting forth the number of representatives for each state for the
1882 apportionment), with Act of Feb. 7, 1891, § 1, 26 Stat. at 735 (setting forth the
number of representatives for each state for the 1891 apportionment).
558 Act ofJan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c (1994)). Section 4 provided for the contingency that a state legislature would
not be able to draw new districts before the next federal election under the new ap-
portionment Id. § 4,31 Stat. at 734. Under those circumstances, a State whose num-
ber of representatives remained the same could elect under existing districts (even
though population shifts since the last apportionment might have made the districts
unequal in inhabitants); a State entitled to additional representatives may elect those
additional representatives at large; and a State entitled to fewer representatives may
elect all their representatives at large. Id.
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Which such State may be entitled in Congress, no district elect-
ing more than one Representative. 55 9
When the Act ofJune 18, 1929, which set forth a reapportionment of
the House, did not contain a districting requirement,56 0 the question
arose whether the districting requirement in the 1911 Act carried for-
ward and applied to the apportionment under the 1929 Act. Because
the 1911 districting requirement applied to "each subsequent Con-
gress," the requirement would seem to carry forward to subsequent
apportionments unless repealed. The Supreme Court, however, held
that the 1911 Act's districting requirement expired of its own terms
because it expressly applied only "'under this apportionment."' 5 61 As
further support for this conclusion, the Court cited the legislative his-
tory of the 1929 Act, in which Congress had debated and specifically
rejected a districting requirement.5 62
Subsequently, Congress twice amended the 1929 Act and carried
fonvard its provisions in 1940 and 1941, each time without adding a
districting requirement.56 3 And, with no requirement to elect House
members by district, in 1962, eight States entitled to more than one
representative elected all or some of their representatives at large.5 64
8. Act of December 14, 1967
In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any sub-
sequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative
559 Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 14 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(1994)). Section 4 provided for the contingency that a state legislature would not be
able to draw new districts before the next federal election under the new apportion-
ment. Id. § 4, 37 Stat. at 14. Under those circumstances, a State whose number of
representatives remained the same could elect under existing districts (even though
population shifts since the last apportionment might have made the districts unequal
in inhabitants), and a State entitled to additional representatives may elect those addi-
tional representatives at large. Id. The statute did not address the case of a State
entitled to fewer representatives, in all likelihood because the 1911 apportionment
did not reduce the representation of any state. Compare Act ofJan. 16, 1901, ch. 93,
§ 1, 31 Stat. at 733-34 (setting forth the number of representatives for each state for
the 1901 apportionment), withAct of Aug. 8, 1911, § 1, 37 Stat. at 13-14 (setting forth
the number of representatives for each state for the 1911 apportionment).
560 See Act ofJune 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26-27 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). Congress did not reapportion the House
after the 1920 census. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 43 (1964) (Harlan, J,,
dissenting).
561 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1932) (citing Act of Aug. 8, 1911, § 3).
562 Id. at 7-8 (citing 70 CONG. REc. 1496, 1499, 1584, 1602, 1604 (1929)).
563 SeeAct of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, 55 Stat. 761 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 2a-2b (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); Act of Apr. 25, 1940, ch. 152, 54 Stat. 162 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
564 See Wesbey, 376 U.S. at 20 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of
subsection (a) of section 22 of the Act ofJune 18,1929, entitled
"An Act to provide for apportionment of Representatives," (46
Stat. 26), as amended, there shall be established by law a num-
ber of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which
such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected
only from districts so established, no district to elect more than
one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to
more than one Representative and which has in all previous
elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Rep-
resentatives at Large to the Ninety-First Congress).rG7
This statute sets forth the districting requirement currently in
effect.56 6
565 Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581, 581 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994)).
566 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994).
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